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Abstract 
 
What explains the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards 
through the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)? This thesis 
addresses this question by analyzing the creation and strengthening of four of IOSCO’s 
international securities market standards between 1991 and 2010 relating to the following 
issues: the governance of cross-border financial crime, the objectives and principles of 
domestic securities market regulation, the regulation of credit rating agencies, and the 
regulation of hedge funds.  
 
This thesis argues that the creation and strengthening of these standards is derived from the 
role and influence of three different political actors: the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, and states. The role and influence of these 
different political actors differs across issue areas and across time. To account for the 
differentiated sources of international securities market standards, this thesis proposes a 
Principal-Agent (PA) analytical framework. Domestic legislatures (the principal) delegate to 
securities regulators (the agent) the authority to oversee and regulate domestic securities 
markets by granting regulators specific forms of statutory authority. Exercising discretion 
within this act of delegation, domestic securities regulators act together in a 
transgovernmental network to create and strengthen international securities market 
standards. They are prompted to act by threats to the integrity and stability of developed 
financial centers from under-regulated or ineffectively regulated foreign financial centers, as 
well as by new policy preferences of domestic legislatures seeking to regulate previously 
unregulated financial market actors. Domestic legislatures also use multiple agents to ensure 
that agents act consistent with their policy preferences: their concerns about the costs of 
under-regulated foreign jurisdictions can generate direct pressure from states on 
international financial regulatory institutions to strengthen the implementation of 
international financial standards. 
 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to existing literature by analyzing previously 
understudied international securities market standards. This thesis also makes a theoretical 
contribution to both IPE literature and PA theory within International Organization (IO) 
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literature. For IPE literature, this thesis establishes a theoretical framework that accounts for 
the differentiated role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators, domestic legislatures, and states in the creation and strengthening of international 
securities market standards. For PA theory within IO literature, this thesis highlights the role 
of the principled professional interests of the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators in creating and strengthening international securities market standards. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: IOSCO and the Politics of 
International Securities Market Standards 
 
Financial globalization is defined as the intensified integration of national financial markets. 
National financial markets have become increasingly interdependent and competitive 
through the removal of technological and regulatory barriers to the execution of trades and 
transactions across national borders. A central feature of this new epoch in international 
financial markets has been the rise of international financial regulatory institutions and the 
international financial standards they create to govern the global financial market system.  
 
A small sub-set of International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship has focused its 
research on understanding this phenomenon, and establishing analytical frameworks that 
explain the emergence of international financial regulatory institutions and the international 
financial standards they create. This thesis seeks to contribute to this specialist literature by 
analyzing the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) – the 
international institution responsible for governing global securities markets, which creates, 
promotes and, to some extent, enforces the adoption and enforcement of international 
securities standards.  
 
IOSCO has been relatively overlooked by existing literature. Although existing IPE 
scholarship has analyzed some of the international securities market standards that IOSCO 
has developed, it has neglected the creation of some of IOSCO’s key international financial 
standards and institutional initiatives to strengthen their implementation. This thesis seeks to 
address this empirical gap by undertaking an in-depth empirical study of IOSCO and four of 
its international securities market standards. 
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This thesis seeks to explain the creation and strengthening of four of IOSCO’s international 
securities market standards including:  
 
1. IOSCO’s Principles for Memoranda of Understanding created in September 1991 
and its strengthening with the creation of IOSCO’s Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding in May 2002 
 
2. IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Market Regulation created in 
September 1998 and its strengthening with the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology in 
October 2003  
 
3. IOSCO’s Principles for Credit Rating Agencies created in September 2003 and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies created in 
December 2004, and their strengthening through the creation of direct regulatory 
regimes for rating agencies in the U.S. and E.U. before and after the 2007/2008 
financial crisis 
 
4. IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation of Hedge Funds created in June 2009 and 
Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010; 
1.1 What explains the creation and strengthening of IOSCO’s international 
securities market standards? 
This thesis seeks to answer this central research question in order to contribute to the 
specialist IPE literature analyzing the politics of international financial regulation. Since the 
late 1980s, a specialist literature within IPE emerged to explain the international financial 
regulatory regime, focusing its analysis on understanding the creation and strengthening of 
international financial standards.  
 
Analytical approaches in IPE literature on international financial regulation can be 
categorized within three broad categories: interstate, domestic, and transnational. The three 
categories of IPE literature are differentiated by the three political arenas that are considered 
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to be the source of international financial regulation. Existing literature has made important 
contributions to our understanding of the politics of international financial regulation by 
identifying the relevant political actors involved in the creation of international financial 
standards, and the power of each actor in creating and enforcing those standards.  
 
Despite these important contributions, existing literature has a number of important 
limitations that warrant further study. As noted above, existing IPE scholarship has not 
analyzed a number of IOSCO’s financial standards and institutional initiatives to strengthen 
their implementation. IPE scholarship has also overlooked some important aspects of 
IOSCO’s international financial standards. Additionally, it has analyzed these standards in 
isolation from each other. In addressing these empirical limitations, this thesis also reveals 
important theoretical limitations of existing literature.  
  
Existing literature concludes that international securities standards are derived from three 
distinct political arenas: domestic, inter-state, and transnational political arenas. This thesis’ 
analysis of the creation and strengthening of four of IOSCO’s standards reveals that the 
influence of these three political arenas is different across issue areas and across time. 
Consistent with the recommendations of Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari’s 2011 review 
article in International Organization,1 this thesis argues that it is necessary to establish an 
analytical framework that can account for the influence that these three competing political 
arenas possess. In an effort to meet the challenge posed by Helleiner and Pagliari, this thesis 
proposes a Principal-Agent (PA) analytical framework to account for the differentiated 
influence of the three competing political arenas in the creation of international securities 
standards. The political arena that influences international securities standards is dependent 
on whether international securities standards are derived from the policy preferences of 
securities regulators, domestic legislatures, or states.  
1.1.1 Who Creates International Securities Market Standards? 
IOSCO’s four international standards fall in to two categories. The first category of 
international securities market standards is predominantly driven by the agency of the 
                                                 
1 See Helleiner and Pagliari 2011 
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transgovernmental network of securities market regulators within IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee and its associated policy committees. These international securities market 
standards are created to address the negative spillovers caused by under-regulated or 
ineffectively regulated jurisdictions. Under-regulated or ineffectively regulated jurisdictions 
are predominantly from relatively peripheral financial centers. In the case of Principles for 
Memoranda of Understanding (to facilitate the prosecution of cross-border financial crime) 
in September 1991 (IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs hereafter), Switzerland was the central cause 
of regulators’ decision to create an international securities market standard and is the 
exception to this general rule. The costs and risks of such negative spillovers have increased 
as international financial markets have become increasingly integrated and interdependent in 
the era of globalization.  
 
This category of international regulatory standards seeks to raise the financial regulatory 
standards of under-regulated or ineffectively regulated foreign financial centers. 
Alternatively, international securities standards establish cooperative regulatory agreements 
with foreign financial regulators that enable regulators to share information, provide mutual 
legal assistance, and to use that information in the prosecution of financial crime. This set of 
financial standards reflects the pre-existing statutory authority of the majority of developed 
financial market centers who are members of IOSCO’s Technical Committee. Through the 
creation, promotion and strengthening of international securities market standards, IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee seeks to improve financial regulatory frameworks in foreign financial 
centers to foster international financial stability and the ability of securities market regulators 
to regulate their respective domestic securities market.    
 
These cases highlight the validity of a transgovernmental network approach. The 
transgovernmental network approach was pioneered by Tony Porter, and supported by the 
work of other transnational scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kal Raustiala and David 
Zaring.2 Transgovernmental network scholars argue that financial regulators are forming 
dense networks to share experiences that foster common understandings of how to 
effectively regulate international and domestic securities markets. Ongoing interactions 
between regulators establish trust and a gradual coalescence of regulatory preferences. This 
                                                 
2 Porter 2005a; Porter 2003; Slaughter 2004; Raustiala 2002/2003; Zaring 1998, p. 313 – 324 
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fosters the creation of cooperative regulatory agreements and coordinated national financial 
regulatory frameworks. As Porter states that “it would be a mistake to see these 
arrangements as simply the product of the type of rationalistic competitive bargaining among 
states that we usually associate with international organizations… what [is] more significant 
are the networks of regulators and other market actors that cut across the formal structures 
of states and international organizations and that display considerable autonomy from them 
[states].”3  
 
A transgovernmental network approach argues that the creation of international standards is 
driven by the principled professional interests of securities market regulators. Securities 
market regulators create international financial standards to establish governance solutions 
that enable them to more effectively govern the domestic financial market system they are 
entrusted to regulate. International financial standards are made necessary by the governance 
demands of an increasingly global financial system and the associated integration and 
interdependence of national financial systems.  
 
Two of IOSCO’s international securities market standards fit this first category: 
 
1. Principles for Memoranda of Understanding (to facilitate the prosecution of cross-
border financial crime) in September 1991  
 
2. IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Market Regulation endorsed in 
September 1998  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Market Regulation 
(IOSCO’s Principles hereafter) were created at the initiative of the community of securities 
regulators from developed financial centers. IOSCO’s Technical Committee was motivated 
to create international financial standards to enable domestic securities regulators to 
effectively prosecute cases of insider trading and financial crime in the era of financial 
globalization. IOSCO’s Principles was created to raise the financial regulatory standards of 
national securities markets. IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s Principles were created 
                                                 
3 Porter 2005a, p. 43 
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in the principled professional interests of regulators acting at the transnational level in order 
to facilitate strengthened coordination and cooperation between national regulatory 
frameworks and their respective national securities market supervisors. These standards were 
created without substantive domestic political pressure, or pressure from foreign relations or 
state departments. These cases highlight the role and influence of the transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators from developed financial centers in the creation of 
international securities market standards.   
 
The second category of international securities standards examined in this thesis was created 
to promote the harmonization of national securities market regulatory frameworks amidst 
the reform of financial market regulation in dominant financial centers. The creation of these 
standards is contingent on shifts in the policy preferences of domestic political actors in 
dominant financial centers and the exercise of agency and discretion by the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. In the cases analyzed, domestic 
legislatures have expressed their preference for securities regulators to improve the 
regulation of previously unregulated financial market actors or have indicated a willingness 
to create new forms of statutory authority to regulate previously unregulated financial 
markets actors. Domestic legislatures become central actors in the governance of national 
financial markets in response to financial instability and the politicization of financial 
regulation.4  Domestic legislatures establish new forms of statutory authority because they 
face a different set of political incentives in favor of regulatory reform rather than the 
regulatory status quo.5 In response, the transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators create international financial standards and cooperate through IOSCO’s policy 
committees to promote the coordination of national regulatory frameworks. Securities 
market regulators promote the coordination of national regulatory frameworks if they 
consider it to be in the interests of investor safety, as was the case in the creation of 
IOSCO’s Principles for Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO’s Prnciples for CRAs hereafter) and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
hereafter). Alternatively, securities regulators seek to coordinate national regulatory 
frameworks to establish common standards of regulation that will enable regulators to 
                                                 
4 Helleiner and Pagliari 2011 
5 Pagliari 2013; Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011 
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monitor the systemic risk posed by internationally active financial firms, as was the case in 
the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation of Hedge Funds (Principles for Hedge Funds 
hereafter) and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds. 
 
This second category of international securities market standards is explained by both a 
domestic politics and transgovernmental politics approach. Domestic politics theory argues 
that international financial standards are created in response to the preferences of domestic 
political actors.6 Domestic politics theory has focused its analysis on analyzing the domestic 
political sources of state preferences for international financial standards. Domestic politics 
theory within IPE literature is the most diverse literature set as it identifies different sources 
of domestic political actors’ preferences for international financial standards. One set of 
authors argue that international financial standards are created in response to 
competitiveness concerns and are intended to be redistributive in favor of domestic financial 
firms and financial markets.7 A second set of authors focus on how international financial 
standards are created once the domestic political context shifts in favor of new regulatory 
preferences. This set of authors highlight that the policy preferences of domestic political 
actors are dependent on the structure of domestic political incentives.8 Due to the nature of 
the standards this thesis analyzes, this thesis adopts the theoretical approach of the second 
set of domestic politics scholars.  IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs, IOSCO’s Code of Conduct, 
IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds, and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge 
Funds do not raise competitiveness issues for dominant financial centers.9 This set of 
standards was created after shifts in the policy preferences of dominant financial centers due 
to shifts in the domestic political context. This category of standards reflects the role and 
influence of domestic legislatures because their creation was contingent on shifts in the 
policy preferences of domestic legislatures and shifts in the domestic political context. The 
ability of securities market regulators to establish international regulatory standards remain 
contingent on the preferences of domestic political actors.  
 
                                                 
6 See Oatley and Nabors 1998; Singer 2007; Pagliari 2013; Fioretos 2010 
7 Oatley and Nabors 1998; Singer 2007 
8 Pagliari 2013; Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011  
9 As Eric Helleiner has analyzed, OTC derivatives market regulation has created competitiveness issues and 
domestic political actors have expressed interest in international financial standards to address these issues. See 
Helleiner Forthcoming. 
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This category of standards is also explained by a transgovernmental network approach. 
Similar to the transgovernmental network approach discussed earlier, IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee was driven to create this category of international securities standards by their 
principled professional interests because it enabled securities regulators to more effectively 
govern the domestic securities market system they were entrusted to regulate and to fulfill 
the regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by domestic legislatures.   
 
Two of IOSCO’s international securities standards fit this second category: 
 
1. IOSCO’s Principles for Credit Rating Agencies in September 2003 and IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies created in December 
2004. 
 
2. IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation of Hedge Funds created in June 2009 and 
IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010 
 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct after domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. had expressed a preference for 
improving the regulation of rating agencies whilst not subjecting rating agencies to a direct 
regulatory regime. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created to promote the coordination of 
national regulatory frameworks for rating agencies amidst their review in the United States 
(U.S.) and European Union (E.U.). IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was created to establish an 
internationally consistent regulatory framework for rating agencies that took into account the 
domestic political constraints in the U.S. and E.U. Securities market regulators were driven 
to create international financial standards for rating agencies to ensure consistent 
assessments of credit worthiness across jurisdictions. Securities market regulators’ decision 
to create international financial standards for rating agencies was contingent on shifts in the 
policy preferences of domestic political actors and their decision to review the regulation of 
rating agencies after their politicization from 2001 – 2003. 
 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation of Hedge Funds 
(Principles for Hedge Funds hereafter) in June 2009. IOSCO’s Technical Committee only 
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created international securities market standards after policy preferences in the U.S. and E.U. 
domestic legislatures shifted in favor of the direct regulation of hedge funds after the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. Before the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (U.S. SEC) (and the majority of securities regulators) favored the 
direct regulation of hedge funds in order to monitory the systemic risk they posed to the 
wider securities market. The U.S. SEC sought the statutory authority to regulate hedge funds 
but was rebuffed by Congress because the domestic political balance of power in the U.S. 
and E.U. favored the continued indirect regulation of hedge funds. As a result, IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee produced reports and principles relating to the valuation of hedge 
funds and other investment protection issues rather than for hedge funds themselves. This 
demonstrates the role and influence of domestic legislatures in the creation of international 
financial standards.  
 
After the 2007/2008 financial crisis, domestic political actors were incentivized to regulate 
hedge funds because of the highly visible role hedge funds played during the crisis, and due 
to cases of highly publicized financial fraud by hedge fund managers such as the Bernie 
Madoff scandal.  IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds 
and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Required for Hedge Funds to promote coordinated national 
regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and E.U. during the reform of hedge fund regulation in 
these jurisdictions to enable regulators to monitor the systemic risk posed by hedge funds. 
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The four international financial standards analyzed in this thesis and the analytical 
frameworks that explain their creation are represented in Table 1.1 below: 
 
Table 1.1 IOSCO’s Four International Financial Standards 
Issue Areas 
 
 
 
 
Cross-Border 
Financial Crime 
and Insider 
Trading 
 
 
National Securities 
Market Regulatory 
Frameworks 
 
 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
Principles for 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
September 2003 
 
Principles for the 
Regulation of Hedge 
Funds 
 
June 2009 
 
 
Standards 
and Date of 
Creation 
 
Principles for 
Memoranda of 
Understanding  
 
September 1991 
 
Objectives and 
Principles of 
Securities Market 
Regulation  
 
September 1998 
Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating 
Agencies  
December 2004 
Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements for 
Hedge Funds  
February 2010 
 
 
Explanatory 
Framework 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Domestic Politics 
and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Domestic Politics and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
 
1.1.2 What Explains the Strengthening of IOSCO’s Securities Market Standards? 
Of the four international securities standards analyzed as part of this thesis, three of 
IOSCO’s standards have been strengthened. IOSCO’s Multilateral of Understanding 
(IOSCO’s MMoU hereafter) in May 2002 and IOSCO’s Methodology for Assessing 
Implementation of IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Market Regulation 
(IOSCO’s Methodology hereafter) in October 2003 are institutional initiatives created by 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee, aimed at strengthening implementation and improving the 
adoption of IOSCO’s financial standards. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct were strengthened after domestic legislatures chose to regulate rating agencies 
through direct regulatory regimes rather than through voluntary industry codes of conduct. 
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These three cases of strengthening international securities market standards highlight the 
role of different political actors.  
 
The creation of IOSCO’s MMoU is explained by a transgovernmental network approach. 
IOSCO’s MMoU was created in May 2002 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks 
on the United States. Despite the association of IOSCO’s MMoU with September 11 and 
traditional foreign policy concerns, IOSCO’s Technical Committee did not create the 
initiative after being subject to domestic political pressure or pressure from their respective 
state departments or finance ministries. Instead, IOSCO’s MMoU was created out of 
regulators’ concern about the incomplete global regulatory coverage of information sharing 
agreements and how this would affect their ability to prosecute cases of financial crime. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks revealed the limitations of IOSCO’s existing bilateral network 
of MoUs and emphasized the necessity of establishing global regulatory coverage for 
information sharing agreements through a multilateral regulatory regime. Rather than the 
idea being proposed by a U.S. regulator, as would be expected if it was created in response to 
foreign policy concerns, the idea to create IOSCO’s MMoU was proposed by a non-U.S. 
regulator at the first meeting of IOSCO’s Technical Committee after September 11.10  
 
The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology is explained by an inter-state and transgovernmental 
network approach. IOSCO’s Methodology was driven by the preferences of powerful states 
and the community of securities market regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
First, IOSCO’s Methodology was created after IOSCO’s Technical Committee was subject to 
pressure from powerful states to improve financial regulatory standards in peripheral 
financial centers after the Asian Financial Crisis. The IMF and World Bank pressured 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee, of behalf of powerful states, to create a comprehensive 
assessment methodology from the creation of IOSCO’s Principles in 1998 through to the 
decision to create the Methodology in October 2001. Powerful states sought to strengthen 
implementation of international financial standards after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 
when they recognized the costs of under-regulated foreign jurisdictions to the stability and 
profitability of their domestic financial centers. This is explained by an inter-state analytical 
                                                 
10 Friedman 2011 
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framework, which argues that international standards are created when it is in the material 
interests of powerful states or a coalition of powerful states.11  
 
Second, IOSCO’s Methodology was created after the transgovernmental community of 
securities market regulators recognized the benefits of improving the adoption of IOSCO’s 
international standards in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. September 11 drew 
regulators’ attention to the dangers of under-regulated peripheral jurisdictions to the security 
and integrity of developed securities markets. This highlights the validity of a 
transgovernmental network approach as IOSCO’s Technical Committee agreed to create 
IOSCO’s Methodology when regulators recognized the importance of improving financial 
regulation in peripheral jurisdictions.  
 
The strengthening of IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards is explained by a 
domestic politics approach. The implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct were strengthened by the decision of domestic legislatures to 
directly regulate rating agencies. The U.S. chose to directly regulate rating agencies in 2006 
through the creation of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. Despite the U.S. creating the 
first direct regulatory regime for rating agencies before the crisis, the regulatory regime 
remained weakened by continued Congressional pressure to respect the First Amendment 
rights of rating agencies. It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis to create a comprehensive 
and substantive direct regulatory regime for rating agencies. The policy preferences of 
domestic political actors in the U.S. and E.U. shifted in favor of comprehensive regulatory 
reform of rating agencies because of widespread reports of conflict of interest, issues relating 
to securitized debt markets, rating agencies’ undervaluation of risks, and their overall 
contribution to the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The strengthened implementation of 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct is explained by shifts in the 
domestic political contexts of the U.S. and E.U.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Simmons 2001; Kapstein 1989; Kapstein 1992; Drezner 2007; also see Gilpin 2001; Keohane 1984 
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The three cases of the strengthening of IOSCO’s international financial standards and the 
analytical perspectives that explain their creation is summarized in Table 1.2 below: 
 
Table 1.2 The Strengthening of IOSCO’s International Financial Standards 
 
1.1.3 Principal-Agent Theory – Accounting for Differentiated Sources of International Securities 
Standards 
An analysis of four of IOSCO’s international securities market standards reveal that the 
creation and strengthening of international securities market standards are explained by the 
role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, 
domestic political actors and states. The role and influence of each of these political actors is 
different across issue areas and across time. Existing theoretical approaches to international 
financial regulatory politics recognize the role of different political arenas in the creation of 
international financial standards but conclude that international securities market standards 
are derived from the preferences of specific political actors from different political arenas. 
Issue Areas 
 
 
 
 
Cross-Border 
Financial Crime 
and Insider 
Trading 
 
 
National Securities 
Market Regulatory 
Frameworks 
 
 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
 
 
Strengthening 
of 
International 
Securities 
Market 
Standard 
 
Multilateral 
Memorandum of 
Understanding  
 
May 2002 
 
Methodology for 
Assessing 
Implementation of 
IOSCO’s Objectives 
and Principles of 
Securities Market 
Regulation  
 
October 2003 
 
 
The creation of 
direct regulatory 
regimes in the U.S. 
and E.U. before 
and after the 
2007/2008 
financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
Explanatory  
Framework 
 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Inter-State and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
Domestic Politics 
Theory 
 
N/A 
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This thesis argues that it is necessary to establish an integrative approach that can account 
for the differentiated political sources of international financial standards across cases.  
 
How are we able to account for the differentiated sources of international securities 
standards across the lifetime of IOSCO? This thesis states that a PA analytical framework 
can explain outcomes at IOSCO. PA theory provides us with an analytical tool to explain 
when international securities standards are derived from financial regulators acting through 
transgovernmental networks, and when they are derived from domestic political actors and 
states.  
 
PA theory is derived from American domestic politics literature from the 1970s and 
International Organization (IO) literature that emerged in the 1990s. PA theory in IO 
literature was cemented by the publication of the major edited volume Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations.12 PA theory states that international organizations are 
representative of a principal-agent relationship in which states delegate authority to IOs in 
order to achieve specific tasks. Outcomes at IOs can be explained by both the agency and 
discretion granted to IOs through the act of delegation, and the mechanisms of control 
exercised by states to ensure IOs act consistently with their preferences.   
 
PA theory in IO literature has focused on how the bureaucratic political interests of IO staff 
combined with states’ exercise of control ensure that IOs act consistent with the preferences 
of powerful states. PA theory in IPE literature, pioneered by David Singer, has analyzed how 
the bureaucratic interests of domestic financial regulators combined with the mechanisms of 
control exercised by domestic legislatures, ensures that outcomes at international financial 
regulatory institutions reflect the preferences of domestic political actors in dominant 
financial centers.13 This thesis argues that PA theory’s underlying theoretical assumption that 
regulators’ interests are bureaucratic and material has led PA theory to under emphasize the 
role and influence of transgovernmental networks in the creation of international financial 
standards. This thesis, therefore, adopts a modified PA analytical framework that recognizes 
                                                 
12 Hawkins et al. 2006a 
13 Singer 2007 
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the principled professional interests of securities market regulators as an important 
explanatory factor in the creation and strengthening of international financial standards.  
 
In the regulation of domestic securities markets, a PA relationship exists between the 
domestic legislature (acting as the principal) delegating authority to domestic securities 
regulators (acting as the agent). Domestic legislatures delegate securities regulators the 
authority to oversee and regulate domestic securities markets. Domestic legislatures do so by 
establishing legislation that grants securities regulators specific forms of statutory authority. 
The domestic legislature delegates securities regulators the task of implementing their 
statutory authority through regulatory rules that provide guidance to financial market actors 
as to how that statutory authority is interpreted and will be implemented.  
 
Securities regulators are granted considerable discretion by domestic legislatures because of 
the technical nature of securities market regulation.14 Discretion is defined by Hawkins et al. 
as “specifying the principal’s goals but not the specific actions the agent must take to 
accomplish those objectives.”15  Securities regulators use the discretion granted to them by 
domestic legislatures to establish international securities market standards at the 
transnational level. The nature of this delegation chain is highlighted in Figure 1.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Delegation Chain in the Creation of International Securities Market Standards 
 
                                                 
14 Porter 2005a; Porter 2005b; Singer 2007  
15 Hawkins et al. 2006b, p. 8 
Discretion 
IOSCO's 
Technical 
Committee 
Delegation  
 
Domestic 
Legislatures 
Domestic 
Securities 
Regulators 
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International securities market standards are created with the “zone of discretion” granted to 
them by domestic legislatures. When acting within this “zone of discretion”, regulators are 
acting consistent with the preferences of their respective states and domestic legislatures, 
whilst acting independently of domestic political pressure. International securities market 
standards are created to establish cooperative agreements with regulators from foreign 
jurisdictions, to export national regulatory frameworks to under-regulated or ineffective 
regulated foreign financial centers, or to promote common regulatory frameworks between 
national jurisdictions. These standards are created to fulfill the regulatory responsibilities of 
domestic securities regulators that are delegated to them by domestic legislatures and are 
created in their principled professional interests. 
 
Consistent with a PA analytical framework, domestic legislatures also retain mechanisms of 
control to ensure regulators act consistent with their preferences. As David Singer’s PA 
model highlights, domestic legislatures place political pressure on domestic regulators by 
threatening their autonomy, prestige and future career opportunities. Domestic legislatures 
are able to achieve this through public hearings, control of the agencies’ budget, and 
legislative intervention.16 In the case of credit rating agency standards, domestic legislatures 
utilized these mechanisms to indicate that improving the regulation of rating agencies was a 
policy priority. This thesis also highlights that domestic legislatures exercise control by 
granting or withholding statutory authority from securities market regulators. This is 
demonstrated in the case of international hedge funds standards. The transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators have created international securities standards to 
promote the harmonization of national regulatory frameworks after domestic regulatory 
reforms in dominant financial centers. The creation of these standards is contingent on 
domestic legislatures delegating securities regulators the task of regulating previously 
unregulated financial market actors. In the case of IOSCO’s Priniples for CRAs and IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct, domestic legislatures had indicated a preference for improving the regulation 
of rating agencies. In response, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Principles for 
CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct to establish common regulatory principles and an 
internationally consistent regulatory regime in response to the domestic legislatures’ changed 
policy preferences. IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds, a majority of members sought to 
                                                 
16 Singer 2007, p. 22 
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create international hedge funds before the financial crisis, but were forced to wait until after 
the crisis because key domestic legislatures were unwilling to grant securities regulators the 
statutory authority to do so.  
 
In order to explain the role and influence of the inter-state political arena, it is necessary to 
re-introduce the concept of multiple agents to PA literature.17 Kenneth Arrow first 
introduced the concept to PA theory in 1984. Kenneth Arrow states, “the many-agent case 
offers new opportunities for inference of hidden actions (or of hidden action) if the 
uncertainty of the relation between the action (or the agent’s observation) is the same for all 
agents.”18 The concept of multiple agents highlights how domestic securities market 
regulators are not the only agent responsible for international securities market standards 
and that there is considerable overlap in the responsibilities of foreign affairs and finance 
ministries and domestic securities regulators. Foreign affairs and finance ministries also 
represent the interests of domestic legislatures and have seniority over domestic securities 
market regulators. Their role and function of finance ministries and treasure departments is 
to represent the interests of the state and they traditionally view issues through the material 
interests of the state. This accounts for the influence of the inter-state political arena in the 
creation of IOSCO’s Methodology, through the IMF and World Bank, when securities 
regulators were subject to external political pressure to create a comprehensive assessment 
methodology from 1998 – 2001. The nature of this delegation chain and the impact of 
multiple agents is represented in Figure 1.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 The Delegation Chain in International Securities Market Regulation 
                                                 
17 Arrow 1984 
18 Arrow 1984, p. 16 
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1.1.4 Summary 
Existing approaches to the study of international financial regulation have established 
competing analytical frameworks to understand the politics of international financial 
regulation. These existing approaches have identified the political actors responsible for the 
creation of international financial standards, the interests of those actors, and the source of 
their power in creating and enforcing international financial standards. This thesis builds on 
the contributions of existing literature, focusing the analytical framework of this thesis on 
answering central research questions posed by existing literature. Current analytical 
approaches, however, are unable to account for the differentiated sources of international 
securities standards across issue areas and across time. It is necessary to adopt an integrative 
approach to understanding the politics of international financial regulation. This thesis 
argues that a PA analytical framework offers an opportunity to integrate the insights of the 
three competing analytical approaches of IPE literature.  
 
A PA approach argues that within the act of delegation securities market regulators are 
subject to mechanisms of control and are granted a “zone of discretion” to determine how 
the legislatures’ goals are obtained. Securities market regulators have utilized this “zone of 
discretion” to create international financial standards to enable them to fulfill their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities. Securities regulators are also subject to pressure from the state 
through the influence of multiple agents. Finance ministries and foreign affairs departments 
also monitor the outcomes of international financial standard-setters and place pressure on 
domestic securities regulators to improve the adoption of international financial standards in 
response to the perceived cost of under-regulated or ineffectively regulated financial 
markets. 
 
 A PA analytical framework enables us to identify when and under what conditions 
international financial standards are derived from the influence of domestic political actors 
and states, or the agency of financial regulators from developed financial centers acting 
through a transgovernmental network. Securities regulators use this “zone of discretion” 
when it is in their principled professional interests by creating international financial 
standards to respond to threats to the integrity and stability of their respective domestic 
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securities markets. Domestic political actors exercise control when they face domestic 
political incentives to regulate new financial market actors. States exercise control when they 
perceive that IOSCO has failed to establish adequate institutions to reduce the costs of 
under-regulated or ineffectively regulated financial markets.  
1.2 Research Methodology and Sources of Analysis 
This study utilizes a process tracing research method based on qualitative analysis. Primary 
policy documents of IOSCO and national and regional financial regulatory organizations, 
web sites, and secondary sources including academic journals and journalistic publications 
were utilized to identify IOSCO’s central institutional initiatives and to identify the potential 
motivations for the creation of these institutional initiatives. To further explore publicly 
available information, an exhaustive keyword search was conducted to identify the political 
context surrounding the creation of these institutional initiatives and any further information 
regarding the design of these initiatives and the motivation of competing actors in their 
creation.  
 
Given the limited availability of primary and secondary documents surrounding the activities 
of IOSCO, it was necessary to buttress the information provided from these sources 
through interviews with leading securities market regulators and other political actors. 
Therefore, I conducted a series of interviews, with the approval of the University of 
Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics: ORE #17195. During the research project, I sent out 
forty-five interview requests and was able to successfully complete twenty-five interviews 
with regulators, journalists and former Finance Ministers from eight different countries. 
Interviews were conducted to establish the political context of important events in 
international securities market regulation. This process sought to understand who was 
interested in pursuing institutional initiatives at IOSCO, the motivation of those actors, the 
logic of those actors in pursuing those institutional initiatives, and the level of political 
pressure placed on those actors during the process.  
 
Interviewees were predominantly from developed securities market centers. This is because 
research suggested that IOSCO’s institutional initiatives were led by, and involved, regulators 
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from developed securities markets and that securities regulators from emerging or 
developing markets did not play a central role. Interview requests were made to regulators 
from emerging and developing markets but only one interview request was returned.  
 
To ensure a comparability of interviews whilst maintaining the ability to learn new 
information from interviewees, this thesis adopted a “semi-structured” interview approach. 
A semi-structured approach was adopted in order to ensure that commonalities between 
interviews could be identified whilst granting interviewees the opportunity to further 
elaborate and identify new and important trends, motivations and political pressures in 
international securities market regulation. Where permission was obtained, the names and 
positions of the interviewees are disclosed. Where permission was not obtained, the names 
and positions of interviewees are kept confidential at interviewees’ own request.  
 
Empirical material for IOSCO’s institutional initiatives that strengthened the implementation 
of IOSCO’s standards was predominantly acquired from interviews and publicly available 
information from IOSCO’s website, due to little journalistic information, and secondary 
resource material available on this subject. Post-crisis empirical material was predominantly 
acquired from IOSCO’s publicly available information, the websites of national securities 
regulators and journalist materials were acquired through exhaustive keyword searches 
relating to specific regulatory issue areas. Regulators were largely unwilling to be interviewed 
on issues that were still being discussed privately.  
1.3 Object of Analysis: The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IOSCO was established in 1983 after members of the Inter-American Association of 
Securities Commissions agreed to disband the regional organization and establish a new, 
global regulatory institution. IOSCO is a universal organization with 115 securities market 
regulators from diverse locations. IOSCO retains an internal set of by-laws that outline the 
rights and responsibilities of its members and defines the constitution of its various 
committees and boards. IOSCO is a consensus-based organization that promotes the 
development, implementation and adherence to “internationally recognized and consistent 
standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain 
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fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seeks to address systemic risks.”19 IOSCO does 
so through the creation of policy reports that identify common problems in market issue-
areas and common solutions to policy problems by identifying a common basis for legal 
oversight regimes, monitoring mechanisms, and enforcement regimes.  
 
In order to achieve the aims of the organization IOSCO has seven organs of power: the 
IOSCO Board,20 IOSCO’s President’s Committee,21 its four Regional Committees,22 the 
Emerging Market Committee,23 its Research Committees and policy Task Forces, the Self 
Regulatory Organization Consultative Committee, and the Assessment Committee.24 At the 
heart of the organization are “IOSCO’s Standards” found in IOSCO’s policy reports 
produced by the IOSCO’s seven Policy Committees.25 The IOSCO Board establishes and 
approves the program of activities of the Policy Committees. Previously, the program of 
activities of IOSCO’s policy committees were determined by IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee, comprised of regulators from mostly developed securities market systems before 
a resolution to change IOSCO’s internal structure in April 2011.26 The only obligation of 
                                                 
19 IOSCO 2010a 
20 The IOSCO Board is responsible for setting the program of activities at IOSCO, IOSCO’s annual budget, 
recognizes Consultative Committees and Regional Committees, and recommends the appointment of new 
members and member sanctions. The IOSCO Board is elected every two years and in 2012 there were 32 
members of IOSCO’s Board.  
21 IOSCO’s President’s Committee is comprised of all ordinary members of IOSCO (those who represent 
national securities market regulators) and each member is given one vote each. The President’s Committee is 
responsible for reviewing and approving the resolutions of the IOSCO Board, electing the IOSCO board, 
admitting new members, determining annual dues, and sanctioning members for failing to pay their annual 
dues.  
22 IOSCO has four regional committees split between Africa/Middle-East, Asia-Pacific, European, and the 
Americas and is intended to act as a forum of discussion on topics common to its members and distribute 
information amongst its members.  
23 The Emerging Markets Committee is required to act in concert with IOSCO’s By-Laws and reports to 
IOSCO’s Board. The Emerging Markets Committee has historically produced regulatory reports on regulatory 
issues for emerging securities markets. The role and function of the Emerging Market Committee has 
substantively declined since IOSCO reconstituted its central decision-making organs in 2012, as it wanted to 
reduce differences between emerging and developing markets.  
24 The Assessment Committee was created in 2011 to “ensure full and consistent implementation of the 
Objectives and Principles across the organization’s membership and to disseminate the best goal’s and practices 
and approaches for meeting this goal.” From IOSCO 2011a, p. 5 
25 The seven policy committees are: the Multinational Disclosure and Accounting, Regulation of Secondary 
Markets, Regulation of Market Intermediaries, Enforcement and the Exchange of Information, Investment 
Management, Credit Rating Agencies, and Commodities Futures Markets Committees. 
26 IOSCO, 2011b 
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membership is to pay their annual dues of between €12,500 and €30,000 depending on the 
national income per capital and total GDP of each member.27  
 
IOSCO was incorporated as a private organization by a private members bill of the Quebec 
National Assembly in 1987. In its early years, IOSCO’s Secretariat was based in Montreal 
and had four staff members. The organization moved to Madrid, Spain in 2001 after the 
Spanish government won the tender process by offering tax breaks to the organization, and 
a former Ministry of Finance building to house the organization and renovation costs.28  
 
IOSCO’s secretariat has expanded since 1983 with 25 full time staff, part of which are 
secondees from IOSCO’s membership.29 IOSCO’s secretariat staff are organized in to six 
different teams to coordinate the work of the related work streams within IOSCO including: 
Policy, Emerging Markets, MMoU, Technical Assistance, Education and Training, and 
Research. The research department was established after the 2008 financial crisis and its role 
is to support the work of the Policy Committees and the Emerging Markets Committee and 
to help overcome any internal disagreements between members of the Policy Committees. 
The MMoU team is responsible for obtaining signatories to the MMoU by promoting the 
benefits of becoming a signatory and providing guidance and training on what regulatory 
policies and legislative reforms need to be adopted to become compliant and accepted as a 
signatory to the agreement. The Technical Assistance department is responsible for 
providing technical assistance, guidance and training to members seeking to comply with 
IOSCO’s international financial regulatory principles for securities markets. The Policy team 
coordinates all of IOSCO’s policy work streams, including work with other international 
financial regulatory institutions such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Joint Forum, 
and others. The Education and Training team coordinates and organizes the education and 
training program’s for IOSCO’s members in response to their reported education and 
training desires and needs.30 
 
                                                 
27 IOSCO, 2011c  
28 Davies 2012 
29 Obtained with the assistance of IOSCO’s General Secretariat. 
30 Obtained with the assistance of IOSCO’s General Secretariat. 
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Senior members of national financial regulators conduct the work of IOSCO’s Policy 
Committees (also known as Working Committees or Standing Committees) across borders. 
Research and policy reports are compiled individually and members often meet together in a 
single location to complete the reports. The work of IOSCO’s Policy Committees is done in 
concert with their everyday duties of their home regulator.31 The policy reports and 
regulatory principles that are produced by IOSCO’s Policy Committees are published 
bearing the name of IOSCO’s Technical Committee and, now, IOSCO’s Board. This 
indicates that the work of IOSCO’s Policy Committees is endorsed by IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee. 
 
IOSCO’s constitution and institutional design reflects the common characteristics of a 
transgovernmental network. IOSCO has a relatively small secretariat staff, has relatively 
informal decision making processes, and, most importantly, its outcomes are driven by its 
members rather than the institution itself. The standards analyzed in this thesis were not 
driven by the secretariat staff but by the regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee 
and policy committees.  
 
IOSCO’s reports promote the adoption of common regulatory standards through the 
process of persuasion and establishment of common understandings between IOSCO 
members. IOSCO promotes the expansion of regulatory standards to more peripheral 
financial centers through its internal institutional initiatives, resolutions, and training and 
education programs that provide technical assistance to regulators from emerging or 
developing securities markets. These initiatives are aimed at enabling IOSCO’s members to 
adopt domestic financial regulatory frameworks consistent with IOSCO’s Principles and other 
financial regulatory standards created by IOSCO’s Policy Committees.  
1.4 Case Studies: IOSCO’s Four International Financial Standards 
This thesis analyzes four of IOSCO’s international securities market standards. These 
standards have been chosen because they were critical in promoting strengthened 
                                                 
31 Bergstraesser and Kunz 2011  
 24 
cooperation and coordination between national securities supervisors from the institution’s 
inception in 1984.32  
1.4.1 Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s MMoU 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs were created in September 1991. IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs 
were created after securities market regulators had identified the threat of under-regulated or 
ineffectively regulated securities markets in foreign jurisdictions to the integrity of developed 
capital markets in the early 1980s. Cross-border financial crime, predominantly in the form 
of insider trading, created the first global public policy problem domestic securities 
regulators faced that necessitated a cooperative regulatory regime. The prosecution of 
financial crime has historically been a central regulatory responsibility for securities market 
regulators. In response to the threat of cross-border financial crime, securities market 
regulators negotiated a unique governance solution to the prevailing problem of cross-
border financial crime, initiated the creation of an international institution to deal with the 
issue, and formed international financial regulatory principles to identify common principles 
that should be incorporated in MoUs signed with foreign regulators. The creation of 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs demonstrates the agency of securities market regulators who 
created an international securities market standard at the transnational level to fulfill the 
domestic regulatory obligations delegated to them by their respective domestic legislature.  
 
The recommendations and regulatory principles identified by IOSCO’s senior members 
were used to lobby domestic legislatures to grant regulators new statutory powers that would 
enable them to sign and execute MoUs with foreign regulators. Securities regulators’ use of 
IOSCO recommendations to obtain legislative reforms from their respective legislature 
highlights the direction of causation. Transnational policy preferences are transmitted to 
national policy preferences, demonstrating the agency of regulators and the influence of the 
transnational political arena. Furthermore, as Michael Mann, the first Director of the Office 
of International Affairs at the U.S. SEC and pioneer of MoUs to govern cross-border 
financial crime, stated, this “was a change in terms of looking at the outside world, where the 
SEC really was able to lead the negotiation with the support of Justice and the State 
                                                 
32 This thesis has not analyzed OTC derivatives markets because it has been analyzed by existing IPE literature. 
See Helleiner and Pagliari 2010; Pagliari 2013; Helleiner Forthcoming  
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Department; and work out something that was a memorandum of understanding.”33 The 
creation of MoUs in the late-1980s was the first case in which securities market regulators 
were influential actors in the governance of international securities markets. 
 
IOSCO strengthened implementation of its Principles for MoUs through the creation of 
IOSCO’s MMoU. IOSCO’s Technical Committee proposed creating IOSCO’s MMoU a 
month after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Regulators were aware 
that an investigation into the perpetrators of the attacks, in particular into possible securities 
violations, would have been hampered by holes in the network of bilateral MoUs governing 
information sharing and mutual legal assistance. September 11, therefore, revealed 
limitations in the existing web of bilateral MoUs, and regulators recognized the necessity of 
creating a more comprehensive cross-border financial crime regime.34 
 
The association of the September 11 terrorist attacks with the creation of an international 
financial standard might suggest that securities regulators created the standard in response 
to, or were acting preemptively to, the requests of their respective foreign affairs 
departments or domestic political pressure. Securities regulators at the meeting in which the 
idea was initially proposed stated that the idea was not proposed by U.S. regulators; the most 
likely source of the idea if it were in response to such pressures. Furthermore, before 
September 11 securities regulators had discussed the limitations of the existing regime and 
had discussed whether it was necessary to strengthen the regime.  
 
Regulators were the central political actors in the creation of international financial standards 
to govern cross-border financial crime. Regulators responded to threats to the integrity of 
their respective domestic securities markets and exercised the discretion granted to them by 
their domestic legislatures in negotiating an international solution to the regulatory issues 
they faced.  
                                                 
33 The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 9  
34 Tanzer 2011  
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1.4.2 The Creation of IOSCO’s Principles and IOSCO’s Methodology 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee initiated the creation of IOSCO’s Principles in 1995 when 
regulators from developed financial markets felt the effects of an increasingly integrated 
global financial system. In 1995, international securities markets experienced a watershed 
moment when the risky bets of rogue trader Nick Leeson (from Barings’ Singapore offices) 
caused the collapse of London’s oldest mercantile bank.  The incident revealed the effects of 
regulatory failure in foreign jurisdictions for the stability of regulators’ home jurisdictions. 
This caused securities regulators to begin work on creating the first comprehensive set of 
international financial regulatory standards for securities market regulation.  
 
The idea of creating a comprehensive set of international securities standards was proposed 
by Ed Waitzer, then head of IOSCO’s Technical Committee and Chairman of the Ontario 
Securities Commission. The idea did not have the full support of the Technical Committee 
as many questioned whether it was appropriate to identify a universal standard for securities 
market regulation. Some securities regulators argued that it was necessary to adapt national 
regulatory frameworks to national historical, political, legal and market contexts. IOSCO’s 
Principles were created in early 1997 after IOSCO’s Technical Committee members had 
enough support to begin the internal policy process. After a lengthy review process IOSCO’s 
Principles were endorsed at IOSCO’s Annual Conference in Nairobi in 1998.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles were strengthened through the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology in 
October 2003. The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology was driven by two political forces. First, 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee faced increasing pressure to create an objective method of 
assessment to assess compliance with IOSCO’s Principles by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank. IOSCO’s Technical Committee faced increasing pressure to create 
an objective method of assessment to assess compliance with IOSCO’s Principles by the IMF 
and World Bank. Since the creation of IOSCO’s Principles in 1998 the IMF’s Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department was under pressure to conduct effective surveillance of states’ 
compliance with international financial standards.35 IOSCO had long resisted efforts to 
create a more specific set of international regulatory principles due to fears that they would 
                                                 
35 Elliot 2011; MacLaren 2011  
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be interpreted too narrowly and would not account for historical, institutional and 
jurisprudential differences between states.36 Tension reached its peak in a 2001 meeting of 
IMF, the World Bank and IOSCO, when it was apparent that IOSCO was unable to resist 
for any longer, and that if IOSCO continued to resist, another institution would write the 
Methodology.37  
 
Second, IOSCO’s Methodology was created in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 
terrorist attacks. A taskforce was established at the same meeting of the Technical 
Committee that created IOSCO’s MMoU. In the wake of the attacks, securities regulators 
felt it was necessary to improve the level of adoption of IOSCO’s international financial 
standards and to raise financial regulatory standards around the world. The September 11 
terrorist attacks were a potent symbol of the dangers of unevenly regulated securities 
markets in the international system. The attacks on the United States, the present threat of 
financial crime, and the threat of under-regulated financial centers shifted the Technical 
Committee’s views on the necessity of clearly defined international standards. This caused 
the Technical Committee to place increased emphasis on ensuring that IOSCO’s Principles 
were comprehensively implemented and, in turn, accepted the necessity of creating IOSCO’s 
Methodology.38  
 
The confluence of events makes the case of IOSCO’s Methodology difficult to categorize. This 
case reveals that IOSCO was subject to pressure from powerful states through the IMF and 
World Bank. Powerful states sought to reduce the costs of under-regulated jurisdictions in 
light of the Asian Financial Crisis. Regulators, however, were also keenly interested in raising 
the quality of securities market regulation in foreign jurisdictions in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology can be explained both 
through preferences of states and financial regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
IOSCO’s Methodology is explained by an inter-state and a transgovernmental network 
perspective.  
                                                 
36 Cameron 2011  
37 MacLaren 2011 
38 Corcoran 2012 
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1.4.3 International Credit Rating Agency Regulation 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct were created in September 2003 
and December 2004 respectively. These international securities market standards were 
created after the politicization of rating agencies in the U.S. and the E.U. from 2001 - 2003. 
In response to the perceived failure of rating agencies to warn investors of the impending 
collapse of large, publicly listed companies, U.S. and E.U. domestic legislatures had indicated 
a preference for improving the regulation of rating agencies. At the same time, they had also 
indicated that they were unwilling to directly regulate rating agencies because of domestic 
political constraints. U.S. and E.U. domestic legislatures indicated their preference for 
improving the regulation of rating agencies through public statements by domestic 
politicians, public hearings, the creation of committees reviewing the regulation of rating 
agencies, the drafting of public reports, and legislation requesting further technical advice 
from securities market regulators.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created in order to promote a coordinated regulatory 
approach to rating agencies amidst their regulatory review in the U.S. and E.U. IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct was created to establish an internationally consistent self-regulatory regime. 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct established a regulatory response to improve the regulation of rating 
agencies whilst taking account of domestic political constraints. The transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators sought to coordinate the national regulatory 
approaches of the U.S. and E.U. to ensure common assessments of creditworthiness across 
jurisdictions in the interests of investor safety.  
 
Implementation of IOSCO’s international standards for rating agency regulation was 
strengthened by the creation of direct regulatory regimes for rating agencies in the U.S. and 
E.U. The U.S. established the first direct regulatory regime in 2006 under the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act. The 2006 Act was driven by the narrow political interests of a 
Pennsylvanian Congressmen Michael Fitzpatrick and Paul Kanjorski, who sought to 
promote competition in the rating agency market to support the efforts of Egan-Jones, (a 
Pennsylvania-based rating agency) to expand its market share. The 2006 Act remained 
limited because of continued Congressional pressure to respect the First Amendment Rights 
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of rating agencies, which made the U.S. SEC rule-making process slow and cumbersome. 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis produced a substantive shift in the policy preferences of 
domestic political actors in the U.S. and E.U. Widespread cases of conflicts of interest issues 
in the securitized debt market matched with the undervaluation of risk by rating agencies led 
policymakers, regulators and the public to perceive that rating agencies were central actors in 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis. This changed the domestic political incentives of 
policymakers in favor of the direct regulation of rating agencies.  
 
The case of international rating agency standards demonstrates the validity of a domestic 
politics and transgovernmental network approach. Securities market regulators created 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in response to shifts in the policy 
preferences of domestic legislatures. This shift in policy preferences was driven by domestic 
political imperatives. The transgovernmental network of securities market regulators 
exercised agency in creating international credit rating agency standards to promote the 
adoption of coordinated national regulatory frameworks. The transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators was driven to create these standards by their principled 
professional interests. The strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s international rating 
agency standards is explained by a domestic politics perspective. The creation of a direct 
regulatory regime in the U.S. was initially driven by the narrow political interests of U.S. 
Congressmen. The creation of comprehensive direct regulatory regimes was driven by shifts 
in the policy preferences of domestic legislatures in dominant financial centers in the wake 
of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. This demonstrates the validity of a PA analytical 
framework. International credit rating agency standards were created in response to the 
preferences of domestic legislatures. Securities regulators then exercised their discretion in 
creating international securities market standards to promote coordinated national regulatory 
frameworks.  
1.4.4 International Hedge Fund Regulation 
IOSCO’s created IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds in June 2009 and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk 
Data Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010. IOSCO’s international hedge fund 
standards were created once the domestic political context of the U.S. and E.U. shifted in 
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favor of the regulation of hedge funds in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Before 
the crisis, the U.S. and the U.K., which are the home jurisdictions of the largest hedge fund 
industries in the world, forestalled any attempts to create international standards for hedge 
funds.  In the U.S., the U.S. SEC sought the regulatory authority to required hedge funds to 
register with the U.S. SEC due to the increased exposure of retail investors to hedge funds. 
The U.S. SEC’s effort to required hedge funds to register was struck down by a U.S. Circuit 
Court judge and U.S. Congress was unwilling to grant the U.S. SEC clear statutory authority. 
The majority of securities market regulators in IOSCO’s Technical Committee favored the 
regulation of hedge funds but domestic legislatures in dominant financial centers did not. 
This forced regulators to limit IOSCO’s work to producing a series of reports on regulatory 
issues for regulated retail investment firms including: a 2003 report titled, Regulatory and 
Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail Investors in (Funds-of) Hedge Funds,39 a 
2006 report titled The Regulatory Environment for Hedge Funds: A Survey and Comparison,40 and 
Principles for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios in November 2007.41 The U.S. SEC and other 
regulators were unable to propose international regulatory principles for the regulation of 
hedge funds because domestic legislatures in dominant hedge fund jurisdictions had not 
granted their securities regulators the statutory authority to do so.  
 
After the 2008 financial crisis, domestic policy preferences changed. The highly visible role 
of hedge funds as a central cause of the crisis, the highly publicized case of financial fraud by 
Bernie Madoff, and a shift in the domestic balance of political power away from the hedge 
fund industry towards institutional funds meant that the U.S. now favored the direct 
regulation of hedge funds. Within the E.U., the U.K. continued to favor the indirect 
regulation of hedge funds. However, Germany, France and a majority of E.U. members 
sought to establish a comprehensive direct regulatory regime for hedge funds. The U.S. had 
indicated that they were willing to regulate hedge funds. As a result of a shift in the domestic 
political contexts of the U.S. and E.U., domestic legislatures had indicated that they were 
willing to directly regulate hedge funds. In early 2009, the Obama Administration was in the 
process of reforming the 1940 Investment Advisers Act, which would ensure that hedge 
                                                 
39 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2003a 
40 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2006 
41 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2007 
 31 
funds were required to register with the U.S. SEC.42 In April, 2009 the E.U. proposed the 
Alternative Investment Advisers Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD).43 These shifts in the 
policy preferences of the U.S. and E.U. culminated in the Group of 20 (G20) declaring that 
hedge funds or hedge fund managers would be required to register with a national regulator 
and be subject to ongoing supervisory requirements in April 2009.44  
 
After domestic legislatures in dominant hedge fund jurisdictions declared their intent to 
require hedge fund managers to be registered with national securities regulators and be 
subject to ongoing supervisor requirements, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created 
international regulatory standards for hedge funds. IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds were 
created in June 2009 to establish common regulatory principles to inform the upcoming 
legislative and rulemaking process. In particular, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created 
common registration, information and reporting requirements. Common information and 
reporting requirements were of particular interest to securities regulators because it was 
necessary to enable securities regulators to monitor internationally active hedge funds. In 
February 2010, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created Systemic Risk Data Requirements for 
Hedge Funds, which outlined what systemic risk data would be required from hedge fund 
managers to enable securities regulators to monitor the systemic risk they posed. IOSCO’s 
Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds established a more comprehensive list of 
reporting requirements after national rulemaking processes, in combination with 
coordination through IOSCO, identified what information was necessary to track the 
systemic risk posed by hedge funds. 
 
The E.U.’s regulatory reform process established a differentiated national regulatory 
framework for hedge funds, which is considered to be discriminatory against U.S.-based 
hedge funds. The adoption of a differentiated national regulatory regime for hedge funds in 
the E.U. further highlights the differentiated role and influence of domestic legislatures and 
the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. The role and influence of the 
transgovernmental network of securities regulators is limited to establishing common 
regulatory principles within the current statutory authority granted to them by domestic 
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43 European Parliament 2009 
44 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2009a 
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legislatures. The nature and scope of the statutory authority or statutory obligations placed 
on financial market actors is determined by domestic legislatures.  
 
The creation of international hedge fund standards is explained by a domestic politics and 
transgovernmental network perspective. Domestic legislatures exercised control over 
securities market regulators by withholding statutory authority from securities regulators 
before the crisis and enabling the creation of international financial standards after the crisis. 
This caused securities market regulators to create international standards that reflected their 
current statutory authority rather than their policy preferences. Once the policy preferences 
of domestic legislatures shifted in favor of the direct regulation of rating agencies, securities 
market regulators exercised their discretion in establishing international hedge fund 
standards to promote the creation of coordinated national regulatory frameworks. This 
demonstrates the validity of a PA analytical framework. International hedge funds standards 
were created once domestic legislatures’ policy preferences shifted in favor of the regulation 
of hedge funds. Securities regulators then exercised their discretion in creating international 
securities market standards to establish common regulatory approaches to hedge funds, to 
enable them to effectively undertake their domestic regulatory responsibilities.   
1.5 Brief Outline of the Dissertation 
This thesis analyzes the creation of international securities standards from the establishment 
of IOSCO in 1983 through to the post-2007/2008 financial regulatory reform process. 
Analyzing the creation of four of IOSCO’s securities market standards over the lifetime of 
the institution provides us with important case studies to analyze and understand the politics 
of international securities market regulation and the political drivers of regulatory 
cooperation.  This thesis argues that the creation of international securities market regulation 
is explained by the role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators, domestic legislatures and states.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews existing international financial regulatory politics literature including 
existing analysis of IOSCO. International financial regulatory politics literature provides 
guidance on the central research question of this thesis. This chapter will demonstrate that 
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there are important empirical and theoretical gaps in IPE literature that necessitate further 
empirical investigation and theoretical innovation. To do so, this chapter summarizes 
existing international financial regulatory politics literature, their contributions, and discusses 
its current analytical and empirical limitations. Critically, IPE literature has not yet analyzed a 
number of important international securities standards including the creation of IOSCO’s 
Principles, IOSCO’s Methodology, IOSCO’s MMoU, and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements for Hedge Funds. IPE literature is also unable to account for the differentiated 
political sources of outcomes at IOSCO over time. PA theory provides an important 
contribution to IPE literature. PA theory offers an analytical framework that accounts for 
how and under what conditions regulators demonstrate agency in exercising discretion to 
create international financial regulators standards. PA theory achieves this by identifying how 
domestic legislatures exercise control over securities market regulators and how the policy 
preferences of domestic legislatures is a necessary condition for the creation of international 
financial standards. This chapter also discusses a number of limitations to PA theory to 
identify how this thesis’ analysis of international financial standards, and the analytical 
framework it has adopted, seeks to contribute to existing PA literature.  
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and their strengthening 
through the establishment of IOSCO’s MMoU. The creation of an information sharing and 
mutual legal assistance regime to assist in the prosecution of cross-border financial crime 
was driven by the community of securities regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
The MoU regime was initiated by the US SEC’s Michael Mann who proposed the creation of 
an informal and flexible MoU to cover information sharing and mutual legal assistance 
between U.S. and Swiss regulators in 1983. The MoU regime expanded when European 
securities regulators approached the U.S. to establish common regulatory principles for 
MoUs. These common regulatory principles would be established through a new global 
regulatory body called IOSCO, which was established in 1983. IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee strengthened the implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs through the 
creation of IOSCO’s MMoU in 2002. IOSCO’s MMoU was proposed one month after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, revealing limitations to the existing 
bilateral network of MoUs. This empirical case highlights how regulators responded to the 
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systemic threats posed by under regulated financial centers to the integrity of securities 
markets in developed financial centers.  
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the creation of IOSCO’s Principles in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis and the strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles through the creation of IOSCO’s 
Methodology. This chapter highlights how IOSCO’s Technical Committee responded to the 
heightened perception of the systemic threat of under-regulated jurisdictions in 1995 by 
proposing the creation of international securities market standards. This chapter also 
analyzes the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology in October 2003. IOSCO’s Methodology was 
created after IOSCO’s Technical Committee received substantive pressure from powerful 
states to create a more comprehensive international securities market standard in order to 
raise financial regulatory standards in more peripheral financial centers. IOSCO’s Methodology 
was also created in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, causing regulators to 
recognize the benefits of strengthening the implementation of IOSCO’s Principles and raising 
the standard of financial regulatory frameworks in foreign jurisdictions. This chapter 
highlights the agency of securities market regulators in the creation of international securities 
market standards as well as the influence of powerful states. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzes the creation and strengthening of international credit rating agency 
standards. This chapter analyzes the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct. The chapter reveals that IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct were created after domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. had indicated a 
preference for improving the regulation of rating agencies. The creation of IOSCO’s 
international credit rating agency standards is explained by both a domestic politics and 
transgovernmental network perspective. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct was strengthened by the U.S. and E.U.’s domestic legislatures decision to establish 
direct regulatory regimes for rating agencies. The strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s 
regulatory standards for credit rating agencies is explained by a domestic politics perspective. 
 
Chapter 6 analyzes the creation of international hedge fund standards. To do so, this chapter 
analyzes the policy preferences of regulators and domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. 
This chapter reveals that hedge funds became a regulatory issue after the Asian Financial 
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Crisis and in the wake of the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a U.S.-based 
hedge fund. International regulatory initiatives addressing these issues reflected the 
preferences of the U.S. and U.K. Before the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the U.S. SEC sought 
to require hedge funds to register with the U.S. SEC but was denied by the U.S. Circuit 
Court and U.S. Congress. This caused IOSCO to limit its reports and regulatory principles to 
the exposure of regulated securities firms to hedge funds rather than hedge funds 
themselves. After the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the domestic political context of the U.S. 
and E.U. shifted, favoring the direct regulation of hedge funds. As a result, IOSCO created 
Principles for Hedge Funds in June 2009 in an effort to promote coordinated regulatory 
approaches to the regulation of hedge funds in the U.S. and E.U. At the same time, the E.U. 
created a different regulatory framework for hedge funds. International hedge fund 
standards demonstrate the role and influence of domestic legislatures and the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators in the creation of international 
securities market standards. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by discussing the key findings of the thesis, the main 
contributions of this thesis to existing literature and identifies potential research agendas for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2  
Governing Global Securities Markets: Explaining 
the Creation and Strengthening of International 
Securities Regulation 
2.1 Introduction 
What explains the creation and strengthening of IOSCO’s international securities standards? 
This chapter begins to address this question by analyzing how existing literature has 
explained the creation and strengthening of international financial standards.  
 
Since the 1980s, IPE literature began analyzing the politics of international financial 
regulation due to the emergence of international financial regulatory standards. This 
specialist literature within IPE has sought to explain the creation and strengthening of 
international prudential financial standards.1 This specialist literature has made a number of 
important contributions to the study of the politics of international securities standards.  
 
Empirically, the focus of early scholarship was on the politics on international banking 
standards, and international capital adequacy standards in particular.2 However, a number of 
IPE scholars have turned their attention to the politics of international securities standards. 
Existing literature has analyzed six international securities market regulatory issue areas and 
standards so far, including: IOSCO’s cross-border listings and disclosure standards,3 
international capital adequacy standards for securities firms,4 IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs,5 
hedge fund regulatory principles,6 over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets,7 and credit 
                                                 
1 Helleiner and Pagliari 2011 p. 170 
2 Kapstein 1989; Kapstein 1992; Wood 2005; Drahos and Braithwaite 2000, p. 114 - 119 
3 Underhill 1995  
4 Underhill 1995; Singer 2007 
5 Simmons 2001  
6 Fioretos 2010 
7 Tsingou 2006; Coleman 2003; Helleiner and Pagliari 2011; Helleiner Forthcoming 
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rating agencies.8 Existing literature has overlooked a number of important institutional 
initiatives and international regulatory standards for securities markets created by IOSCO. 
 
Theoretically, IPE literature has formed three competing analytical categories to explain the 
creation of international financial standards. The three competing analytical categories are 
differentiated by the distinct political arena from which international financial standards are 
considered to be derived from including: the inter-state, domestic political and transnational 
arena. Within these distinct political arenas, IPE scholars have identified the role and 
influence of four political actors including: states, domestic political actors, 
transgovernmental networks of financial regulators, and transnational private financial 
market actors. IPE literature has identified how international financial standards help these 
four political actors to obtain their interests. Furthermore, existing scholarship has identified 
the differentiated sources of power of each political actor that enables them to create, 
promote and enforce international financial standards.  
 
Current analytical frameworks proposed by IPE scholars provide an important basis for 
understanding the politics of international securities market regulation and the creation of 
international financial standards. This thesis seeks to build on the work of existing 
scholarship rather than proposing wholesale theoretical change.  
 
Despite the important contributions of existing literature, there are important limitations that 
this thesis seeks to address. Existing literature’s limitations are empirical and theoretical. 
There are three empirical limitations to existing literature. First, existing literature has 
overlooked important institutional initiatives and international regulatory standards for 
securities markets created by IOSCO. Current literature has not yet conducted in-depth 
empirical analysis of IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s Methodology, IOSCO’s MMoU, and 
IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds. This thesis seeks to fill this empirical 
gap by examining previously unanalyzed international securities market standards. Second, 
existing literature’s analysis of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct has 
overlooked a number of important political dynamics that this thesis considers important to 
understanding the politics of these issue-areas. Third, existing literature has analyzed 
                                                 
8 Pagliari 2013 
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international financial standards either in isolation of each other or has analyzed financial 
standards from a single era.  
 
The second limitation to existing literature is theoretical. This thesis reveals that international 
securities market standards have been created to obtain the preferences of the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic political actors and 
states. The extent to which international standards are created in the interests of these 
political actors differs across issue areas and across cases. To account for the differentiated 
sources of international financial standards, it is necessary to adopt an integrative theoretical 
approach. As Helleiner and Pagliari argue, “more effort should be devoted to the task of 
integrating insights from developments in all three of these political contexts.”9 This thesis 
seeks to work towards this aim and address the limitations of existing literature through the 
use of PA theory. 
 
This thesis utilizes a PA model to explain the creation and strengthening of international 
securities market standards. A PA approach provides the theoretical tools to account for the 
differentiated political sources of international securities market standards. PA theory 
achieves this by establishing that securities regulators are simultaneously subject to control 
by the domestic legislature and are granted discretion to create international financial 
standards. A PA analytical model recognizes that, through the domestic institutional 
environment, international financial standards can be created in the principled professional 
interests of the transgovernmental network, the political interests of domestic political actors 
and the material interests of states. 
 
In order to develop this argument, this chapter will discuss existing literature, its 
contributions, and its limitations. This thesis proposes a PA analytical framework to 
overcome these limitations, as it is able to account for how and when the relevant political 
actors exercise influence over the creation and strengthening of international financial 
standards. 
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2.2 The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation 
A specialist literature in IPE emerged in the late 1980s, focusing on the political economy of 
international financial regulation. Four theoretical frameworks have emerged that fit within 
three broad categories to explain the creation and strengthening of international financial 
standards: interstate, domestic, transgovernmental network and transnational private actor 
theories of international financial regulation.10 These theoretical frameworks are 
differentiated by their conception of which political actors drive the creation and 
strengthening of international financial standards. In doing so, IPE scholars attribute power 
and authority to different political actors in the international system. Current scholarship 
analyzing the politics of international financial regulation provides an important basis to 
explain the creation of international securities market standards. 
2.3 Interstate Politics of International Financial Regulation 
Interstate theories argue that the creation and strengthening of international financial 
standards is driven by the material interests of powerful states. Interstate theories are divided 
between realist and neoliberal institutional approaches. A neoliberal institutionalist approach 
focuses on the incentives for states to create cooperative institutions. A realist approach 
argues that international financial standards are created to protect the competitiveness of 
dominant financial centers by utilizing international organizations to mitigate the costs of 
adjustment caused by financial regulatory reform in dominant financial centers. International 
financial standards achieve this by ensuring that competing financial centers are subject to 
the same regulatory demands. All interstate scholars argue that the power of states to create, 
enforce and promote regulatory harmonization is derived from their relative market size. 
The threat of excluding market access from these large and valuable financial centers ensures 
compliance with their regulatory preferences. 
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2.3.1 Explaining States Preference for International Financial Regulation 
Interstate scholars argue that international financial standards are created in the material 
interests of states. Consistent with state-centric approaches in IPE and International 
Relations (IR) literature, interstate scholars emphasize how international institutions help 
facilitate powerful states’ pursuit of their material preferences.11  
 
Ethan Kapstein’s pioneering work on international banking regulatory standards in the 1980s 
adopted a neoliberal institutionalist approach.12 Neoliberal institutionalist scholars emphasize 
how self-interested states create international financial regulatory standards to help 
overcome coordination problems and realize joint gains from cooperation.13 Ethan Kapstein 
highlighted that emerging issues in international banking crises were symptomatic of the 
interdependence problems associated with globalization. States and regulators needed to 
identify “how to benefit from increased economic intercourse while pursuing legitimate 
national objectives, such as bank safety and soundness.”14 In the absence of an international 
regime, competition between international banks led to a decline in banking capital adequacy 
that threatened the safety and soundness of domestic and international financial markets. 
Regulators felt pressure to allow declining banking capital requirements to maintain the 
competitiveness of domestic financial firms. Banking supervisors negotiated the Basel 
Capital accord, which would “remove this source of competitive advantage and help to 
create a ‘level playing field’ on which international banks can compete.”15 The Basel Capital 
Accord was created by states in order to obtain joint gains from cooperation by establishing 
a single capital adequacy standard, which would protect against a regulatory race to the 
bottom. This ensured that competition between financial centers did not affect the financial 
stability of domestic and international banking systems. Kapstein’s approach, therefore, 
argues that international financial standards are cooperative, Pareto-improving institutions 
that help protect the international and domestic banking system from financial instability by 
coordinating the policy frameworks of states.  
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Later interstate scholars adopted a more realist approach. Realist approaches emphasized 
that powerful states create international financial standards in order to manipulate the 
distribution of resources to favor their domestic financial markets and financial firms. Realist 
IPE scholars characterize the international system as a system comprised of competing states 
concerned about the distribution of resources. As prominent realist IPE scholar Robert 
Gilpin explains, “states have a strong incentive to take actions that safeguard their own 
values and interests, especially their power and freedom of action, and they also attempt to 
manipulate market forces to gain power and influence over rival states or to favor friendly 
states.”16 Realist scholars recognize that states establish cooperative governance mechanisms 
but only because such mechanisms are in their material interests because they are 
redistributive.  
 
In the realist tradition, a second school of interstate theories argues that states from 
dominant financial centers created international prudential standards to obtain relative gains 
over competing states by exporting higher regulatory standards. Beth Simmons concurs, 
stating that regulatory harmonization was not cooperative or “Pareto-improving.”17 The 
United States established regulatory systems in response to domestic political and regulatory 
concerns.18 The United States exported its regulatory preferences to foreign jurisdictions 
when foreign regulators’ failure to harmonize was costly to U.S. financial markets. Daniel 
Drezner’s book All Politics is Global makes a similar argument, arguing that international 
prudential standards were created when U.S. and E.U. policy preferences were consistent. 
International financial standards were created to export the costs of adjustment on to foreign 
states.  
2.3.2 The Exercise of Power by States from Dominant Financial Centers 
Interstate scholars emphasize that international financial regulatory agreements are created 
and enforced through the exercise of power by states from dominant financial centers. 
Kapstein emphasized that consensual knowledge was an important variable because it 
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created a common basis for agreement between regulators.19 However, national regulatory 
differences remained and “these differences could not be quickly smoothed by research, no 
matter how compelling.”20 The international regulatory agreement was only established once 
the U.S. and U.K. established a powerful alliance due to common policy preferences for risk-
weighted capital adequacy requirements. Kapstein re-emphasized this point in his 1992 
International Organization article, arguing that central bankers are not an epistemic community 
because there is no “substantial body of consensual theoretical and empirical knowledge on 
international banking.”21 International prudential standards were not driven by the 
convergence of regulatory preferences but were obtained through the leadership and exercise 
of power by the U.S. and U.K.22  
 
Drezner’s book states that market size is an important determinant in the creation and 
enforcement of international financial standards. Drezner argues that, “a great power concert 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational 
issue. Without such a concert, government attempts at regulatory coordination will be 
incomplete, and non-state attempts will prove to be a poor substitute.”23 Beth Simmons 
argues that the concentration of financial power in the U.S. and U.K. enables regulators 
from these financial centers to independently obtain their regulatory preferences at home 
and export their preferences to foreign financial centers.24 David Bach and Abraham 
Newman’s study of the adoption of insider trading laws concludes that a strong relationship 
with the U.S. SEC has a greater impact on the adoption of insider trading laws than 
membership at IOSCO. Bach and Newman’s study statistically demonstrates the influence 
of powerful states on regulatory harmonization.25 
 
Elliot Posner argues that outcomes in international financial regulation have been driven by 
shifts in the balance of power between the U.S. and E.U. This shift has caused the U.S. to be 
increasingly accommodative to the E.U.’s policy positions from 2002 onwards. Regional 
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integrative political processes led to the centralization and harmonization of financial 
regulation within the E.U., creating a larger common financial market. Posner states that the 
creation of this large common market improved the bargaining position of European 
regulators, forcing the U.S. to adopt a more conciliatory approach. European securities 
regulation became centralized through the adoption of a series of laws that formed part of 
Europe’s accelerating integration project.26 In the same vein, Lucia Quaglia argues that the 
E.U.’s centralization of regulatory responsibilities has strengthened the regulatory capacity of 
the E.U. and enabled them to obtain their interests in international financial standards.27 
Posner states that the argument that regulators leverage market access to large and attractive 
financial markets to obtain their policy preferences does not explain changing international 
regulatory dynamics because U.S. to European equity market capitalization remains 
unbalanced and has increased from “approximately 2:1 in 1994 to 2.5:1 in 2003.28 Instead, 
Posner argues that it is the expansion of regulatory authority and authority over a greater 
number of foreign firms that strengthens the bargaining authority of European regulators.  
 
Posner analyzes political regulatory dynamics in six major regulatory disputes after 2002 
including: the supervision of financial conglomerates, accounting standards, public company 
auditors, corporate board composition, deregistration of foreign issuers and stock exchanges. 
From 2002 onwards, these policy disputes saw the U.S. make mutual adjustments to placate 
the concerns of E.U. regulators.29 Posner argues that the case provides a basis for fruitful 
dialogue between realist and constructivist theorists. Posner states that the “improved E.U. 
bargaining leverage set the stage for serious dialogue, showing that iterative processes may 
breed deliberation and thereby the trust necessary for mutual recognition and other forms of 
sovereignty-sharing in contexts that lack formal institutions.”30 Reiterative negotiations led 
E.U. regulators to become aware of their altered power capacities, informing their strategies, 
goals and identities.31  
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Randall Germain’s analysis of the governance of international financial markets adopts a 
historical materialist approach. Germain focuses on a number of social, economic, ideational 
and power factors in explaining the governance of the international financial system. As will 
be discussed later, Germain’s historical materialist perspective argues that the global 
economic and social order favors the interests of private financial market actors. At the same 
time, Germain argues that the balance of power between states is an underlying determinant 
of the nature of international financial governance. Germain argues that the prospects for 
effective international financial regulatory cooperation are relatively weak because “the 
effectiveness of international cooperation is dependent upon the interests and willingness of 
states to engage in negotiations with each other.”32 Furthermore, Germain argues that the 
international monetary order is “created by states, and that the aims, interests, and powers of 
major states are the principal moving forces to investigate.”33 Germain reiterates this 
argument in his analysis of the post-crisis financial market order. Germain describes the 
prospects of effective regulatory cooperation by stating the following:  
 
“even as we see an effort to strengthen the institutional framework of 
regulation at the international level, we should recognize that on many 
measures the most important institutional regulatory changes will take place 
at the national level, and most critically among the key financial powers.”34 
 
Germain’s assessment of the prospects of subjecting the governance of financial markets to 
deliberative democratic processes also concludes that historically, the governance of financial 
markets has been framed in national terms and that this is problematic given the global scale 
and nature of finance.35 Germain argues that the structure of financial governance offers 
some prospect for being subject to transnational deliberative democratic processes,36 but the 
current regime is undergirded by the exercise of power by dominant states. Therefore, at 
present, the governance of international financial regulation is driven by the policy 
preferences of powerful states.  
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Interstate theories argue that international financial standards are created and enforced by 
states with dominant financial centers.  The power of states is derived from their relative 
market size. The threat of excluding foreign financial centers from gaining access to these 
large, attractive and systemically important financial markets ensures the adoption of 
international financial standards and enables regulators from these powerful states to lead 
negotiations in the creation of international financial standards. As Beth Simmons also 
argues, the relative size and attractiveness of these markets also means “much of the world’s 
financial regulatory expertise… is concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom.”37 
This further strengthens the power of states with dominant financial centers in negotiations 
with foreign jurisdictions, enabling them to secure their policy preferences. 
2.3.3 New Questions in Financial Regulatory Literature: Institutional Design  
Interstate theories of international financial regulation opened up new avenues of 
scholarship as they began to ask questions about the sites of international financial 
governance and variation in the types of international institutions used to pursue 
international prudential standards.  
 
Simmons’ analysis of international prudential standards focuses on explaining variance in the 
institutional design of international financial regulatory institutions from private regulatory 
institutions to formal multilateral institutions and informal transgovernmental networks. 
Simmons asks, “whether harmonization will be economically or politically induced” and 
what “role, if any, [will be] played by international institutions in the process.”38 The system 
of governance pursued by the U.S. is determined by two variables: negative externalities and 
the incentives to emulate. Negative externalities are the cost of other countries’ failure to 
harmonize. The incentive to emulate is the anticipated willingness of countries to harmonize 
with the U.S.’ system of governance as determined by the costs of adjustment and the 
benefits derived from regulatory adjustment.  
 
                                                 
37 Simmons 2001, p. 594 
38 Simmons 2001, p. 591 
 46 
Consistent with the rational design literature,39 Simmons argues that states’ level of 
investment, as reflected in the institution’s design, is dependent on the expected costs of 
peripheral states’ failure to comply with the preferences of powerful states. States will invest 
heavily in formal international organizations when the negative externalities of non-
harmonization are high and will undertake smaller investments for less costly cases of non-
compliance. Alternatively, when there is a high incentive for other states to follow the U.S.’ 
lead, market institutions will likely occupy the role such was the case in international 
accounting standards. Drezner states that the U.S. forms small “club” institutions that enable 
the dominant states to set the regulatory agenda and force the costs of adjustment on other 
states.40  
2.3.4 Interstate Theories of IOSCO and International Securities Market Regulation 
Two sets of scholars have applied an inter-state theoretical framework to the study of 
IOSCO and the governance of international securities markets. First, Beth Simmons’ analysis 
of variation in institutional design includes IOSCO’s information sharing and mutual legal 
assistance regime. Simmons concludes that states have established a weak regulatory regime 
to govern information sharing because the costs of failing to establish an effective regime to 
powerful states is comparably low.41  
 
Second, Abraham Newman and David Bach’s analysis of the U.S. SEC’s and IOSCO’s 
influence on the adoption of insider trading laws concludes that the U.S. SEC is more 
influential than IOSCO in the adoption of insider trading laws. Bach and Newman conduct 
quantitative analysis to measure the strength of the relationship between the adoption of 
insider trading laws and 1) membership within IOSCO in a given year, 2) the signing of an 
MoU with another country, and 3) the signing of an MoU with the U.S. SEC.42 Bach and 
Newman conclude that the signing of an MoU with the U.S. SEC makes it four times as 
likely that the country will adopt insider trading laws but that membership in IOSCO 
increases the likelihood that insider trading laws are actually enforced. Bach and Newman’s 
analysis highlights how the U.S. SEC uses “transgovernmental ties to export its regulatory 
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model.”43 Bach and Newman’s analysis emphasizes that relationships with powerful states 
are a necessary and sufficient condition for regulatory harmonization rather than 
international institutions. International institutions have a secondary effect by providing the 
necessary training and support to develop domestic regulatory capacity, which leads to the 
utilization of enforcement powers.  
 
Interstate scholarship has contributed some important theoretical concepts to the study of 
international financial regulation and provides an important basis to understand the politics 
of international securities market standards. Interstate scholars usefully argue that 
international financial standards are not entirely functionalist but are created to address 
materialist concerns. The creation and enforcement of international financial standards 
address these concerns by raising regulatory standards in foreign financial centers. This is 
evident in the case of IOSCO’s Methodology. Interstate scholars have also argued that 
powerful states are able to enforce international financial standards through relative market 
size and the threat of exclusion. This dissertation shows that a number of regulatory 
initiatives have benefited from the material powers of states with dominant financial centers 
including IOSCO’s Principles and IOSCO’s MMoU program, even if those standards were 
created in the principled professional interests of securities regulators.  
2.3.5 Limitations of Interstate Theory to the Politics of International Securities Market Regulation 
Despite the useful contributions of interstate theories, they have a number of important 
limitations. As noted above, interstate scholars have only analyzed the adoption of insider 
trading laws and IOSCO’s MoU information sharing regime. Interstate scholars have 
overlooked a number of important international securities standards. Furthermore, even in 
the cases that have been studied, existing interstate scholarship has conducted limited and 
incomplete empirical studies. Bach and Newman’s analysis of the adoption of insider trading 
laws overlooks the role and influence of IOSCO’s MMoU in the facilitation of states’ 
adoption of insider trading laws. IOSCO’s MMoU requires states to adopt a series of 
legislative reforms that enable regulators to identify, investigate, and prosecute cases of 
financial crime. Insider trading is the most common form of financial crime. In overlooking 
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the role of IOSCO’s MMoU, Bach and Newman establish an inaccurate indicator of 
IOSCO’s influence in the adoption of insider trading law. Simmons’ analysis of information 
sharing was also unable to include an analysis of the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU because it 
was created after the time of her publication.  
 
The analysis of IOSCO’s MMoU in chapter three reveals that the creation of IOSCO’s 
MMoU was driven by the preferences of the transgovernmental network. The association of 
the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU with the events of September 11 suggests that it was created 
as an ex ante response to the concerns of foreign affairs departments and finance ministries. 
Within weeks of the September 11 terrorist attacks, a non-U.S. regulator had proposed the 
idea of creating the MMoU to strengthen the adoption of IOSCO’s Principles for MOUs.44 
IOSCO’s MMoU was created because regulators recognized the impact of gaps in the 
bilateral network of MoUs and how this presented a threat to the integrity of national 
securities markets as well as national security. This highlights that inter-state analytical 
frameworks are unable to wholly account for the political dynamics of the adoption of 
insider trading laws and that international regulatory principles for insider trading laws were 
driven by the community of regulators at the transnational level. 
 
Finally, domestic politics scholars have highlighted the role of the U.S. SEC and the policy 
preferences of the U.S. in creating international financial standards. This thesis demonstrates 
that, whilst the role of the U.S. SEC has been important in the creation of IOSCO’s 
standards, a number of regulators from outside the U.S. have been integral in the creation of 
IOSCO’s standards. In contrast to the argument of Bach and Newman, European 
regulators, and France in particular, were critical in the creation of international regulatory 
principles for MoUs and the adoption of insider trading laws by foreign jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, Canada’s Ed Waitzer proposed the idea of creating IOSCO’s Principles in 1995 
and Hong Kong’s Tony Neoh again pioneered the idea in 1997. Furthermore, a non-US 
regulator proposed the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU to govern cross border financial crime 
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.45 These developments demonstrate that 
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the U.S. was not always a central actor in the creation of international securities standards 
and that regulators from middle powers were important political actors. This suggests the 
importance of an ideational perspective rather than a market power focus to understand the 
creation and strengthening of international securities market standards.  
2.4 Domestic Political Theories 
Domestic politics scholarship argues that international standards are created in the political 
interests of domestic political actors. Consistent with interstate theories, domestic political 
scholars argue that domestic political actors from dominant financial centers are able to 
create and enforce international financial standards by leveraging access to their large and 
attractive financial markets. Domestic political scholars differ from interstate theorists in that 
they focus their analysis on analyzing the domestic sources of state preferences by examining 
domestic political contexts. Domestic political theories unbundle the state as a unitary actor, 
seeking to unveil the domestic roots of state preferences in the international system.  
 
Domestic politics scholarship is the most diverse literature set within international financial 
regulatory politics literature. Domestic politics scholars identify different domestic political 
mechanisms that explain the creation of international financial standards. One set of scholars 
highlights that international standards are created to address the competitiveness concerns of 
domestic political actors. A second set of scholars highlights that international financial 
standards are created after shifts in the policy preferences of domestic political actors due to 
changes in the domestic political context.  
2.4.1 The Preferences of Domestic Political Actors  
Domestic politics theories identify different domestic political sources of preferences for 
international financial standards. This section will discuss and summarize the different 
domestic political sources of international financial standards identified by existing literature. 
 
The first set of scholars argues that international standards are created to address the 
competitiveness concerns of domestic political actors after unilateral increases in domestic 
regulatory demands. Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors’ 1998 International Organization article 
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directly responds to Kapstein’s seminal article on the Basel Capital Accord in arguing that 
the accord was not aimed at addressing coordination problems but at satisfying domestic 
political concerns.46 Oatley and Nabors’ public choice approach contends that international 
agreements are demonstrative of rent-seeking behavior by domestic politicians. Domestic 
politicians seek to obtain the greatest number of votes from voters and campaign 
contributions from the financial industry. Voters expressed their preference for banks to 
assume the cost of risk from overseas debt through higher capital adequacy standards rather 
than direct state assistance. Banks sought to maintain their competitive advantage against 
foreign banks through relatively low capital adequacy requirements.47  
 
Oatley and Nabors state that U.S. banking regulators pursued an international financial 
standard to satisfy the interests of domestic political actors. To simultaneously satisfy 
demands for financial stability and maintain the competitive advantage of domestic banks, 
domestic politicians placed direct pressure on banking regulators to form an international 
agreement with foreign regulators.  Congress threatened Japanese banks with the prospect 
that they would no longer be able to secure funding from their preferred financial market if 
they did not raise their capital adequacy standards.48 The Basel Capital Accord was 
redistributive because “the U.S. proposal sought to transfer income from Japanese 
commercial banks to compensate American commercial banks for the costs of regulation 
demanded by voters. Moreover, international capital adequacy regulations were instituted 
only through U.S. policy makers’ use of financial market power.”49 Oatley and Nabors argue 
that the Basel Capital Accord was more focused on satisfying domestic political problems 
than providing effective policy solutions to prevailing problems in the international financial 
system.   
 
Singer investigates what causes regulators to create international financial standards. Singer 
adopts a PA analytical model to understanding what causes regulators to create international 
financial standards. Singer’s theoretical framework focuses on the domestic political 
environment of financial regulators and how domestic political institutions, combined with 
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the bureaucratic political interests of regulators, transmit the policy preferences of domestic 
political actors to the international level. Singer states that a PA relationship exists between 
Congress and financial regulators, enabling Congress to place pressure on financial 
regulators when they perceive that regulators are failing to act in their interests.50 As Singer 
states, “the prospect of intervention by legislators therefore creates ex ante constraints on a 
regulator’s range of policy choices which ensures that the principal can maintain some 
control over the agent.”51 Regulators respond to the political pressure of domestic politicians 
in order to secure their own bureaucratic political interests. Regulators’ interests are in 
maintaining their autonomy, prestige and future career opportunities. 
 
The interest of Congress is in maintaining the financial stability of domestic financial 
markets and the competitiveness of domestic financial firms. Financial regulators are able to 
secure the stability of the domestic financial market system by raising regulatory demands on 
domestic financial firms. However, increased regulatory demands on domestic financial 
firms come at a cost and impact their competitiveness. When domestic financial markets 
face twin shocks to their stability and competitiveness, regulators’ “win-set” closes forcing 
regulators to seek an international financial standard that enables regulators to export 
domestic financial regulatory demands to foreign financial centers.52  When unilateral 
increases in domestic regulators do not impact domestic financial firms’ competitiveness, 
regulators do not pursue international financial standards. In sum, Singer argues that 
international standards are created to satisfy the domestic political dilemmas that financial 
regulators face, and that international financial standards are ultimately derived from the 
preferences of domestic politicians. International financial standards are redistributive since 
they are created to export the costs of adjustment to foreign financial centers. 
 
Eric Helleiner’s analysis of post-crisis governance of global OTC derivatives concludes that 
changes in the governance of OTC derivatives markets are explained by developments in the 
transnational, interstate and domestic political contexts. Helleiner states that domestic 
political shifts favoring strengthened regulation of OTC derivative markets in the U.S. 
caused U.S. policymakers to become leading advocates in the creation of international 
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regulatory standards to ensure U.S. derivative markets can compete on a level playing field. 
Furthermore, U.S. policymakers threatened to revoke access to U.S. markets if their home 
jurisdiction failed to comply with U.S. regulation.53  
 
A second group of scholars focus on changes in the domestic political context in dominant 
financial centers to explain the creation of international financial standards. A special issue of 
Review of International Political Economy proposes a historical institutionalist approach to analyze 
domestic sources of state preferences. The special issue focuses less on the preference for 
regulatory harmonization and more on policy preference change in response to 
environmental uncertainty. Paralleling domestic neo-pluralist theory, the theoretical 
framework of this set of scholars expects interests groups embedded within state institutions 
to have their policy preferences form the basis of state negotiating positions. States will 
pursue policies that capture the greater benefits to preferred domestic interest groups.54 
National domestic political processes impact international agreements by establishing whose 
preferences are given the greatest weight in international negotiations.55 The historical 
institutionalist approach focuses its analysis on “how the characteristics of public policy 
institutions shape actor behavior, interests, and strategy, especially in moments of 
environmental uncertainty.”56 
 
Orfeo Fioretos applies the historical institutionalist approach to explain why the U.S. was 
willing to accept international hedge fund regulation when it previously was not.57 Fioretos 
concludes that the creation of international hedge fund regulation was induced by a change 
in the balance of preferences between the U.S., U.K., France and Germany in the wake of 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis. France and Germany long maintained a preference for direct 
regulation. Germany’s preferences derived from the fact that its domestic banking markets 
focused on providing long-term funding manufacturing firms, while France’s stemmed from 
its historical tradition of state-intermediated finance and consumer protection. Those states 
alone did not negotiate from a strong enough bargaining position to obtain international 
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regulatory agreement due to the dominance of the U.S. and U.K. hedge fund industry. U.S. 
and U.K. hedge fund dominance, in combination with their competitive advantage, led the 
U.S. and U.K. to prefer indirect industry-led regulation and made them unwilling to establish 
an effective international agreement.  
 
The U.S. domestic political balance tipped away from favoring the hedge fund industry 
towards the increasingly influential institutional investor industry, which preferred direct 
regulation. Domestic political change within the U.S. altered the international balance of 
power because the U.S. favored the direct regulation of hedge funds. This established an 
effective coalition for international regulatory standards for hedge funds. Only the U.K. 
favored indirect regulation to maintain the profitability and competitiveness of London’s 
financial market. Due to changes in the domestic political context of the U.S. and E.U., and 
because the international balance of power shifted in favor of the direct regulation of hedge 
funds, IOSCO created the first international standard for hedge funds.  
 
Stefano Pagliari makes a similar argument in his 2013 doctoral thesis analyzing the politics of 
hedge funds, credit rating agencies and OTC derivatives market regulation. Pagliari argues 
that policy makers’ preference for favoring market-based mechanisms or predominantly 
state-based regulation is determined by “the degree of public salience of different financial 
domains.”58 He argues that the degree to which financial products and firms are subject to 
state-based regulation is determined by the domestic political incentives for E.U. and U.S. 
politicians to intervene. In a Working Paper analyzing the changing role of international 
financial regulatory institutions, in relation to credit rating agencies and hedge funds, Pagliari 
argues that domestic political forces have driven financial regulatory dynamics rather than 
the preferences of international financial regulatory institutions. Pagliari states that, despite 
the flurry of activity at IOSCO, its “expansion has been the result of pressures from political 
actors at the domestic and international level, which have weakened the capacity of 
international regulators to influence the international agenda and to shaping the path of 
domestic regulatory capacities.”59 Pagliari concludes that domestic political actors are the 
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main force in driving financial regulatory reforms rather than regulators acting through 
IOSCO.  
 
Helleiner and Pagliari focus on the role of domestic political change in dominant financial 
centers to explain the politics of regulatory change after the crisis and, in particular, shifting 
policy preferences from private self-regulation to public regulation. Helleiner and Pagliari 
argue that shifts in policy preferences towards direct, public regulation of hedge funds and 
OTC derivatives is explained by shifts in the preferences of domestic political actors in the 
U.S. and the U.K. Helleiner and Pagliari’s chapter argues that elite policy makers changed 
their views on “the merits of market discipline and self-regulation,” and that private financial 
sector members “came to favor regulation both for defensive reasons at a moment of 
weakened political legitimacy and for more positive reasons of improving the functioning of 
their industry.”60 Pagliari argues that the sustained politicization and high salience of financial 
regulatory issues creates “strong incentives for elected policy makers to reverse [market-
based governance arrangements].”61 
 
Similarly, in a 2003 chapter, William Coleman concludes that the domestic political and 
institutional context of securities market regulation in the U.S. and U.K. gave rise to an 
international private regulatory regime for OTC derivatives markets before the crisis. 
Coleman states that the U.K.’s business culture “translated into an ideology supporting 
‘practitioner-based self-regulation.’”62 The overly cumbersome legalistic approach of the U.S. 
left OTC derivatives markets outside of the statutory authority of independent U.S. 
regulatory agencies.63 The domestic institutional context of U.S. and U.K. regulators gave 
rise to a quasi-public/private regulatory regime for OTC derivative markets. Furthermore, 
private market actors established an effective regulatory response to regulators and 
policymakers’ concerns. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), and 
the Master Agreement it shaped, established an effective international private self-regulatory 
regime. This private regulatory regime was complemented by the creation of a basic 
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information-sharing regime between IOSCO members through the Windsor Declaration in 
May 1995.64 
 
David Bach analyzes why international financial regulation is created through 
transgovernmental networks rather than other institutional forms of governance. Bach notes 
the diverse array of governance institutions that have been utilized to govern the global 
economy, including formal state-based international organizations, private self-regulatory 
regimes, and transgovernmental network-based organizations. Bach contends that 
institutional diversity internationally reflects institutional diversity of issue areas domestically. 
Bach argues that the institutional arrangements of states, derived from domestic political 
processes, influence the dynamics of international financial regulation. That is because, “how 
a domestic market is regulated determines who can leverage domestic market access in 
pursuit of a global regulatory agenda, thereby defining the constitutive actors for regulatory 
cooperation and thus setting policy areas on distinct governance trajectories.”65  
 
A majority of scholars focused on domestic politics agree with interstate theorists that the 
power of states from dominant financial centers is necessary to reach agreement between 
states. Andrew Walter is the notable exception, arguing that peripheral states only adopt 
international standards when it is in the interests of dominant domestic political interest 
groups. Andrew Walter’s analysis highlights that the adoption of financial standards is 
dependent on domestic political preferences rather than the exercise of power by dominant 
states. He discussed a wider array of actors involved in the policy process than those 
identified by other scholars. The adoption of reforms is dependent upon the balance of 
power between pro-reform and status quo interest groups in each different issue-area. This 
approach explains variations in the level of implementation and enforcement of various 
financial reforms across different issue areas in East Asian states. East Asian states placate 
the international community by adopting mock compliance, whereby states legislate financial 
reforms without intending to enforce them.66  
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2.4.2 Domestic Politics and IOSCO 
A number of domestic politics scholars have analyzed the politics of international securities 
markets and the work of IOSCO. Domestic politics scholars have covered international 
capital adequacy standards for securities firms, hedge funds, OTC derivatives market 
regulation and credit rating agencies.  
 
David Andrew Singer analyzes the efforts of regulators to create an international capital 
adequacy standard for securities firms. Singer’s analysis establishes that in response to bouts 
of financial instability in the U.K., U.K. regulators pursued an international capital adequacy 
standard through IOSCO. Singer reveals that the U.S. SEC defeated the proposition in 1992. 
The U.S. did not wish to accept an international capital adequacy standard that endorsed the 
U.K. and E.U.’s lower capital adequacy standards. Singer argues that U.S. regulators didn’t 
seek an international financial standard because U.S. regulators were able to address financial 
instability in domestic financial markets through unilateral regulatory reforms and because 
only U.K.-based investment firms faced a declining share of the global investment market. 
The U.S. SEC did not need to create an international financial standard to address the 
political pressure placed upon them by domestic politicians.67  
 
David Bach concludes that diversity in international governance arrangements are explained 
by diversity in domestic institutional arrangements. IOSCO’s transgovernmental network 
character is explained by the delegation of broad sweeping authority to the U.S. SEC. Bach 
states that IOSCO’s outcomes and international securities standards reflect the preferences 
of the U.S. SEC. IOSCO was created and began governing global securities markets “when 
financial globalization in the early 1980s threatened to undermine the agency’s ability to 
uphold strict domestic standards.”68 International securities market agreements, therefore, 
are created when U.S. securities regulators require cooperation with foreign supervisors to 
enable them to effectively govern their domestic securities markets.  
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Fioretos has highlighted that international regulatory standards was only made possible by 
shifts in the domestic political contexts of powerful states. These shifts enabled a coalition of 
powerful states to create an international financial standard for hedge funds.69 Eric 
Helleiner’s work analyzing the creation of OTC derivative market standards, concludes that 
one of the reasons why an international standard was created was because the U.S. increased 
regulatory demands on U.S. OTC derivative markets, which threatened their 
competitiveness.70 International standards for OTC derivative markets helped export the 
adjustment costs to foreign jurisdictions. Pagliari’s analysis of IOSCO’s hedge fund and 
rating agency regulation are driven by the preferences of domestic political actors rather than 
the preferences of members of IOSCO and the transgovernmental network of regulators.71 
Coleman concludes that the domestic institutional context of securities regulators in the U.S. 
and U.K. has given rise to a private self-regulatory regime for OTC derivatives markets that 
is complemented by basic information sharing between national securities regulators.72  
 
Domestic politics scholars have identified how shifts in domestic political contexts can cause 
states to favor international financial standards when they previously resisted any efforts to 
create them. This is of particular importance in the post-crisis financial regulatory reform 
process when states that previously opposed regulatory harmonization now favored it. 
 
David Singer’s adoption of a PA analytical framework has usefully identified how 
international securities market standards are the result of the delegation of authority from 
the domestic legislature to securities market regulators and the exercise of discretion by 
securities market regulators. Furthermore, this has identified how securities regulators are 
subject to domestic political pressure despite being granted wide sweeping authority and 
power. This has brought light to how the preferences of domestic political actors are 
transferred to the transnational level through transgovernmental networks such as IOSCO.  
 
There are a number of cases in which the creation of IOSCO’s international securities 
standards can be explained through the preferences of domestic political actors. Domestic 
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politics scholars, therefore, make an important contribution to our understanding of the 
politics of international securities market regulation.  
2.4.3 Limitations to Domestic Politics Theory 
As this section has discussed, domestic politics theory makes some important contributions 
to our understanding of the politics of international securities market regulation. As such, 
this thesis uses the main tenets of domestic politics theory to explain the creation of some of 
IOSCO’s international securities market standards. The critical limitation to domestic politics 
theory is that it overlooks the role and influence of the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators. As the previous section discussing inter-state IPE literature had 
established, there are a number of international securities standards that cannot be accounted 
for without understanding the role and influence of securities market regulators. This section 
will focus its criticism on Singer’s PA analytical approach.  
 
The main limitation to Singer’s PA analytical framework is that securities market regulators’ 
motivation in creating international securities market standards is not limited to addressing 
threats to the competitiveness of their domestic financial center. This thesis’ analysis of 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs, IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s MMoU highlight cases in which 
the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators drove the creation of 
international securities standards. These standards did not serve the material interests of 
states or domestic legislatures and were not created to address competitiveness concerns. 
These international securities standards were created to enable securities market regulators to 
more effectively govern the securities markets they were delegated to regulate, and to 
respond to threats to the stability and integrity of their domestic financial centers. This 
highlights that the transgovernmental network of securities regulators working through 
IOSCO is an important and consequential political actor. Furthermore, this demonstrates 
that ideational factors are a core driver in the governance of international securities markets 
and the creation of international securities standards.  
 
Singer’s PA analytical framework echoes the limitations of PA theory in IO literature, which 
will be discussed in detail later. Singer focuses on the exercise of mechanisms of control over 
 59 
securities regulators by domestic legislature and does not grant enough attention on the 
importance and influence of discretion in the creation of international securities market 
standards. By focusing on the exercise of mechanisms of control, Singer’s PA analytical 
framework overlooks the agency of securities market regulators, the influence of the 
transgovernmental network of securities regulators, and the centrality of ideas in the creation 
of international securities market standards. Furthermore, Singer assumes that the only 
interests of securities regulators are bureaucratic and material. This overlooks the ideational 
interests of securities regulators in creating international standards that enable them to more 
effectively govern international securities markets. This thesis recognizes that domestic 
legislatures exercise control over the creation of international securities market standards, 
predominantly by withholding statutory authority from securities regulators. This is 
demonstrated in the case of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs, IOSCO’s Code of Conduct, and 
IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds. This thesis also recognizes that states can exercise control 
over IOSCO’s outcomes when they perceive that the institution is not acting in their 
interests, as demonstrated in the case of IOSCO’s Methodology in October 2003 and IOSCO’s 
updated Code of Conduct in May 2008. However, Singer’s analytical framework fails to account 
for when IOSCO’s outcomes are influenced by the exercise of control by domestic 
legislatures and when they are derived from the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators.  
2.5 Transgovernmental Network Theory 
A transgovernmental network approach to international financial standards emphasizes the 
role of dense networks of financial regulators in creating international financial standards 
and in coordinating national financial regulatory frameworks.  
2.5.1 International Financial Standards and the Preferences of Transgovernmental Networks 
A transgovernmental network approach argues that international standards are created by 
the preferences of financial regulators acting through transgovernmental networks. 
Transgovernmental network theory emphasizes that their overarching interest in effective 
governance of financial markets explains the creation of international financial standards. 
Transgovernmental theory argues that the creation of international financial standards 
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reflects the gradual coalescence of policy preferences around the technical demands of the 
system, rather than particularistic national interests. Andrew Baker calls international 
financial regulatory institutions, such as IOSCO, “technical problem-solving networks.”73  
 
Transgovernmental network theory borrows heavily from functionalist theory pioneered by 
David Mitrany. Mitrany’s functionalist theory argued that states were increasingly 
rationalizing the policy making process by delegating authority to functionally specific, task-
orientated institutions within states. This act of delegation was believed to lay the 
foundations of new international governance arrangements characterized by consensual 
agreements between like-minded actors and the decline of particularistic state interests.74  As 
David Mitrany notes, “by linking authority to a specific activity [functionalism] seeks to 
break away from the traditional link between authority and definite territory.”75 In the spirit 
of Mitrany’s work, Porter argues that international financial regulatory standards are created 
to fulfill the governance demands that an increasingly integrated and complex international 
financial system places on financial regulators.76 Tony Porter’s earlier work argued that 
intense competition and a lack of private regimes in banking regulation necessitated the 
creation of relatively strong international banking standards. In contrast, the lack of 
competition and stronger private regimes in securities markets means that, by comparison, 
international securities market standards were weaker.77 This demonstrates that Porter argues 
that international financial regulatory institutions and the standards they create are driven by 
functional concerns rather than the materialist concerns highlighted by domestic politics or 
inter-state politics scholars. Porter argues that the technical and practical nature of 
networked regulatory institutions, such as IOSCO, causes regulators to “conform to the 
technical demands of the system rather than to the political interests of the states that 
appoint them.”78  
 
From this perspective, international financial standards are created to more effectively 
govern the international financial system. International financial standards are created to 
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respond to the increasing complexity, integration and interdependence of national financial 
systems. Transgovernmental scholars emphasize the impact of transgovernmental networks, 
operating at the transnational level, on national regulatory preferences and regulatory 
frameworks. As David Zaring explains, international financial regulatory institutions cause 
states to become enmeshed “in a web of technical cooperation and international 
organizations.”79 Inter-state and domestic politics scholars emphasize the role of the state 
and domestic political preferences in creating international financial standards. 
Transgovernmental network scholars argue that international standards are derived from the 
preferences of the transgovernmental network of financial regulators, and that the 
preferences of this community of regulators are predominantly functionalist rather than 
materialist.  
 
Tony Porter’s functionalist approach expects outcomes of transgovernmental networks to 
reflect international best practice, and the policy preferences of the informed regulatory 
community, rather than the particularistic interests of states or regulators themselves.80 
Porter, however, recognizes the strengthened role of private market actors in the creation of 
international financial standards and in influencing the substance of those standards.81 
Furthermore, Andrew Baker argues that the policy preferences of transgovernmental 
networks are narrowly defined because they privilege “a particular view of the world largely 
derived from neoclassical economic theory.”82 Porter and Baker argue that regulators are 
focused on effectively governing the international financial system but the way that securities 
regulators govern is influenced by their ideational framework. 
2.5.2 The Power of Transgovernmental Networks 
Transgovernmental network theory highlights the authority of a community of regulators 
who operate through transgovernmental networks. Transgovernmental network theories, 
therefore, focus on the accumulation of power by financial regulators and, by association, 
the power of transgovernmental networks.  
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Trasngovernmental network scholars argue that two issues and processes have empowered 
financial regulators and transgovernmental networks: technical complexity and 
interdependence. First, as Tony Porter highlights, technological complexity in domestic and 
international financial systems has led to the delegation of authority away from the central 
state towards specialist, technical and independent state agencies. Technical and specialized 
actors become empowered because technical issues preclude the involvement of traditional 
political processes and actors.83 Second, the interdependence of national economic and 
financial systems has increased international policy demands on states causing central states 
to delegate authority away from the executive and traditional loci of foreign policy making 
towards more specialized independent agencies. States have responded to the changing 
demands of the global system. As Kal Raustiala puts it, “as the problems policymakers 
address have gone global, this argument claims, so have the policymakers.”84  
 
These forces, driven by globalization, have led states to delegate authority to functional, 
specialized and largely independent government agencies. As Anne-Marie Slaughter states, 
“the state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. 
These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking 
with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, 
transgovernmental order.”85 A transgovernmental network perspective argues that domestic 
political actors and states have become increasingly deferential to the preferences of 
regulators and other technical actors. The preferences of these actors are being increasingly 
influenced and informed by their interactions with their foreign counterparts within 
transgovernmental networks.  
 
Transgovernmental scholars argue that international financial standards are enforced 
through ideational influences rather than more traditional sources of power, such as relative 
market size. This is evident through the argument of transgovernmental network scholars 
that the development of peer-to-peer ties and collegial relationships facilitate a gradual 
coalescence of regulatory preferences. Transgovernmental scholars emphasize the role of 
ideas in structuring the governance of international financial markets.  
                                                 
83 Porter 2003; Porter 2001 
84 Kal Raustiala 2002/2003, p. 4 
85 Slaughter 1997, p. 184 
 63 
2.5.3 Institutional Design and Transgovernmental Network Theory 
Transgovernmental network scholars emphasize the distinct institutional and legal character 
of these networks from traditional international organizations. Networked international 
institutions are characterized by their relatively informal internal structure, flexible internal 
governance arrangements and decentralized bureaucracies. Concurrently, these institutions’ 
effectiveness relies on the development of peer-to-peer ties and relationships through 
constant interaction rather than formal negotiations.86 Porter argues that this is because of 
the technical functional nature of these networks as form follows function.87 
Transgovernmental network scholars argue that this form of international cooperation 
provides a viable alternative to the liberal internationalism that previously dominated the 
international system.88  
2.5.4 Transgovernmental Network Theory and IOSCO 
Transgovernmental theorists state that IOSCO is one of a series of institutions in which 
regulators’ frequent interactions foster a convergence of regulatory preferences and 
consequent regulatory harmonization. Porter states that a “technical systems approach will 
be confirmed if the history reveals a set of relatively robust institutional arrangements that 
have evolved through their interactions with an evolving technical system.”89 Porter states 
that IOSCO’s work is consistent with this approach as it is characterized by constant 
interactions between the world’s leading regulators with a focus on the production of 
technical reports and standards. Porter’s research on credit rating agency regulatory reform 
after the crisis argues that IOSCO’s approach to rating agency reform reemphasizes the 
technical nature of IOSCO’s work and the emphasis on technical policy reports to identify 
appropriate solutions to prevailing problems.90 
 
Critical to the argument is the empowerment of regulators to establish international 
agreements on behalf of states. Porter states that public sector officials “have developed so 
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much autonomy from the states that these officials ostensible represent, that it is a problem 
to treat them as simply a negotiating forum for states.”91 Transgovernmental network 
scholars including Kal Raustiala, David Zaring and Andrew Baker have undertaken 
comparably limited empirical studies of IOSCO. These scholars focus on the internal 
governance arrangements, how IOSCO’s members harmonize their regulatory frameworks 
through persuasion and consensus rather than formal agreements between states,92 and how 
neoclassical economics has influenced international financial standards.93 David Zaring and 
Kal Raustiala have also highlighted how IOSCO has established cooperative governance 
mechanisms such as IOSCO’s MoU program for information sharing to enable regulators to 
effectively regulate their national markets in an increasingly global financial system.94 
 
Transgovernmental network scholars have contributed to the study of the politics of 
international financial regulation by highlighting the role and influence of financial regulators 
in governing the international financial system. These scholars have demonstrated that 
international financial standards are created in response to the negative spillovers of an 
interdependent global financial system. This insight has revealed that the preferences of 
regulators are not solely driven by the material interests of states and domestic political 
actors but are also ideational. Financial regulators do create international securities standards 
to more effectively govern the international financial system, and their creation is driven by 
the principled professional interests of regulators. Financial regulators retain a principled 
professional interest in governing international financial markets effectively, which is 
reinforced through their professional training, experience, and expertise. Transgovernmental 
network theory has demonstrated that financial regulators play an important role in the 
governance of global financial markets. Their importance is demonstrated by regulators’ 
ability to act semi-autonomously from domestic legislatures and states in creating 
international financial standards. 
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2.5.5 Limitations of Transgovernmental Network Literature 
Despite the important contributions of transgovernmental network literature, there are a 
number of limitations within this approach that need to be addressed. The first limitation is 
empirical. Transgovernmental network literature has not analyzed IOSCO’s initiatives in 
detail. Transgovernmental network literature has only summarized and briefly analyzed the 
international financial standards and regulatory initiatives created at IOSCO and other 
international financial regulatory institutions.  
 
The second limitation to transgovernmental network literature is that international financial 
standards are not entirely derived from the preferences of regulators. As noted above, 
scholars working within the domestic politics and inter-state approaches have shown 
effectively how international financial standards are also derived from the preferences of 
domestic political actors and the material interests of states. This dissertation confirms this 
insight, showing a number of international securities market standards that are derived from 
these actors.  
 
This thesis also highlights how securities market regulators are unable to obtain their 
preferences. For instance, because the U.S. SEC was not granted the statutory authority to 
regulate hedge funds, IOSCO’s Technical Committee was unable to endorse international 
hedge fund standards. Instead, IOSCO’s Technical Committee shifted its focus to the risk 
and regulated funds’ exposure to hedge funds, reflecting the limits of their statutory 
authority. Despite the majority of securities market regulators supporting the regulation of 
hedge funds, the U.S. and E.U.’s domestic political context caused regulators to create 
regulatory principles for investment funds that fell under their existing statutory authority.  
 
The third limitation to transgovernmental network theory is that it overlooks the role of 
more traditional forms of power in enforcing international financial standards. 
Transgovernmental network scholars have overemphasized the role of social interactions 
and ideas in enforcing international financial standards. International financial regulatory 
standards are enforced through a combination of ideational forces and threats of restricting 
market access to dominant financial centers. Financial regulators have relied on ideational 
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forces through technical assistance programs that transmit knowledge from central financial 
markets to more peripheral financial centers. Financial regulators also rely on regulatory 
diplomacy, which touts the material and reputational benefits of adopting financial 
regulatory reforms. Financial standards have also relied on domestic legislatures in dominant 
financial centers threatening to restrict market access for foreign financial firms if foreign 
jurisdictions fail to comply with international financial standards.  
2.6 Transnational Private Financial Market Actor Models 
Transnational private financial market actor models contend that international standards are 
derived from the preferences of transnational private financial market actors. Transnational 
private financial market actors predominantly seek the harmonization of national regulatory 
frameworks, the promotion of capital liberalization, and an expansion of free-market 
regulatory models that rely on private self-regulatory regimes. Transnational private financial 
market actors are able to obtain these preferences through their preferential access to 
transgovernmental regulatory networks and through their superior technical expertise 
relative to financial regulators. 
2.6.1 International Financial Standards and the Preferences of Transnational Private Financial Market 
Actors 
Transnational private financial market actor scholars contend that international financial 
regulatory outcomes reflect the preferences of private transnational financial groups. 
International financial standards serve their interests because they promote the 
harmonization of national regulatory frameworks enabling greater capital mobility, 
expansion of capitalist relations and replication of the Anglo-American free-market capitalist 
model.95 Geoffrey Underhill argues that international financial standards reduce the 
transaction costs associated with operating in foreign financial markets, expand financial 
firms’ access to foreign, more peripheral financial centers, and liberalize domestic securities 
markets to favor financial innovation. As he puts it, “the work of IOSCO is characterized by 
low-profile negotiations to harmonize securities regulation and supervision in order to 
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facilitate the emergence of transnational securities issuance and trading.”96 Critical scholars 
argue that international financial standards act in the material interests of transnational 
financial firms by harmonizing national regulatory frameworks. 
2.6.2 The Power of Transnational Private Financial Market Actors 
Within transnational private financial market actor theories scholars provide three competing 
explanations of the power of private financial market actors. The first set of scholars argue 
that the power of transnational private financial market actors is derived from their 
privileged access to international financial regulatory institutions, and the shift of the 
regulatory policymaking process from domestic to transnational policy processes. The shift 
from domestic political processes to transnational policy making processes has enabled 
financial regulatory reform processes to escape forms of political oversight since there is 
little or no political oversight at the transnational level. Underhill highlights that private 
financial market actors retain a privileged position in the international policy making process 
and are consulted exclusively. Underhill and Xiaoke Zhang highlight that societal actors such 
as NGOs are kept out of discussions about the content of international financial standards.97 
Underhill argues that private actors’ centrality in these institutions have enabled them to 
obtain their preference for financial market integration and market orientation in economic 
governance.98 Consistent with transgovernmental network theory, transnational private 
financial market actor models argue that national regulatory preferences are increasingly 
derived from international regulatory institutions and that this empowers private 
transnational market actors by moving the policy making process away from the domestic 
realm.  
 
A second set of scholars argues that the power of transnational private financial market 
actors is derived from their comparative knowledge advantage over financial market 
regulators. Torsten Strulik argues that financial markets are characterized by increasing 
complexity in financial systems. Politicians and regulators lack the “cognitive competence” 
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to keep up with innovation of the economy.99 Strulik argues that analyzing international 
financial standards requires an understanding of the characteristics and consequences of 
knowledge production within the financial system. Strulik argues that “a knowledge-based 
financial system requires organizations which are specialized in a knowledge-based 
production of system trust. With their expertise in credit assessments, rating agencies not 
only observe the trustworthiness of states, firms and financial instruments, they also expand 
the risk-processing capacity of the global financial system.”100 Important actors within the 
system are those that are able to provide knowledge and, through their reputations, ensure 
the maintenance of trust. In financial markets, these are predominantly private actors.  
 
Strulik remains agnostic about the impact of private actors’ involvement in the regulatory 
process. The current governance problem is characterized by the existence of ignorance 
defined as “unsolvable information problem”. Often the information problem is unsolvable 
because it no longer reflects a normal risk but reflects a constellation of risks that is too 
difficult to be understood by decision makers.101 Whether it is a positive development or not, 
transnational private financial market actors have become important actors in the creation of 
international and national regulatory regimes.  
 
Eleni Tsingou’s research on transnational policy networks adopts a similar theoretical 
approach to Strulik. Tsingou emphasizes that the power and authority of private 
transnational financial actors within transnational policy networks is derived from their 
knowledge and technical authority compared to public regulators. Tsingou’s analysis of OTC 
derivative regulation, and the favoring of self-regulatory private regimes over direct state 
regulation of OTC derivatives, suggests that it was the knowledge power of the transnational 
policy community, which enabled them to obtain their preference for self-regulation. Under 
Tsingou’s model, private financial firms are not the predominant actors in the policy process 
but their preferences are transmitted through transnational policy networks. Tsingou 
highlights the role of the Group of 30 (G30), which is comprised of senior public, private 
and academic representatives, generally considered to be market-friendly. Tsingou states that 
the G30’s work on derivatives was influential because the G30 “produced and transmitted 
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crucial knowledge on OTC derivatives markets and demonstrated that the private sector had 
the expertise, capacity and incentive to self-regulate.”102 Tsingou also highlights the role of 
the ISDA, which created the Master Agreement that formed a private self-regulatory regime 
for OTC derivatives. In forming a Master Agreement, ISDA was able to convince regulators 
and policymakers that OTC derivatives markets were capable of effective self-regulation.  
 
As discussed in the inter-state theory section, Germain’s historical materialist approach 
straddles both an inter-state and transnational private financial market actor analytical 
framework. Germain’s focus on the global economic and social order argues that the 
governance of international financial markets is driven by political, social and cultural forces, 
which emphasize the exercise of power by states and the nature of class relations.103 
Germain’s analytical framework is consistent with transnational private financial market 
actor models as he argues that the governance of international financial markets favors the 
interests of private financial market actors over wider social interests. Germain’s analysis of 
the pre-crisis global social and economic order argues that a coherent and consolidated 
“managerial class” has helped to embed liberal and neoliberal ideas in to the global financial 
order. This strength of the global capitalist class has led to the devolution of control away 
from national regulators towards private financial institutions.104 Similar to Tsingou, the 
power of this managerial class is the salience and power of their ideas. Germain also agrees 
with Strulik in arguing that financial firms have an information and knowledge advantage 
over regulators.105 Germain states that a combination of “technology, a more permissive 
political environment and changes in the behavioral incentives produced by their regulatory 
environment,” has enabled financial institutions to become more innovative and to create 
new revenue streams.106  
 
Germain’s analysis of the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis on the governance of 
global financial markets concludes that the established structure of power has not yet 
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changed. Germain’s analysis of the extent to which the crisis shifted the balance of power 
concludes the following: 
 
“we see at best a recalibration of public and private authority that leaves 
intact the economic basis of global capitalism, a reconfiguration of regulatory 
authority that allows the state to impose its demands more fully on financial 
systems but which does not modify unduly the essentially private character of 
those systems”107 
 
This is the paradox of the post-crisis financial order. Financial markets will be subject to 
greater regulation but regulation will continue to respect and serve the interests of financial 
markets rather than wider social interests. Germain’s 2012 introduction to the Review Of 
International Political Economy issue re-emphasizes how the balance of power remains firmly in 
the hands of globally dominant financial firms and that this is a result of “their information 
rich position in the global financial system and their extensive ties to key national regulatory 
communities.”108 
2.6.3 Transnational Private Financial Actor Theory and IOSCO 
Geoffrey Underhill’s analysis of IOSCO argues that the organization propels the 
transnationalization of financial markets. According to Underhill, IOSCO’s main goal is “the 
removal of regulatory barriers and barriers to the enforcement of national standards, which 
necessarily involves a degree of harmonization across regulatory boundaries.”109 Underhill 
highlights two cases of IOSCO’s policy initiatives that promulgate the transnationalization of 
securities markets. First, IOSCO’s work on cross-border listings sought to harmonize public 
listing requirements, especially disclosure requirements. This reflected the preferences of 
transnational financial market actors by cutting the costs of financial firms operating across 
borders. Second, IOSCO sought to harmonize capital adequacy requirements with the lower 
standards in the U.K. and E.U. Underhill states that the U.S. considered lowering its capital 
adequacy requirements to satisfy the interests of private financial firms. Underhill concludes 
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that, “if the United States cannot stand up for the principles and standards it seeks for its 
markets in an era of increasing globalization, few others can.”110  
 
Zhang and Underhill explain that IOSCO keeps itself at arms-length from traditional 
government oversight mechanisms and is more accountable to self-regulatory organizations 
and private market participants.111 Furthermore, IOSCO delegates some of its functions to 
private sector organizations. IOSCO delegated responsibility for accounting harmonization 
to the IASB and clearance and settlement issues to the G30.112 Underhill and Zhang 
conclude that the nature of IOSCO’s governance process, its internal institutional 
arrangements, and its accountability mechanisms, mean that IOSCO represents the interests 
of private sector participants rather than the broader public.113 Underhill argues that the 
influence of IOSCO on the national regulatory framework of the U.S. and other states 
demonstrates the power of transgovernmental networks of IOSCO and the transmission of 
the regulatory preferences of transnational financial market actors to national regulatory 
frameworks.  Tsingou’s analysis of OTC derivatives market regulation touches on the role of 
IOSCO, as it had addressed the regulatory issue area. Tsingou’s analysis of OTC derivatives 
market regulation highlights how transnational private financial market actors were able to 
avoid direct regulation through their authority at the transnational level.  
 
Transnational financial private market actor models have identified the interests and 
influence of private financial market actors in the creation of international financial 
standards. As Underhill has demonstrated, private financial market actors benefit from 
regulatory harmonization. Underhill, and Underhill and Zhang demonstrate that private 
financial market actors benefit from preferential access to institutions such as IOSCO. 
Strulik and Tsingou have argued that private financial market actors benefit from their 
comparative information advantage.  
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2.6.4 Limitations to Transnational Private Financial Market Actor Models 
Despite the important contributions of private transnational financial market actor models, 
there are a number of limitations to this approach that need to be addressed. International 
securities market standards are not harmonized as Underhill hypothesized. For instance, 
cross-border disclosure requirement and capital adequacy standards remain disharmonized 
despite Underhill’s contention to the contrary. The United States maintains U.S. GAAP 
accounting standards, whereas the rest of the world has converted to International Financial 
Reporting Standards. U.S. capital adequacy standards also continue to differ from the U.K. 
and E.U. Interviews with senior securities regulators and senior members of IOSCO reveal 
that securities market regulation remains nationally distinct. Those officials also stated that 
the historical development of securities markets and differentiation in the level of 
development, sophistication, and financial products offered between national securities 
market means that regulatory harmonization is an unlikely prospect. Regulatory 
harmonization is partial.  
 
Third, and most importantly, efforts to establish harmonized financial regulatory 
frameworks are driven by the ideational preferences of securities regulators. As chapter five 
and six of this thesis discusses, international credit rating agency and hedge fund standards 
were created to promote harmonized financial regulatory frameworks. In the case of credit 
rating agencies, IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct were created to 
promote the harmonization of national regulatory frameworks amidst regulatory reform in 
the U.S. and E.U. Securities regulators sought harmonized national regulatory frameworks in 
order to ensure common assessments of credit worthiness across jurisdictions. Securities 
regulators were concerned that dual systems of rating regulation would create dual systems 
of assessing credit worthiness and believed this was not in the interests of protecting 
investors. In the case of hedge funds, international securities market standards were 
produced by IOSCO’s Technical Committee at the beginning of the international financial 
regulatory reform process to establish common information and reporting requirements that 
would enable regulators to monitor the systemic risk that hedge funds posed. As Ethiopis 
Tafara and Robert Peterson, the former Director and current Deputy Director of the Office 
of International Affairs (OIA) at the U.S. SEC, discuss in a 2007 article in the Harvard 
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International Law Journal, regulators’ preference for harmonized financial regulatory 
frameworks are driven by their ideational preferences, not political pressure from private 
financial market actors.114 Andrew Baker concurs.115  
2.7 Limitations to IPE Literature on the Politics of International Financial 
Regulation 
There are a number of limitations to existing IPE literature that this thesis seeks to address. 
These limitations fall in to two categories: empirical and theoretical.  
2.7.1 Empirical Limitations to IPE Literature 
Existing IPE literature has analyzed a number of dimensions of IOSCO and the politics of 
international securities market regulation. However, important international securities 
standards have not yet been analyzed. This includes: IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s 
Methodology, IOSCO’s MMoU, and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds. 
These empirical cases are important institutional initiatives within IOSCO and they reveal 
important political dynamics in international securities market regulation. This thesis 
addresses this empirical gap.  
 
The second empirical limitation is that existing IPE literature has conducted single case 
studies or multiple case studies in a single time period. Whilst this empirical approach is 
understandable, this thesis argues that it has led to a myopic view of the political dynamics of 
international securities market regulation. In explaining single financial regulatory standards, 
or regulatory standards from a single era, existing literature has attributed cause to certain 
political factors that were present at the time of their creation. This has caused existing 
literature to explain international financial standards through the role and influence of just 
one of three competing political arenas: inter-state, domestic, and transnational. This thesis 
has conducted an empirical analysis of international securities standards over the lifetime of 
the issue, from the genesis of securities market regulatory cooperation in 1983, through to 
the post-2007/2008 financial regulatory reform process. This research approach reveals that 
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international financial standards are derived from different political arenas across time and 
across issue areas.  
2.7.2 Theoretical Limitations to IPE Literature  
This thesis argues and demonstrates that international financial standards are derived from 
different political arenas and that the political arena from which they are derived depends on 
the historical and political context of each regulatory standard. Existing literature is unable to 
account for the differentiated sources of international securities standards and the 
differentiated sources of power in the promotion and enforcement of those standards. As 
Helleiner and Pagliari state, existing international financial regulatory politics literature 
“points to a distinct political arena – interstate, domestic, and transnational – as the source 
of the creation and strengthening of international financial standards.”116  
 
Interstate, domestic political, and transnational private financial market actor theories 
recognize the power and authority of regulators to create international financial standards 
through transgovernmental networks, such as IOSCO. However, they argue that 
international financial standards are not derived from the preferences of financial regulators 
but from the political and material interests of states, domestic political actors, or private 
transnational financial market actors. Existing literature correctly argues that regulators are 
not wholly autonomous actors and are subject to political pressure from states and their 
domestic legislatures. Of the international securities standards analyzed as part of this 
dissertation, little evidence has been found that IOSCO was subject to direct political 
pressure from transnational financial market actors to create international financial 
standards. Instead, private financial market firms have lobbied at the domestic political level 
to obtain their interests. This thesis argues that, although regulators have been subject to 
political pressure from states and domestic political actors, they have also created 
international securities standards at their own initiative. Those international securities 
standards have been created to obtain the professional interests of securities regulators, 
rather than their bureaucratic political interests. These international securities standards are 
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derived from the transnational level and the policy preferences of the network of regulators 
within the transgovernmental network.  
 
The central theoretical limitation to existing IPE literature is that it is unable to account for 
the differentiated political sources of international financial standards. This limitation 
warrants theoretical innovation. In order to achieve this aim this thesis proposes the use of a 
revised PA analytical framework to explain the creation and strengthening of international 
securities market standards.  
2.8 Principal-Agent Theory 
PA theory provides an analytical tool to understand how and when IOs act autonomously. 
PA theory does so by establishing how and under what conditions states exercise control 
over IOs. PA theory in IR literature was pioneered by Mark Pollack’s International Organization 
article on the European Union in 1997, which analyzed the delegation of governance tasks to 
supranational public bureaucracies within the EU.117 PA theory in IO and IR literature 
emerged out of U.S. domestic politics literature in the U.S., which applied theories of the 
firm to understanding how domestic legislatures do and should control the behavior of 
opportunistic public bureaucracies.118 IR literature began to apply PA theory to analyze the 
dynamics between states and international public bureaucracies and how states ensure that 
IOs act consistently with the interests of states. 
 
David Singer pioneered the use of PA theory in IPE and, more specifically, financial 
regulatory politics literature. Singer analyzes the impact of PA relationships at the domestic 
political level on the creation of international financial regulatory standards at the 
transnational level. Singer argues that by threatening the autonomy, prestige and future 
career opportunities, domestic legislatures exercise control over regulators. As a result, when 
domestic financial systems suffer bouts of financial instability and threats to domestic 
competitiveness, securities market regulators create international financial standards. 
International financial standards enable domestic politicians to responding to financial 
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instability, whilst reducing the costs of adjustment by exporting domestic financial regulatory 
demands to foreign financial centers.  
2.8.1 PA Theory in IO and IPE Literature 
Central to PA theory is the act of delegation. As Hawkins et al. explain, “delegation is a 
conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on 
behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and must be 
revocable by the principal.”119 The conditional grant of authority enables the principal to 
renegotiate the contract with the agent to define the conditions of the act of delegation, 
which enables the principal to exercise control over the agent.   
 
PA theory assumes that bureaucracies are opportunistic political actors who seek to expand 
their mission and accumulate political and material resources.120 As D. Roderick Kiewet and 
Michael Daniel McCubbins explain, “agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own 
interests subject only to the constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal.”121  
Through the act of delegation, principals can and often do incur agency losses defined as 
“costs when agents engage in undesired independent action or when they [principals] expend 
resources to contract with or monitor and control those agents.”122 Independent action by 
agents occurs through agency slack and occurs in the form of shirking and slippage. Shirking 
represents the minimization of the agent’s efforts when acting in the principal’s interests, 
whereas slippage occurs when the agent shifts policy away from the preferences of the 
principal towards its own.  
 
The principal forms contracts, administrative procedures and other mechanisms of control 
that define the scope of the activity of the agent to ensure that the agent acts in the interests 
of the principal. PA theory adopts a ‘logic of consequences’ approach, in which the behavior 
of agents is conditioned by the expectation of the consequences of their behavior.123 It is 
through the logic of consequences that principals are able to control the behavior of their 
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agents. The formation of contracts and administrative procedures come at a cost. The 
rationalist tradition of PA theory contends that “principals will adopt a given control 
mechanism only if its cost is less than the sum of agency losses that it reduces.”124 Consistent 
with rational design literature, PA literature presumes that states’ investment in institutions 
to ensure outcomes within IOs is dependent on the extent to which they expect the IO to 
deviate from the interests of states, and the rate of return on investing in those institutions. 
PA theory in its present form argues that outcomes at IOs are derived from the preferences 
of states who exercise control over IOs. 
 
PA theory also utilizes the concept of discretion to discuss how IOs or transgovernmental 
networks exercise agency in the international system. PA theory states that within a 
Principal-Agent contract, principals grant agents discretion. Discretion is defined as 
“specifying the principal’s goals but not the specific actions the agent must take to 
accomplish those objectives.”125 When IOs act within the zone of discretion, they are acting 
in the interests of the states, but act semi-autonomously by choosing the range of actions to 
fulfill states’ specific goals. Singer’s analytical framework highlights how this concept is used 
by existing literature. Financial regulators go to the transnational level to create an 
international financial standard to obtain the policy goals or interest of domestic political 
actors. This is an example of how the agent exercises discretion to obtain the principal’s 
specified policy goals.  
2.8.2 The Contributions of PA Theory to International Financial Regulatory Politics Literature 
A PA analytical framework provides important theoretical concepts that enable IPE 
literature to establish an integrative approach to international financial regulatory politics. PA 
theory’s identification of mechanisms of control highlights how domestic political actors are 
able to exercise control over outcomes at IOSCO. As David Singer discusses, domestic 
political actors exercise control over outcomes at IOSCO by threatening the power, 
autonomy and prestige of domestic securities market regulators. This thesis also reveals that 
domestic legislatures exercise control by granting or withholding statutory authority to 
govern previously unregulated financial market actors from domestic securities regulators. 
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PA theory’s concept of multiple agents is also able to account for the role and influence of 
states in the strengthening of international securities market standards. Kenneth Arrow first 
introduced the concept of multiple agents in 1984. Arrow is not an IO, IR or IPE scholar, 
but was an economist. The concept of multiple agents helps us to account for the role and 
influence of states on the creation and strengthening of international securities market 
standards. Arrow discusses the issue of the hidden-information problem. The hidden-
information problem refers to the fact that “the agent has made some observations that the 
principal has not made. The agent uses (and should use) this observation in making 
decisions; however, the principal cannot check whether the agent has used his or her 
information in the way that best serves the principal’s interests.”126In order to overcome this 
monitoring issue, the principal utilizes multiple agents that also represent and act in the 
interests of the principal. This accounts for the role of states in the strengthening of 
IOSCO’s international financial standards. Finance ministries also oversee the outcomes of 
international financial regulatory organizations, particularly after financial crises. When 
finance ministries are unhappy with the outcomes of these institutions and feel they need to 
improve their financial regulatory frameworks, they exercise control over these institutions. 
In the case of IOSCO’s Methodology, financial ministries exercised control over IOSCO 
through their influence over relatively senior international financial institutions: the IMF and 
World Bank.  
 
PA theory’s concept of discretion provides an important theoretical concept to describe the 
role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities regulators through 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee. The concept of discretion recognizes that the semi-
autonomous actions of the agent are still consistent with the specific interests of the 
principal. Discretion sits in contrast to agency shirking or slippage. When exercising 
discretion, the agent is not pursuing its own interests at the cost of the principal. The agent 
acts in the interests of the principal by exercising the discretion granted to them by the 
principal. The interests of the principal and the agent must be aligned. When agents are 
acting consistently with the preferences of the principal whilst exercising discretion, agents 
are operating within the “zone of discretion”. However, when agents, or in this case 
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securities regulators, exercise discretion, they demonstrate initiative and create governance 
regimes that are important to the governance of international financial markets. The concept 
of discretion helps to establish how and under what conditions international financial 
regulatory standards are derived from the preferences of the community of regulators within 
IOSCO. International regulatory standards must serve the interests of regulators, domestic 
legislatures and states. A PA analytical approach makes two important insights in to the role 
and function of securities market regulators in the creation of international securities market 
standards. 
 
A PA analytical approach establishes that the transgovernmental network of securities 
regulators demonstrate agency in the governance of international financial markets and that 
this agency is derived from the domestic political context. The authority of securities 
regulators’ is derived from their domestic institutional environment. The agency of securities 
regulators is acquired through the discretion granted to them to create international financial 
standards. This has led to the creation of governance mechanisms to address threats to the 
integrity and stability of the domestic securities market system that they regulate. When 
financial regulators create international financial standards to address threats to the integrity 
and stability of domestic securities market systems, they are acting in their principled 
professional interests. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 discusses, the creation of IOSCO’s 
Principles for MOUs, IOSCO’s MMoUs, IOSCO’s Principles, and IOSCO’s Methodology were 
driven by the preferences and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities 
regulators within IOSCO.  
2.8.3 Limitations to PA Theory 
The first limitation to PA theory is that it has not yet incorporated an analysis of 
transgovernmental networks in the chain of delegation. PA theory in IO literature has 
analyzed the principal-agent relationship between states and international organizations.  
Existing PA theory analyzes a simple delegation chain between states and IOs as 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1 Delegation Chain within Existing IO literature 
 
David Singer’s PA theory incorporates an analysis of transgovernmental networks. However, 
Singer’s PA model does not consider transgovernmental networks to be an important 
explanatory variable in the creation of international financial standards. Singer states, 
 
“[transgovernmental regulatory networks] are not constituted by treaty and 
are not granted agency – legal or otherwise – to act in international affairs… 
ultimately, a compelling explanation of regulator behavior must be grounded 
in domestic politics (including domestic institutions) and the domestic 
ramifications of globalization.”127 
 
Singer argues that transgovernmental networks are epiphenomenal and, therefore, focuses 
on what domestic political factors lead regulators to create international financial standards. 
This thesis argues and demonstrates that transgovernmental networks are an important 
explanatory variable in explaining the creation and strengthening of international financial 
standards and turns its focus on to what leads the community of securities market regulators 
to create and strengthen international financial standards.  
 
PA theory does analyze a number of alternate chains of delegation ranging from multiple 
principals to multiple acts of delegation. PA theory has not yet encapsulated the nature of 
the delegation chain that this thesis highlights. The PA relationship highlighted by this thesis 
involves the delegation of authority from domestic legislatures to domestic securities 
regulators. Securities regulators use the considerable autonomy and discretion granted to 
them by domestic legislatures to establish international regulatory standards at the 
transnational level, through transgovernmental networks. Furthermore, multiple agents are 
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used to monitor the creation and strengthening of international financial standards including 
finance ministries. This chain of delegation is represented below in Figure 2.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Delegation Chain in International Securities Market Regulation 
 
The second limitation of existing PA theory is that it underemphasizes the role of IOs or 
transgovernmental networks in the international system. PA theory underemphasizes the 
role of IOs and transgovernmental networks because it establishes an incomplete model of 
IO preferences. PA theory assumes that IO preferences are derived from rationalist, material 
and bureaucratic political interests. PA theory presumes that ideational factors are exogenous 
to explanations of outcomes or changes in international financial regulatory organizations. 
This thesis highlights that this provides a limited view of the preferences of financial 
regulators by demonstrating that than pursuing international securities market standards 
based on rationalist, material or bureaucratic political interests, securities regulators have 
created international financial standards to obtain their principled professional interests. This 
highlights that the ideational interests of securities market regulators are an important 
explanatory factor in the creation of international financial standards. 
 
PA theory recognizes the role of IOs in outcomes in the international system through 
concepts such as agency slack and discretion. However, PA theory claims that states 
overcome agency slack through systems of monitoring and mechanisms of control over IO 
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outcomes.128 PA theory’s discussion of discretion emphasizes how states benefit from the 
agency of IOs and transgovernmental networks, rather than emphasizing the role of IOs or 
transgovernmental networks in governing the international system. This is because existing 
PA theory assumes that the preferences of transgovernmental networks are bureaucratic and 
material, thereby discounting or dismissing the ideational preferences of transgovernmental 
networks. As Stephen Nelson and Catherine Weaver argue, ““PA models largely conform to 
economistic analysis by assuming IOs to be self-interested, rational actors who have 
predefined (and unchanging) preferences centered on the expansion of staff, their missions 
and resources. [What’s] missing is a persuasive theory of IO identity and interests that goes 
beyond this blanket assumption to understand the constitution of IO preferences”129 PA 
theory overlooks the internal cultural values or ideational beliefs of IOs or 
transgovernmental networks. It is necessary to better account for and theorize the role and 
influence of transgovernmental networks (or agents more generally) within PA theory.  
 
In order to better account for the role and influence of transgovernmental networks it is 
necessary for PA theory to open the “black box” of regulators’ interests. As Catherine 
Weaver explains, “the PA model assumes, rather than explains, IO preferences. More often 
than not PA analysis tends to “black box” the IO in a manner that obscures a clear sense of 
the internal “social life” and dynamics of bureaucratic politics.”130 In opening the “black 
box” of regulators’ preferences, a PA model that incorporates analysis of regulators’ 
preferences or bureaucratic culture can better account for outcomes at international financial 
regulatory outcomes. This work builds on the emerging literature set within IO literature that 
identifies bureaucratic culture as an important explanatory variable in explaining outcomes at 
IOs.131 
 
PA theory has not shed enough light on to what happens within the “zone of discretion” 
and what explains international financial regulatory organizations’ creation of international 
financial standards. Securities market regulators have created international financial 
regulatory standards that export national financial regulatory frameworks to foreign financial 
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centers and established cooperative regulatory mechanisms. The creation of these standards 
reflects the preferences of their domestic legislatures as they are created to fulfill their 
domestic regulatory responsibilities and reflect domestic regulatory frameworks. These 
standards, therefore, are reflective of the transgovernmental network acting within the “zone 
of discretion”. This thesis argues that the principled professional interests of the 
transgovernmental securities market regulators is an important explanatory variable in the 
creation of this set of international financial standards.  
 
The third limitation of PA theory is that it has not yet analyzed the role of multiple agents 
over outcomes in the international system. This thesis argues that the role of multiple agents 
can account for the role of the state in international financial standards. The role of multiple 
agents highlights that, whilst securities regulators are responsible for international securities 
market standards, finance ministries retain overarching responsibilities for the economy as a 
whole. These departments have historically been involved in international financial 
regulation and the international financial architecture through the G7/G20 in the wake of 
financial crises. Their role has been historically focused on coordinating financial regulatory 
reform processes by committing themselves and other members to implementing 
international financial standards.  
 
The role of finance ministries in international financial regulation proves that there is a 
degree of agent overlap and that there are multiple agents. Finance ministries and treasury 
departments within the G7 or G20 traditionally view international financial standards 
through an inter-state lens, focusing on the costs of non-compliance by peripheral financial 
centers and/or competing financial centers. This is why their role is focused on 
implementation of international financial standards after domestic policy preferences are 
established. If these actors perceive that international financial standards are not sufficiently 
implemented, they will place pressure on their regulatory counter-parts to improve 
implementation; as is the case in IOSCO’s Methodology. These actors have placed pressure on 
their regulatory counter-parts through the IMF and World Bank, within which they are 
powerful political actors.  
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2.9 Conclusion: Contributions to PA Theory and IPE literature 
IPE literature has made an important contribution to the study of international financial 
regulatory politics. IPE literature has identified the different political sources of international 
financial standards and the interests of the relevant political actors in creating them. IPE 
literature has also identified the source of power of each political actor in creating, 
promoting and enforcing international financial standards. Furthermore, IPE literature has 
conducted important but limited empirical studies of international securities standards 
including: MOUs, cross-border disclosure requirements for public listings, capital adequacy 
requirements, hedge funds, OTC derivatives, and credit rating agencies. There are a number 
of limitations to existing literature that this thesis will seek to address.  
 
There are important empirical gaps in the IPE literature’s analysis of international securities 
market regulation. First, there are three important international financial standards that have 
not been analyzed by IPE literature. Those standards are IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s 
Methodology, IOSCO’s MMoU, and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds. 
These international securities standards have been important in the governance of 
international securities markets. They also reveal important political dynamics that further 
our understanding of international financial regulatory politics. Second, existing empirical 
studies have also overlooked a number of important aspects in the creation of international 
securities standards. Accounts of post-crisis regulatory reforms have focused on shifts in 
domestic political preferences and contexts in causing the creation of international financial 
standards. With the exception of Eric Helleiner,132 these accounts have overlooked the 
preferences of the community of regulators. Finally, IPE literature has limited its empirical 
analysis to single financial regulatory standards or an analysis of limited time periods. This 
thesis argues that this has led scholars to overlook the differentiated political sources of 
international securities market standards across the lifetime of IOSCO. 
 
The results of this research project conclude that international securities standards were 
derived from different political arenas at different times in the history of IOSCO.  The first 
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category of standards was created by the transgovernmental network, driven by the 
principled professional interests of securities market regulators. These standards were 
created to address threats to the integrity and stability of domestic financial markets by 
under-regulated or ineffectively regulated jurisdictions. This includes IOSCO’s Principles, 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s MMoU. IOSCO’s Principles was created to improve 
national regulatory frameworks in peripheral jurisdictions to improve financial instability 
after a series of financial crises impacted the stability of dominant financial centers. IOSCO’s 
Principles for MoUs was created to address the threat of under regulated jurisdictions in foreign 
financial centers – predominantly Switzerland at the time. IOSCO’s MMoU was created to 
raise financial regulatory standards and to promote cooperation with foreign regulators.  
 
The second category of international financial standards was driven by the preferences of 
domestic legislatures and the transgovernmental network. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and 
Code of Conduct was created in response to domestic legislatures indication that strengthening 
the regulation of rating agencies was a priority after rating agencies’ heavily publicized failure 
to warn investors of the impending collapse of large, publicly-listed companies. IOSCO’s 
international credit rating agency standards were created after domestic legislatures’ policy 
preferences had changed. At the same time, the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators exercised their discretion in creating international securities market 
standards to promote the creation of harmonized national financial regulatory frameworks. 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct created an internationally consistent regulatory regime that was 
applied in different jurisdictions. The implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was strengthened when domestic legislatures from developed 
financial markets began to favor the direct regulation of rating agencies after widespread 
instances of conflicts of interest and rating shopping in the securitized debt market. This 
highlights the role of domestic legislatures in the strengthening of international financial 
standards.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds 
were created once domestic political contexts in the U.S. and E.U. shifted to favor the direct 
regulation of hedge funds. Despite the majority of securities regulators favoring the direct 
regulation of hedge funds in the years before the crisis, the U.S. domestic legislature was 
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unwilling to grant the U.S. SEC the statutory authority to do so. After the crisis, the 
domestic political context shifted in favor of directly regulating hedge funds. Once the 
domestic political context had shifted in favor of regulating hedge funds, the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators created international financial 
standards to promote common regulatory frameworks that would enable securities 
regulators to monitor the systemic risk posed by internationally active hedge funds.  
 
Finally, IOSCO’s Methodology was driven by the preferences of powerful states. States placed 
pressure on securities regulators to create a methodology through the IMF and World Bank. 
States with dominant financial centers did so because of the perceived costs of under 
regulated jurisdictions had changed. This led finance ministers and world leaders within the 
G7 to establish and promote the international financial standards project, investing in 
international financial institutions to raise financial standards in foreign jurisdictions.  
  
This thesis argues that a PA analytical framework can account for when and under what 
conditions international securities standards are derived from the community of regulators 
within the transgovernmental network, from domestic political actors or states. PA theory 
recognizes that regulators are subject to the exercise of control by their domestic legislature 
through public oversight and through the granting or withholding of statutory authority. 
This thesis also highlights the role of discretion in granting agency to securities market 
regulators. The “zone of discretion” granted to regulators enables them to create 
international financial standards so long as they act consistently with the preferences of the 
domestic legislature. When securities markets in developed financial centers face threats to 
their integrity and stability from more peripheral financial centers, regulators demonstrate 
agency in the creation of international securities market standards. PA theory provides 
important analytical tools to help understand the role and influence of states. The concept of 
multiple agents can account for the role of finance ministries in placing pressure on IOSCO 
to improve the implementation of IOSCO’s Principles through the creation of IOSCO’s 
Methodology. 
 
A PA approach seeks to make an important contribution to IPE literature by proposing an 
analytical framework that integrates the insights of currently competing analytical 
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frameworks. A PA approach can better account for the nature of domestic political actors, 
states, and transgovernmental networks’ preferences and influence in the governance of 
international financial markets.  
 
PA theory also has some important theoretical limitations that this thesis seeks to address. 
PA theory has not yet analyzed the nature of the PA relationship within transgovernmental 
networks. As this chapter has discussed, this thesis highlights how securities regulators create 
transgovernmental networks and international financial standards by exercising the 
considerable autonomy and discretion granted to them by domestic legislatures. Also, PA 
theory currently presumes that ideational factors are exogenous to outcomes in the 
international system because outcomes at IOs are ultimately derived from the preferences of 
states. This thesis argues that it is necessary to shine a light on what happens within the 
“zone of discretion” by analyzing the source of regulators preferences in the creation of 
international financial standards. By analyzing what occurs within the “zone of discretion”, 
and recognizing the importance and influence of ideational factors in the creation of 
international securities market standards, this thesis overcomes an important theoretical 
limitation of existing PA theory. 
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Chapter 3  
 The Creation and Strengthening of International 
Securities Standards for Memoranda of 
Understanding  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will seek to explain the creation and strengthening of international securities 
standards for MoUs. In the 1980s, securities regulators faced increasing threats to their 
ability to protect the integrity of their respective securities markets. Securities market 
regulators faced difficulties in prosecuting cases of financial crime, predominantly in the 
form of insider trading, because they originated in foreign jurisdictions. In response to this, 
securities regulators created MoUs, which established information sharing and mutual legal 
assistance mechanisms that would assist regulators in investigating and prosecuting cases of 
financial crime. MoUs assisted regulators in overcoming legal barriers to sharing information 
with foreign regulators, and enabled regulators to utilize information obtained from foreign 
regulators during prosecution.  
 
MoUs were pioneered by the U.S. SEC’s Michael Mann as an effective regulatory response 
to the first two successful prosecutions of cross-border financial crime involving Swiss 
financial entities in 1981. IOSCO was created in 1983, in part, to help regulators identify 
common solutions to address the threat of cross-border financial crime. IOSCO’s first 
Working Group was created to address the issue of cross-border financial crime. In 1991 
IOSCO produced its first international securities market standard, IOSCO’s Principles for 
MoUs. IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was created to promote the adoption of cooperative 
mechanisms to assist in the prosecution of financial crime and to identify how securities 
market regulators, from both developed and emerging markets, could more effectively 
prosecute cases of cross-border financial crime. 
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From their creation in 1991 until 2001, IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was promoted through 
the diplomacy and encouragement of securities market regulators from predominantly 
developed securities markets. IOSCO’s Technical Committee encouraged IOSCO members 
to sign MoUs with foreign counterparts by drafting a number of resolutions and reports. 
These resolutions and reports served to identify non-cooperative jurisdictions that had failed 
to establish information sharing mechanisms or provide assistance in the prosecution of 
financial crime. This led to the formation of a network of bilateral MoUs, which left critical 
gaps in the international securities market system. These critical gaps were revealed in the 
wake of September 11 terrorist attacks. Securities regulators realized that if securities 
regulators were required to assist federal investigators in identifying the perpetrators of the 
attacks, their efforts to identify the perpetrators would have been limited by gaps in the 
international system of MoUs.  
 
The September 11 terrorist attacks established a new tenor in regulatory cooperation, as 
foreign regulators were more willing to provide assistance, and realized the costs of an 
ineffective regulatory regime for the prosecution of cross-border financial crime. In 
response, IOSCO created the MMoU. IOSCO, led by former Chairman of the Executive 
Committee Jane Diplock, sought to have all of its members as signatories by January 1, 2013. 
As of 2013, 92 of IOSCO’s members are signatories to IOSCO’s MMoU and 26 members 
have committed themselves to gaining the legal authority to becoming full signatories to 
IOSCO’s MMoU.1  
 
The creation and strengthening of international standards for MoUs is best explained 
through a transgovernmental network perspective. Securities regulators initiated the creation 
of MoUs as a novel form of governance in the early 1980s to enable regulators to fulfill their 
regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by their domestic legislature. IOSCO’s Principles 
for MoUs was established in response to threats to the integrity of domestic securities markets 
by financial globalization and technological innovation.  
 
                                                 
1 IOSCO 2013  
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Regulators demonstrated agency in four ways. First, the U.S. SEC’s Michael Mann created an 
MoU with foreign regulators that established a cooperative regulatory mechanism that would 
enable regulators to prosecute cases of cross-border financial crime. Second, regulators 
created IOSCO to establish a cooperative governance solution to the issue of cross-border 
financial crime, and identify common barriers to information sharing and mutual legal 
assistance. Third, regulators proposed the creation of international financial standards for 
MoUs in the form of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs, which established common systems of 
governance to deal with the issue of cross-border financial crime. Finally, the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators acted independently of domestic 
political pressure. As Michael Mann explained,  “the only "pressure" I recall was to do the 
right thing.”2 IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was created to enable securities regulators to fulfill 
the regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by domestic legislatures. This demonstrates 
the validity of a PA analytical approach, as securities regulators were acting within the “zone 
of discretion” in the creation of MoUs and IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs. IOSCO’s Prnciples for 
MoUs was created by securities regulators at the transnational level to enable securities 
regulators to fulfill the regulatory responsibilities delegated to them at the domestic level. 
Regulators exercised their discretion in establishing an international regulatory regime to 
govern cross-border financial crime.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs influenced the domestic regulatory and legislative frameworks of 
states. The recommendations of the report formed the basis of regulators’ lobbying efforts 
of their respective legislatures. This granted them the necessary statutory powers that 
enabled them to share information and provide legal assistance to foreign regulators, as well 
as allowing the use of information obtained from foreign regulators to be used in domestic 
courts of law. The case of IOSCO’s cross-border financial crime regime demonstrates the 
influence of the preferences of the transgovernmental network on the policy preferences of 
states.  
 
The strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs through the creation IOSCO’s MMoU in 
May 2002 is best explained through a transgovernmental network perspective. Securities 
market regulators exercised the discretion granted to them by domestic legislatures. The 
                                                 
2 Mann 2012 
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creation of IOSCO’s MMoU, and its correlation with the events of September 11, suggests 
that it was created to pre-empt domestic political pressure and to address traditional foreign 
policy concerns. The idea of creating IOSCO’s MMoU was proposed at the first meeting of 
the Technical Committee after September 11 in October 2001. However, an interview with a 
regulator who attended the meeting revealed that U.S. regulators did not propose the idea. 
Regulators had also expressed concerns about the limitations of the existing network of 
MoUs prior to September 11. Securities regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee 
created IOSCO’s MMoU to address limitations to IOSCO’s cross-border financial crime 
regime by standardizing MoUs and by centralizing and multilateralizing the MoU process 
through IOSCO.  IOSCO’s Technical Committee demonstrated initiative in creating 
IOSCO’s MMoU, and demonstrated that the MMoU was created to address concerns about 
the effective regulation of international securities markets.  
3.2 The Creation of Memoranda of Understanding 
The U.S. SEC’s investigation of suspected insider trading during the takeover of St Joe 
Minerals by Seagrams, and of Santa Fe International by the Kuwaiti Foreign Investment 
office, led to the creation of the first MoU. Both cases were illustrative of the challenges that 
securities regulators faced in the era of financial globalization and technological innovation. 
This was the first case in which securities regulators conducted foreign policy on behalf of 
their respective states and securities regulators negotiated a cooperative governance solution 
that enabled them to fulfill their domestic regulatory responsibilities. 
3.2.1 St Joe Minerals and Santa Fe International 
In March 1981, the U.S. SEC began an investigation of the takeover of St Joe Minerals by 
Seagrams. The U.S. SEC was investigating a high volume of trading in the purchasing of 
options in St Joe Minerals prior to the announcement of the takeover under the Swiss-based 
accounts of Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) and its principal advisor Giuseppe Tome.3 
The U.S. SEC successfully sued BSI and was granted a court order to freeze the BSI’s New 
                                                 
3 See SEC v Banca della Svizerra Italiana 92 FRD 111 (SDNY 1981) as discussed in Lowenfeld 1996, p. 166 – 
179 
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York-based assets by Judge Polack. The U.S. SEC also filed and won a motion to compel 
discovery of the identities of BSI’s customers.  
 
Soon after the investigation of St Joe Minerals (and as the case proceeded) in October 1981, 
the U.S. SEC began investigating high volume trading in the purchase of options of Santa Fe 
International prior to the announcement by the Kuwaiti Investment Office of its takeover 
bid. Five of the largest Swiss Banks were under investigation. Judge Polack’s decision was 
monumental in both cases, as it would determine whether Swiss banks could shield the 
identity of their clients from discovery by the U.S. SEC. As Michael Mann recounts: 
 
“At this time, the SEC had an enormous weapon -- the Swiss banks were 
looking down the barrel of Judge Pollock’s judgment in which he ordered a 
fine of $50,000 against BSI for each day it failed to comply with his order to 
identify its client.”4 
 
Swiss government regulators could not compel BSI to comply with Judge Pollack’s orders, 
and Swiss banks were unable to reveal the identity of their clients due to the nature of 
Switzerland’s bank secrecy laws. As Michael Mann explains:  
 
“What grew out of that confrontation were approaches to the SEC by the 
Swiss government and the Swiss banks. In sum, they argued that they 
wanted to cooperate but they had to respect their bank secrecy laws. In the 
end they agreed to develop a mechanism pursuant to which they could 
legally respect those laws and still provide the information.”5 
 
The St Joe’s Mineral case established an important legal precedent and revealed the unique 
legal barriers that regulators faced in effectively prosecuting cases of financial crime. 
Although foreign regulators were not resistant to sharing information and providing mutual 
legal assistance, they were legally hamstrung by domestic legislation that restricted their 
ability to assist foreign regulators. 
                                                 
4 Mann 2011 
5 Mann 2011  
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3.2.2 The Discovery of Legal Barriers to the Prosecution of Cross-border Financial Crime 
U.S. regulators faced significant legal barriers in obtaining information and mutual legal 
assistance from foreign regulators. Swiss banking secrecy laws prohibited regulators from 
providing information to foreign regulators. Swiss courts allow regulators to provide 
assistance only when the crime fulfils the criteria of criminal duality. As David Chaikin 
explains, “the dual criminality principle requires that the relevant conduct alleged in the 
foreign request amounts to a crime not only in the requesting State but also in Switzerland, 
assuming hypothetically it was committed there.”6 At the time, insider trading was not a 
crime in Switzerland. This was problematic because nobody wanted to “spend their career 
litigating the agreement after the fact at the Hague, or litigating at the Hague for 
enforceability”7 to establish legal precedent that would allow regulators to cooperate with 
their foreign counterparts. Regulators needed to establish a mechanism that would allow 
regulators to exchange information and provide legal assistance without circumventing Swiss 
law, and without being overly cumbersome to negotiate. It was from these legal barriers to 
cooperation that the idea of an MoU was born.  
3.2.3 The Legal and Regulatory Benefits to MoUs 
U.S. and Swiss regulators proposed the use of an MoU after a series of discussions that were 
aimed at identifying how U.S. regulators could obtain the information necessary for the 
prosecution of cross-border financial crime whilst respecting the legal constraints on Swiss 
regulators and Swiss banks. A non-binding MoU was used for three reasons. First, an MoU 
helped regulators avoid the legal barriers that regulators faced in sharing information and 
providing mutual legal assistance by obtaining the consent of customers to turn documents 
over to the U.S. SEC to assist in their investigation.8 The MoU achieved this by establishing 
a non-binding agreement with Swiss-based banks called Convention XVI. Convention XVI 
“was a private agreement among the bankers that provided, if certain circumstances were 
met, that the banks would have in their hands waivers of Swiss bank secrecy that would 
allow them to comply with the SEC’s request that would be made through inter-
                                                 
6 Chaikin 2006, p. 201 
7 The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 9 
8 Mann 2011  
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governmental channels.”9 Rather than requiring regulatory harmonization, the U.S. SEC’s 
MoU established a statement of intent that committed banks to provide information 
necessary for the prosecution of cross-border financial crime. This enabled Swiss banks to 
maintain banking secrecy laws whilst providing assistance in instances of suspected cross-
border financial crime.10 
 
Second, MoUs established a non-binding, voluntary agreement between the U.S. SEC and its 
designated counterparts (sometimes a securities regulator and sometimes a government 
department or agency), outlining how cooperation would occur and how information 
requests would be handled. By utilizing an MoU, the U.S. SEC was able to avoid overly 
cumbersome treaty-based negotiations and was able to lead negotiations rather than involve 
the State Department. The MoU established a common understanding between regulators to 
address common concerns, rather than forming an agreement that bound two states and be 
confined to the specific terms of the agreement. This enabled regulators to avoid the 
constraints of wider foreign policy concerns. MoUs were built on the principle of trust 
because it was in the common interests of both parties. The flexible approach also enabled 
regulators to adapt to rapid developments in international markets.11  
 
Third, the creation of an MoU reflected the legal status and statutory authority of the U.S. 
SEC. The U.S. SEC was an independent regulatory agency of the U.S. government and was 
unable to negotiate treaty-based agreements with foreign governments. The U.S. State 
Department has a formal process for negotiated agreements with foreign states and this is 
why MoUs were explicitly written as documents of intention rather than formal, negotiated 
agreements. In creating an MoU, the U.S. SEC was able to overcome limitations to its 
authority, whilst achieving the ultimate goal: enforcing domestic securities laws and 
addressing the governance dilemma that multi-jurisdictional crimes presented. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 5 
10 Mann 2011  
11 Mann 2011  
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3.2.4 The Agency of Regulators in the Governance of Cross-Border Financial Crime 
The creation of an MoU with the Swiss government was the first instance where the U.S. 
SEC conducted foreign policy and established a foreign regulatory agreement with a foreign 
regulator and/or government. As Michael Mann states in his interview with the U.S. SEC 
Historical Society, this “was a change in terms of looking at the outside world, where the 
U.S. SEC really was able to lead the negotiation with the support of Justice and the State 
Department; and work out something that was a memorandum of understanding.”12  The 
issue of cross-border financial crime and the negotiation of an MoU with the Swiss 
government propelled securities regulators in to playing an integral role in the governance of 
the international financial system.  
 
The creation of a cooperative governance solution for the prosecution of financial crime was 
created at the initiative of U.S. securities regulators. U.S. regulators did not face the same 
domestic political pressure to respond to threats against the integrity of U.S. securities 
markets. As Michael Mann explains, “there was definitely criticism from Congress that this 
was a priority but I do not regard that as pressure… the only "pressure" I recall was to do 
the right thing.”13 The U.S. Congress was aware of the threat that under-regulated foreign 
jurisdictions, such as Switzerland, posed to the integrity of domestic securities markets and 
had expressed its concerns to the U.S. SEC. The U.S. SEC created MoUs in order to 
establish an effective response to the threat of cross-border financial crime and the legal and 
regulatory barriers faced in prosecuting multijurisdictional cases of financial crime and 
insider trading in the 1990s. Securities regulators were driven to create MoUs by their 
principled professional interests in maintaining the integrity and stability of the domestic 
securities market they are responsible for regulating.  
3.3 Cross-Border Financial Crime and the Creation of IOSCO 
IOSCO was established in 1984 after regulators from the Inter-American Association of 
Securities Commissions (IASC) agreed to transform the organization into a global 
                                                 
12  The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 10  
13 Mann 2012 
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cooperative body in 1983.14 The creation of IOSCO was primarily driven by regulators’ 
interest in establishing a global cooperative body to help govern cross-border financial crime 
and in facilitating the development of emerging securities markets.15 European regulators 
were particularly interested in turning the regional body of securities regulators in the 
Americas in to an international financial regulatory institution.  
 
At the time of IOSCO’s creation, France was becoming frustrated by the U.S. SEC’s extra-
territorial application of U.S. law. As Marie-Claude Robert Hawes, former Head of the 
Service of International Matters at France’s COB said, “[the U.S. SEC] wanted to conduct 
investigations in other countries and other countries didn’t want them to. Instead, they 
offered to launch their own investigation and cooperate with the SEC.”16 European 
regulators, therefore, wished to establish a cooperative mechanism to address the issue, and 
to allay the concerns of U.S. regulators, in order to restrict the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law.  
 
European regulators sought to resolve their own issues of cross-border financial crime. 
According to Marie-Claude Robert Hawes, the chief problem facing French markets was 
that French investors were executing trades using inside information from Swiss-based 
investors. This meant that financial fraudsters were able to conduct their business with 
impunity as they hid behind Switzerland’s banking secrecy laws. France’s COB, headed by 
Yves Le Portz, sought to establish effective diplomatic ties with Switzerland to ensure their 
cooperation on the escalating problem of cross-border financial crime that originated in 
Switzerland. France’s COB believed that bringing Switzerland into a global organization to 
negotiate a solution to cross-border financial crime enforcement would be the most effective 
way to deal with the problems that Switzerland posed and to effectively deal with cross-
border financial crime.17  
 
                                                 
14 Sommer Jr. 1995/1996, p. 15 “IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement,” Northwest Journal of International Law 
and Business 17 (1995 – 1996): 15; also see IOSCO 2012a  
15 The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 23; Robert Hawes 2012  
16 Marie-Claude Robert Hawes. Interview.  
17 Robert Hawes 2012 
 97 
France took a leadership role in creating IOSCO. Yves Le Portz who headed France’s 
Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB) at the time, hosted the first meeting of IASC 
outside of the Americas and spent considerable time gaining support for a global cooperative 
regulatory institution in Europe.18 At the time, there were many proponents of the idea of 
establishing a global cooperative regulatory institution in order to establish a cooperative 
solution to the issue of cross-border financial crime, including the U.S. SEC. 
 
Domestic and inter-state politics approaches in IPE literature often presume that the U.S. 
and/or the U.K. were critical actors in the creation of international financial standards. They 
argue that because of the relative market size of these two dominant financial centers, they 
are the only states that have the power to initiate, create and enforce international financial 
standards. The creation of IOSCO and the use of MoUs is a more nuanced narrative. The 
U.S. SEC did negotiate the first MoU but the U.S. SEC was not the only national securities 
market regulator who was interested in utilizing MoUs to help govern cross-border financial 
crime. Furthermore, the U.S. SEC did not force MoUs on other national regulators. Instead, 
there was a community of regulators who were interested and motivated to improve the use 
of MoUs to tackle the emerging governance issue that national securities regulators faced. 
IOSCO was created in response to the issue of cross-border financial crime. The community 
of national securities regulators began cooperating for the first time through IOSCO in 
order to effectively to this issue.  
3.4 IOSCO and the Creation of Principles for Memoranda of Understanding 
IOSCO’s creation of Principles for MoUs in 1991 through Working Group No. 4 (the Working 
Group on Enforcement and Exchange of Information) demonstrates the influence and 
agency of the community of regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. In response 
to threats to the integrity of their domestic securities markets, the community of regulators 
gathered within Working Group No.4 to identify a cooperative solution to the threat posed 
by cross-border financial crime. Securities regulators created a global cooperative body to 
address the issue and to establish international regulatory principles to govern the issue at 
                                                 
18 Robert Hawes 2012.  
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their own initiative. Securities market regulators were not driven to create IOSCO’s Principles 
for MoUs by domestic political pressure.  
 
Securities regulators utilized the recommendations of IOSCO’s Working Group No.4 to 
successfully lobby their domestic legislatures for new forms of statutory authority and 
reforms of existing legislative frameworks. Securities regulators, working through IOSCO, 
were critical in establishing effective governance mechanisms to assist in the prosecution of 
cross-border financial crime. Furthermore, regulators demonstrated the influence of 
transgovernmental networks through domestic regulatory reforms, which were secured 
through the recommendations of the community of regulators.  
3.4.1 Working Group No. 4 and the Creation of Principles for Memoranda of Understanding 
IOSCO’s Working Group 4 was comprised of mostly European securities regulators, many 
of whom still resided within finance ministries, foreign affairs, and trade departments. 
IOSCO’s Working Group 4 included the Swiss Banking Commission, the industry 
organization of Swiss financial firms, and the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, further 
highlighting the centrality of Switzerland to the issue of cross-border financial crime. 
Working Group No.4 worked over the next six years to establish regulatory principles for 
MoUs to govern cross-border financial crime. Working Group No. 4 identified common 
barriers to the exchange of information and provision of mutual legal assistance, both from 
Requesting Authorities (or home jurisdiction) and the Requested Authority (the foreign 
jurisdiction that holds evidence relating to a case of financial fraud that occurred within the 
home jurisdiction). Interactions between regulators were critical in identifying a policy 
package that should be incorporated in domestic regulatory regimes.  
 
Working Group No. 4 illuminated a number of critical issues for regulators in order to 
establish effective agreements with foreign regulators, and to utilize the benefits that MoUs 
provided. Regulators identified three critical issues that needed to be addressed, including: a) 
the ability to investigate cases of financial crime on behalf of foreign regulators; b) 
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maintaining the confidentiality of investigations; and c) the admissibility of evidence in 
domestic courts.19 
 
In 1990 Working Group No. 4 produced a report in November 1990 titled, Report Addressing 
the Difficulties Encountered while Negotiating and Implementing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), 
which identified the critical issues in the creation of MoUs.20 IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs 
arose from the work of Working Group No.4 and the issues identified in the 1990 report. It 
was hoped that IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs would “provide a blueprint for use by securities 
and futures regulatory authorities in developing MoUs with their foreign counterparts.”21 
The intention of IOSCO was “to develop a consensus among regulators about provisions 
that should be included in MoUs in order to develop effective tools for fighting fraud and 
other abuses in the securities and futures markets.”22 
 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs highlighted the issues that need to be addressed within MoUs 
including: subject matter included in the agreement, confidentiality policies, implementation 
procedures, rights of persons subject to an MoU request, consultation between regulators, 
public policy exceptions, participation by the requesting authority, and cost sharing.23 One of 
the critical issues that the principles identified was that MoUs should include a provision that 
requires regulators to provide reciprocal assistance “without regard to whether the type of 
conduct under investigation would be a violation of the laws of the Requested Authority 
unless the Requested Authority is not permitted to provide assistance where the type of 
conduct under investigation would not be a violation of the laws of the Requested 
Authority.”24 Furthermore, IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs state that MoUs should outline the 
types of assistance that Requested Authorities are able to provide under existing statutes and 
internal capacity. 
 
After Working Group No. 4 identified the critical regulatory issue areas, the use of MoUs 
expanded. The U.S. SEC established an MoU with Canadian and Brazilian regulatory 
                                                 
19 Mann 2011 
20 Technical Committee of IOSCO 1991 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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authorities and began negotiations that would craft a common approach to the issues raised 
by domestic limitations to mutual legal assistance. The U.S. SEC utilized MoUs to outline 
how and when cooperation would be granted, as defined by the evidence gathered by the 
Requesting Authority. Furthermore, regulators developed confidentiality policies to ensure 
that the information provided by securities regulators remained confidential until a case was 
established. Through the work of Working Group No. 4, IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs 
established an international standard for bilateral MoUs between securities market regulators. 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was intended to establish and identify effective mechanisms of 
cooperation to facilitate the prosecution of cross-border financial crime.  
3.4.2 The Influence of Transgovernmental Networks on Domestic Legislative and Regulatory 
Frameworks 
Regulators obtained the necessary statutory authority and subsequent legislative reforms by 
lobbying their domestic legislatures.25 The flexibility of MoUs meant that regulators would 
first develop internal policies that outlined what regulatory powers were necessary before 
seeking the “organic authority”26 from domestic legislatures. Regulators still required the 
statutory authority from domestic legislatures to enable them to comply with the conditions 
of the MoU signed with foreign regulators.  
 
In the United States, confidential information obtained from foreign authorities was covered 
under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. The FOI Act allowed information that had 
been obtained during information exchange procedures to be made publicly available. This 
made foreign regulators unwilling to provide information to U.S. authorities, due to both 
policy and legal concerns. It was necessary for the U.S. SEC to seek legislative reforms, 
ensuring that confidential information obtained from foreign regulators was not subject to 
the FOI. Furthermore, under Section 21(a) of the United States Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, the U.S. was only able to provide assistance to foreign regulators if the relevant 
investigation related to a violation of U.S. law; not foreign law. The U.S. SEC lobbied 
Congress from around 198727 and had convinced Congressman John D. Dingell to propose 
                                                 
25 Robert Hawes 2012 
26 The Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society 2005, p. 17 
27 Ibid., p. 17 
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legislation titled, The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988.28 This bill was 
passed as part of a larger securities market reform act, H.R. 1396, Securities Act Amendments of 
1990 and was passed in to law on the 15th of November 1990.29 After the U.S. SEC lobbied 
Congress, regarding the authority to cooperate with foreign regulators and the right to 
maintain the confidentiality of information obtained through an MoU, Congress passed a 
package of legislation in 1990.   
 
The U.S. SEC lobbied its domestic legislature to obtain the necessary statutory authority to 
provide assistance to foreign regulators, and to obtain the rights and powers to prosecute 
multijurisdictional cases of financial crime. A number of securities regulators obtained the 
necessary domestic legislative reforms to enable them to agree to and execute MoUs with 
foreign regulators.30 IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs formed the basis of domestic legislative 
reforms in a number of member states, demonstrating the influence of securities regulators’ 
recommendations on domestic legislative and regulatory frameworks.   
3.5 Explaining the Creation of International Standards for Memoranda of 
Understanding  
International regulatory standards for MoUs were created after regulators’ ability to 
investigate and prosecute cases of financial crime were threatened by globalization and 
technological innovation. As Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson (former Director and 
current Deputy Director of the OIA at the U.S. SEC respectively) explain, “technology and 
globalization have [also] created new opportunities for securities fraud. It is well recognized 
that the technology that allows for cross-border markets also allows for cross-border 
fraud.”31 Regulators from developed financial market centers created international financial 
standards for MoUs through IOSCO’s Technical Committee to enable regulators to fulfill 
their domestic regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by their respective legislatures. 
Regulators demonstrate agency in pursuing international financial regulatory standards that 
enable them to foster financial stability and to protect the integrity of their respective 
national securities markets. IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs are derived from the 
                                                 
28 United States 100th Congress 1988  
29 United States 101st Congress 1990  
30 Mann 2011 
31 Tafara and Peterson 2007, p. 35 
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transgovernmental network of securities regulators and were created in the pursuit of their 
principled professional interests. 
3.6 IOSCO’s Early Efforts to Promote the Adoption of MoUs 
Since the creation of IOSCO in 1983, IOSCO established a number of institutional 
initiatives aimed at promoting the adoption of MoUs to facilitate the prosecution of financial 
crime. First, IOSCO passed the Resolution Concerning Mutual Assistance in 1986.32 
IOSCO’s resolution, or the Rio Declaration as it became known, encouraged regulators to 
become signatories to the Rio Declaration, indicating their commitment “to provid[ing] 
assistance on a reciprocal basis to the extent permitted by law to all securities authorities who 
accede to the Resolution of the Executive Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions dated November 7, 1986.”33 The Rio Declaration accumulated 66 
signatories from 1987 until 1997.34 The Rio Declaration was replaced in 1998 by the creation 
of IOSCO’s Principles, which included recommendations that securities regulators adopt 
information sharing and mutual legal assistance mechanisms with foreign regulators.  
 
IOSCO expressed concerns about the lack of cooperation between regulators on 
enforcement issues in the early 1990s. In 1994, IOSCO began to place pressure on non-
cooperative and under-regulated jurisdictions for their failure to establish bilateral MoUs 
with other jurisdictions. A 1994 report, Issues Raised for Securities and Futures Regulators by Under 
regulated and Uncooperative Jurisdictions,35 found “that obstacles continue to exist for securities 
and futures authorities in obtaining necessary information from under regulated and 
uncooperative jurisdictions.”36 IOSCO’s resolutions resolved that current members must 
undertake a self-evaluation of their ability to provide assistance to foreign regulators and that 
new members would not be admitted unless they agree to undertake self-evaluations.37 
IOSCO monitored the level of cooperation and consultation between securities supervisors 
with particular focus on non-cooperative jurisdictions. In July 1996 and September 1998 
                                                 
32 IOSCO 1986 
33 Ibid. 
34 From 1997 onwards IOSCO’s 1998 Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation replaced the Rio Declaration.  
35 IOSCO 1994a 
36 IOSCO 1994b, p. 1  
37 Ibid. 
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IOSCO produced the Report on Implementation of IOSCO’s Resolutions and in November 1997 
the Report on the Self-Evaluation Conducted by IOSCO Members Pursuant to the 1994 IOSCO 
Resolution on “Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of High Regulatory Standards and Mutual 
Cooperation and Assistance”.38 These reports monitored the level of participation in the system 
of bilateral MoUs, and the level of cooperation by jurisdictions on issues of mutual legal 
assistance; raising concerns about the level of participation and cooperation by some 
members.  
 
IOSCO’s encouragement, combined with the independent actions of interested regulators 
within the organization, led to the creation of a network of bilateral MoUs. The U.S. SEC 
signed enforcement assistance MoUs with regulators from 20 different countries between 
1988 and 2002.39 The U.S. SEC often signed more than one MoU with individual 
jurisdictions in order to address different regulatory issues that arose over time.40 France’s 
COB, and subsequently the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), signed enforcement 
assistance MoUs with regulators from 34 different countries. Through the diplomatic efforts 
of regulators from large, developed financial centers, a network of bilateral MoUs was 
created. Although IOSCO placed pressure on its members to sign bilateral enforcement 
MoUs with foreign regulators, the network of bilateral MoUs remained incomplete and had 
important gaps.  
3.7 September 11 and the Creation of IOSCO’s MMoU 
September 11 was critical to securities regulators realizing the importance of strengthening 
the existing network of bilateral MoUs. It was originally feared that al Qaeda financially 
benefited from their act of terrorism by purchasing options on U.S. Airline stocks, expecting 
that stock prices would fall after the terrorist attacks.41 Immediately after the attacks, U.S. 
regulators received phone calls from a number of securities regulators from developed and 
emerging securities markets. Securities regulators extended their support and let the U.S. 
                                                 
38 IOSCO 1996; IOSCO 1997a; IOSCO 1998a 
39 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2012 
40  The US SEC also formed MOUs to help provide assistance in investigations in to market participants and 
market vulnerabilities. For instance, the SEC signed an MOU with the Bank of England in 1997 after concerns 
that securities firms had exposures to Barings Bank in the wake of its collapse.  
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SEC know that they willing to provide any assistance necessary in order to investigate any 
incidents of financial crime that occurred around the time of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.42 Although it turned out that suspicions of insider trading were unfounded, the event 
still drew regulators’ attention to the importance of establishing an effective governance 
regime to combat cross-border financial crime.  
3.7.1 The First Meeting of the Technical Committee of IOSCO after September 11 
The Technical Committee was scheduled to meet in Rome in mid-October, hosted by Italy’s 
Commissione Nazionale per la Societa e la Boursa (CONSOB).43 During that meeting, Felice 
Friedman, the U.S. SEC’s acting Director of the Office of International Affairs, recalls that a 
non-US member of the Technical Committee suggested the idea of forming an MMoU that 
would create a single global standard for MoUs.44  
 
IOSCO’s MMoU was not created to primarily address states’ concerns about terrorist 
financing. Instead, the events of September 11 made it clear that the bilateral network of 
MoUs had some important limitations, and that it was necessary to establish a more effective 
system to govern cross-border financial crime. As Greg Tanzer, former Secretary General of 
IOSCO, explains: 
 
“When September 11 happened we understood that it was a pretty big web 
with pretty big holes in it with not many interconnecting lines in it. We found 
the MoUs were not sufficient or binding enough for cooperation when we 
needed it. We undertook an initiative at the time to create a special group 
headed by Michel Prada…There were concerns [about the existing system of 
bilateral MoUs] but they were a bit muted. But people felt that with the 
bilateral MoUs we were getting at the principles of promoting cooperation 
where we could. The truth is that September 11 highlighted the truth; the fact 
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that we moved on it so quickly after September 11 demonstrates that there 
were concerns but it hadn’t reached such a level to produce an official 
response.”45 
 
Furthermore as David Brown, former Chair of IOSCO’s Technical Committee and 
Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, explains: 
 
“The trigger for the change was the September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. We had a meeting scheduled 10 days after that attack. We 
recognized that there was a role for securities regulators to play in response to 
those terrorist attacks, particularly in response to the possibility that the 
terrorists were using the world’s capital markets to conduct terrorism. That’s 
when he hatched the plans for the MMoU. We had an emergency meeting of 
the Technical Committee in Rome in mid-October. We decided that we as 
securities regulators should be harnessing the enforcement branches of all the 
members of IOSCO, particularly the members of the Technical Committee to 
start with, to coordinate their efforts to counteract securities fraud with a 
particular focus on counteracting terrorism.”46 
 
The creation of an MMoU would standardize MoU requests to ensure that common barriers 
to cooperation in the execution of information requests and mutual legal assistance were 
removed. An MMoU would also fill the gaps that existed within the bilateral system of 
MoUs by standardizing MoUs and expanding their global reach. On October 12, 2001, 
IOSCO announced the creation of a Special Project Team. IOSCO’s Special Project Team 
respond to the events of September 11, by forming contingency plans in response to 
“disorderly conditions”; strengthen client identification in line with the Financial Action 
Task Force’s recommendations; and to expand regulatory cooperation and information 
sharing. Michel Prada, then President of France’s COB, chaired the Special Project Team 
created to respond to these events. David Brown, Chair of IOSCO’s Technical Committee 
stated in IOSCO’s Press Release: 
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“IOSCO has created this new project team to build on our experiences. 
Regardless of the outcome of any investigations relating to the events of 
11 September, we are doubling our efforts to ensure the preparedness of 
the securities community and the ability of regulators to combat financial 
crime involving securities markets.”47  
 
The Special Task Force drew on the 1999 report Principles for MoUs48 outlining what should 
be emulated in bilateral MoUs. IOSCO’s MMoU created international regulatory standards 
that ensured that regulatory authorities had: 
 
• The adequate statutory authority to provide mutual legal assistance and to undertake 
information exchanges with foreign regulators; 
 
• the regulatory authority had adequate confidentiality policies in place that ensured 
that the information being exchanged was kept confidential; and 
 
• the regulatory authority to provide mutual legal assistance and information exchange 
when requested by a foreign regulatory authority.49 
3.7.2 IOSCO’s Verification Process 
As part of the MMoU, IOSCO designed a verification process to ensure that an applicant to 
the MMoU had the adequate legal authority to become a signatory, or had at least 
demonstrated its intentions to obtain the necessary legal authority. The verification process 
was integral to the success of the MMoU, because it was necessary that regulators’ and their 
states’ participation was substantive rather than simply symbolic. The U.S. SEC expressed 
concerns from the outset that the MMoU could unintentionally weaken regulatory 
cooperation and assistance if it provided an international seal of approval to signatories even 
if they were relatively uncooperative. The United States and other regulators stressed the 
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need for the MMoU to have teeth.50 IOSCO designed a verification process that sought to 
ensure that applicants were compliant with the MMoU’s requirements or, where further steps 
were needed, provided assistance to applicants to enable them to become compliant. 
 
IOSCO’s screening process seeks to ensure the legal authority of the regulators is accurately 
reflected in the legislative authority of the regulator, as encompassed in its domestic laws. 
Applicants provide comprehensive answers to the questionnaire and provide the supporting 
documents to IOSCO’s Secretariat. Once received, the verification case is handed to one of 
seven verification teams. Each verification team, where possible, has representatives from 
each region to ensure a diversity of legal traditions from different jurisdictions. Where 
possible, the lead regulator conducting the verification process will be based in a similar time 
zone and be familiar with the language and jurisprudential traditions of the applicant.51  
 
Each verification team assesses compliance with the MMoU’s demands. The MMoU states:  
 
“The verification of the questionnaire responses will be limited to verification 
that the responses accurately reflect the legal authority of members to comply 
with the specific MOU provisions cited in the questionnaire based on the 
laws, rules and regulations cited in the responses.”52  
 
This process is a paper-only process and does not involve interviews with the regulators or 
industry members who are regulated. The verification team outlines its recommendations on 
the applicants’ compliance with each of the MMoU provisions to the screening group. If the 
screening group provides recommendations to the decision-making group comprised of the 
Technical, Emerging Markets and Executive Committee regarding verification of the MMoU 
provisions and the applicants’ laws. Given any negative recommendations, the applicant is 
allowed the chance to meet with assessors upon request. The decision-making group then 
decides if the member becomes a signatory to the MMoU. The MMoU clearly and directly 
outlines the obligations of signatories to the MMoU.53  
                                                 
50 Friedman 2011 
51 Davies 2011  
52 IOSCO 2002 
53 See IOSCO 2002 
 108 
 
The MMoU would have two forms of signatories, known as Appendix A and Appendix B 
signatories. Appendix A signatories are members who have been assessed to have the 
appropriate legal authority to be compliant with the demands of the MMoU, allowing them 
to be full signatories to it. Appendix B signatories are those members who may not have the 
full and sufficient legal authority to be compliant with the demands of the IOSCO’s MMoU, 
but who “have committed to seeking the legal authority necessary to enable them to become 
full signatories to the IOSCO MMoU (Appendix A).”54 
3.8 Post-2002: IOSCO’s Promotion and Enforcement of MMOU Signatories  
IOSCO’s MMoU was endorsed in May 2002 at the Annual Conference in Istanbul, Turkey. 
Once formed, IOSCO’s Executive Committee turned its focus to how to accumulate 
signatories. The Executive Committee decided that rather than forcing its members to 
become signatories immediately, IOSCO would wait three years from the creation of 
IOSCO’s MMoU before more forcefully encouraging its members to become signatories in 
2005.55  IOSCO’s Executive Committee decided it was important to discover how realistic it 
was to get IOSCO members to become signatories, and to identify what barriers there were 
to members becoming signatories. From 2003 to 2005, IOSCO, led by the Executive 
Committee, sought to accumulate the greatest number of signatories possible.  
 
In 2003, 24 members became signatories to IOSCO’s MMoU. The first 24 signatories were 
predominantly from large and highly respected markets. As Jane Diplock, former Chair of 
IOSCO’s Executive Committee described: 
 
“As most of the large jurisdictions became able to sign the MMoU it developed 
its own momentum and became a badge of good corporate citizenship. The 
waiting period and the accumulation of political momentum placed greater 
pressure on non-signatories to undertake the necessary reforms in order to 
become signatories.”56  
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As Michel Prada discussed,  
 
“This created a virtuous circle whereby those who had been pushing in this 
direction convinced their governments to sign immediately so that those who 
were not signatories became uncomfortable. They said, “We are out of the game 
therefore our credibility is at stake and please allow us to sign. Let us make the 
credible changes to allow us to sign.” This rapidly helped bring together the 
most significant members of the major markets.”57 
 
In 2005, years after the MMoU was endorsed, IOSCO announced that it would seek for all 
of its members to become signatories of IOSCO’s MMoU by 2010. IOSCO stated in its 
Final Communiqué: 
 
“At this Annual Conference, IOSCO has adopted a timetable by which all 
member regulators, which are not already signatories to the MoU, will be asked 
to meet this benchmark by 1 January, 2010. By this time all members should 
have applied for and been accepted as signatories under Appendix A of the 
IOSCO MoU or have expressed (via Appendix B), a commitment to seek legal 
authority to enable them to become signatories.”58 
 
In order to assist members in becoming signatories, IOSCO created the IOSCO MoU 
Assistance Program. In its 2004 Annual Report, Jane Diplock explains, 
 
“This Program assists members to become signatories to the MoU. It provides 
expert assistance for completing the application questionnaire, and in planning 
and implementing actions that an applicant may need to take to meet the 
requirements of the MoU. IOSCO also launched, through its Technical 
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Committee, an initiative to address issues relating to off-shore financial 
centers.”59 
 
In parallel to this, IOSCO raised its annual dues to expand the resources available to the 
General Secretariat in Madrid in order to fund programs such as the MoU Assistance Program. 
Annual dues rose from €8,300 to €10,100 from 2004 to 2005.60 
 
In addition to the technical assistance and training provided by IOSCO, the leadership of 
IOSCO’s Executive Committee aggressively pursued the initiative. In particular, Jane 
Diplock, was intensely focused on the success of the MMoU and the accumulation of 
signatories. As Felice Friedman states,  
 
“Jane Diplock was very interested in the MOU. She quickly saw the benefits of it 
for many reasons but also for IOSCO as an institution. She very much took 
interest in the MoU and gave it publicity. She saw the MoU as the centerpiece of 
IOSCO… She came to IOSCO meetings and would push to have half the 
organization signed on the MoU by a certain year. There was real pressure on the 
organization to do that.”61  
 
The initiative was largely successful. By September 2010 there were 71 Appendix A 
signatories and 43 Appendix B signatories.  
 
In July 2010, IOSCO agreed to a resolution, requiring the unanimous support of the 
President’s Committee, which intensified efforts to accumulate signatories and to enforce 
the adoption of the MMoU on all of its members. For non-applicant members, “the 
Executive Committee is asked to intensify efforts to provide technical assistance to the non-
applicants to encourage them to apply as well as to comply with the requirements; and the 
Executive Committee is asked to create a watch list of non-applicant members which should 
be maintained and disclosed in the public area of the IOSCO website.”62 Furthermore, 
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Appendix B signatories “are asked to apply to become full signatories to the IOSCO MoU 
by 1 January 2013,” IOSCO’s Executive Committee was also asked to make technical 
assistance programs and advice available to Appendix B signatories.  The 2010 resolution 
agreed to create a ‘watch list’ after 1 January 2013 for members who fail to make an 
application to advance to Appendix A of the IOSCO MoU.”63 The list has come to be 
known as the ‘2013 list’, referring to countries that are not Appendix A countries by the 
January 1 2013 deadline.64 As Georgina Philippou, Chair of IOSCO’s Standing Committee 4 
and Co-Chair of IOSCO’s Screening Group, explains: 
 
“we published the list because we think it is an important part of our strategy 
to raise international standards of cooperation among member jurisdictions 
and we think that it is important to highlight the fact that certain jurisdictions 
do not have the legislative standards which we think are required to facilitate 
effective enforcement cooperation in market misconduct cases.  Publishing 
the list was the logical outcome of the work we have done in recent years to 
encourage all IOSCO members to reach the standards of the MMoU.  The 
idea for the list was developed by Committee 4 and the Screening Group 
working closely with the IOSCO Secretariat and it was signed off by the 
IOSCO Board.”65 
 
This demonstrates that IOSCO’s ‘2013 list’ was created by IOSCO’s Standing Committee 4 
and driven by IOSCO and regulators’ interests in strengthening implementation of IOSCO’s 
MMoU rather than from outside pressure from the G20 and the FSF.  
 
The creation of IOSCO’s watch list or “2013 list” has been effective in encouraging 
members to become signatories to IOSCO’s MMoU. In an article in the Antigua Observer 
entitled “Trinidad Moves to Avoid Being Blacklisted by International Regulatory Group,” 
Finance Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Larry Howai is cited as saying the following: 
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“this Bill seeks to address deficiencies in the previous Bill relating to regulator 
access to records of market participants, sharing information with other 
regulators, record-keeping and confidentiality provisions… Failure to enact 
this Bill into law this year will result in Trinidad and Tobago being blacklisted 
by IOSCO… We cannot afford to find ourselves in such a situation in which 
we are unable to comply with these international standards, as the consequence 
for our securities market in such an event would indeed be dire.”66 
 
The threat of being included on IOSCO’s watch list or ‘2013 list’ has been influential in 
enforcing the adoption of IOSCO’s MMoU.  
3.9 Explaining the Strengthening of IOSCO’s International Standards for 
Memoranda of Understanding  
In IOSCO’s early years, the promotion of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was comparatively 
weak. Despite the Rio Declaration and the series of reports assessing and identifying non-
compliant jurisdictions, IOSCO’s Technical Committee remained mostly content with the 
bilateral network of MoUs. This dramatically changed with the events of September 11. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks were important for two reasons. First, they revealed the costs 
of an ineffective and comparatively weak international regulatory regime for cross-border 
financial crime. Second, they changed the tenor of cooperation between securities market 
regulators. Securities regulators were suddenly more willing to cooperate as a result of 
September 11 and the costs of regulators’ failure to cooperate prior to the terrorist attacks 
on the United States.  
 
The events of September 11, and the subsequent strengthening of domestic and international 
regulatory institutions to identify and investigate terrorist financing might suggest that 
regulators created IOSCO’s MMoU as an ex ante response to domestic political pressure, and 
pressure from domestic foreign affairs and state departments. There are, however, two 
important aspects of the decision to create IOSCO’s MMoU that negates that perspective. 
Firstly, a U.S. regulator did not propose the idea. Secondly, regulators had previously 
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expressed concerns about the limitations to the pre-existing bilateral network of MoUs 
Although regulators were keen to addresses these issues, the concerns had not reached a 
critical point until the September 11 terrorist attacks and the implications of terrorist 
financing revealed. The decision of IOSCO’s Technical Committee to create the MMoU was 
driven by the preferences of the transgovernmental network and concerns about their ability 
to identify and prosecute cases of financial crime in an increasingly global securities market 
system.  
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the creation of international securities market standards for MoUs. 
An investigation into the history and political context of IOSCO’s creation of international 
standards for MoUs in 1990, and the strengthening of those international standards through 
the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU in 2002, reveals important political dynamics. These 
political dynamics are best explained through a transgovernmental perspective.  
 
The establishment of MoUs as a result of the first prosecuted cases of cross-border financial 
crime highlights how Michael Mann of the U.S. SEC created the first international regulatory 
agreement between supervisors in order to allow the U.S. SEC to fulfill their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities. Regulators initiated negotiations between Swiss and U.S. 
regulators to address the unique legal barriers faced by regulators in the prosecution of cross-
border financial crime, made possible by globalization and technological innovation. As 
interviews with U.S. SEC’s Michael Mann reveal, securities regulators were not subject to 
domestic political pressure. Instead, regulators proactively responded to issues because it was 
necessary to “do the right thing.”67 The principled professional interests of regulators, 
therefore, drove the creation of the first MoU with Switzerland. 
 
IOSCO was created in 1983, in part, to address the issue of cross-border financial crime. 
European regulators, led by France, approached the United States to transform the regional 
organization of American securities regulators into a global regulatory body to establish a 
forum to negotiate a cooperative solution for cross-border financial crime. European 
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securities regulators sought to push back against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
and to establish a diplomatic solution to Switzerland’s threat to the integrity of European 
securities markets. IOSCO was created to enable regulators to obtain their professional 
interests by enabling them to effectively investigate and prosecute cross-border financial 
crimes. The recommendations of Working Group No.4, and IOSCO’s 1991 Principles for 
MoUs, was also driven by these issues and these concerns.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was initially promoted through the individual work and efforts 
of IOSCO’s Technical Committee members. This comparatively weak system was 
strengthened through the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU in October 2002. In the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., IOSCO’s Technical Committee 
proposed the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU because securities regulators sought to address 
the costs of having incomplete global coverage of MoUs between securities regulators. 
Regulators recognized the limitations to the current network of bilateral MoUs prior to the 
crisis, but it had not reached a critical point where securities regulators were willing to do 
something to address it. September 11 was that critical point. IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee created the MMoU in 2002 to address threats to the integrity of domestic 
securities markets after realizing the costs of failing to establish an effective global regulatory 
regime.  
 
The political dynamics of the creation and strengthening of international securities standards 
for MoUs highlight the validity of a PA analytical framework in explaining international 
securities market regulation. The creation and strengthening of MoUs to facilitate the 
prosecution of cross-border financial crime was driven by the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee created these standards to obtain their own principled professional interests. 
Therefore, domestic political actors did not need to place substantive political pressure on 
securities market regulators, because regulators were willing to create these standards of their 
own volition. The creation of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was created to obtain the policy 
goals delegated to securities regulators by the domestic legislature. The creation and 
strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs reflects regulators’ exercise of agency within the 
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“zone of discretion”, by forming an international cooperative policy solution to address 
domestic policy problems.  
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Chapter 4  
The Creation and Strengthening of IOSCO’s 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Market 
Regulation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyze the creation of IOSCO’s Principles and the strengthening of 
IOSCO’s Principles through the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology. IOSCO’s Principles was 
created in 1997 under the leadership of Tony Neoh, Chairman of the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong and Chairman of IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
IOSCO’s Principles was created in the midst of the creation of the New International 
Financial Architecture (NIFA), an institutional initiative led by the G7, which saw the 
creation of the Twelve Key Standards and Codes of for Sound Financial Systems to assess compliance 
with international financial standards. This suggests that IOSCO’s Principles was created after 
pressure from powerful states. However, IOSCO’s Principles was first proposed in 1995 after 
Nick Leeson was found to have caused the collapse of Barings Bank, due to a series of risky 
bets executed at Barings’ Singapore offices. Furthermore, in 1994, Mexico suffered a 
financial crisis that brought financial systemic interdependence to the forefront of regulators’ 
minds. Finally, IOSCO’s Principles was proposed at a meeting of IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee in May 1997, before the collapse of the Thai Baht that marked the beginning of 
the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
IOSCO’s Methodology was proposed in October 2001 at the first meeting of IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States – the 
same meeting in which IOSCO’s MMoU was proposed. The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology 
was driven by two political factors. First, IOSCO was being pressured by the IMF and 
World Bank to create a more comprehensive international securities standard. Doing so 
would enable the IMF and World Bank to conduct objective assessments of compliance with 
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international financial standards under the IMF’s Financial Stability Assessment Program 
(FSAP) and the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). The 
creation of IOSCO’s Methodolgoy was driven by the preferences of states with dominant 
financial centers. After the Asian Financial Crisis, these states’ perception of the costs of 
under-regulated jurisdictions had changed. As such, those states promoted and enforced an 
international financial regulatory regime based on the assessment of the Twelve Key Standards 
and Codes for Sound Financial Systems. Second, IOSCO made the decision to create IOSCO’s 
Methodology in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks after resisting pressure from the 
IMF and World Bank, three years since the creation of IOSCO’s Principles. IOSCO’s 
Methodology was created after securities regulators’ recognized the importance of 
strengthening the implementation of international securities market regulation in the wake of 
September 11. 
 
The creation of IOSCO’s Principles is explained by a transgovernmental network perspective. 
IOSCO’s Principles was created by regulators through IOSCO’s Technical Committee in 
response to threats to the stability of developed financial centers by under-regulated 
jurisdictions. IOSCO’s Principles was created in the principled professional interests of 
securities market regulators. The strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles through the creation of 
IOSCO’s Methodology is explained through an inter-state and a transgovernmental 
perspective. The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology was driven by the preferences of states and 
by the principled professional interests of securities regulators. Securities regulators were 
subject to political pressure from the IMF and World Bank, which were acting on behalf of 
states with dominant financial centers. But the decision to relent to that pressure was driven 
by regulators’ interest to improve national regulatory frameworks in more peripheral 
jurisdictions.  
 
The political dynamics of the creation and strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles highlights the 
validity of a PA analytical model. First, the creation of IOSCO’s Principles was driven by the 
preferences of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. Securities 
regulators’ independent pursuit of international financial regulatory standards reflects 
regulators’ exercise of discretion to fulfill the regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by 
the domestic legislature. The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology highlights the role of multiple 
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agents. Securities market regulators and finance ministries have overlapping responsibilities 
for financial regulation. The role and function of finance ministries is to represent the 
interests of the state, viewing issues through the material interests of the state as a whole. 
Finance ministries were unsatisfied by the enforcement and adoption of international 
securities market standards, and placed pressure on IOSCO’s Technical Committee, through 
the IMF and World Bank, to create more effective international financial standards. This 
accounts for the influence of the inter-state political arena in the creation of IOSCO’s 
Methodology.  
4.2 The Creation of IOSCO’s Princ iples : From 1995 to the post-Asian Financial 
Crisis Regulatory Reform Process 
The transgovernmental network of securities market regulators within IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee created IOSCO’s Principles in recognition of the increasing integration of national 
securities markets and threat of under-regulated foreign financial centers. IOSCO’s Principles 
was created amidst a series of financial crises and the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995. This 
section tracks the creation of IOSCO’s Principles and seeks to contextualize its creation. This 
section concludes that IOSCO’s Principles was derived from the preferences of securities 
regulators who sought to respond to the impact of increasingly integrated national securities 
markets, and the effects of under-regulated peripheral jurisdictions.  
4.2.1 The Barings Crisis, IOSCO’s Strategic Review and the Initiation of IOSCO’s Principles 
Securities regulators first proposed creating international securities market principles in a 
meeting of the Executive Committee on March 14, 1995 in Sydney, Australia.1 The 
Executive Committee proposed an organizational review, which included the idea of creating 
international financial standards. The review was introduced by the Chairman of the 
Executive Committee, who “proposed a review (the Organizational Review) of IOSCO’s 
structure and range of activities.” The Review’s purpose was to fine-tune IOSCO’s structure 
and activities so that the Organization can more effectively implement its important 
international objectives.”2 Around the same time as the organizational review, IOSCO 
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proposed to create an international securities market standard.3 At the meeting, the 
Executive Committee decided: 
 
“it may be an appropriate occasion to consider the following issues: 
  
1) the importance of not wasting resources within IOSCO notably by 
duplicating work on international standards and principles; 
 
2) the necessity of establishing, in an increasingly global financial 
environment, a unique set of international standards and principles and the 
resulting need of having within IOSCO only one committee responsible for 
this important task; and 
 
3) the importance of enabling all the members of the Organization to 
somehow participate in the elaboration and in the implementation of those 
international standards and principles.”4 
 
The idea of creating international securities principles was proposed at a time of increased 
recognition of the importance of established international financial regulatory standards in 
order to guide national securities standards, and to improve financial regulatory frameworks 
in peripheral jurisdictions.  
 
Barings Bank collapsed in February 1995 after Nick Leeson took large speculative positions 
on future prices on the Singaporean Stock Market. Those large speculative positions became 
unmanageable by February 1995, and Barings Bank collapsed.5 Second, in December 1994, 
Mexico suffered a devastating financial crisis, widely known as the Peso or Tequila Crisis. 
These twin crises highlighted the impact of under-regulated peripheral jurisdictions on 
dominant financial centers. Moreover, this provided regulators the opportunity to raise 
financial standards. As Ed Waitzer, Chairman of IOSCO’s Technical Committee in 1995 and 
Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, explains, “we took it [the Barings Crisis] as 
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an opportunity to raise [regulatory] standards and create common standards.”6 Securities 
regulators were already beginning to think about seeking to raise regulatory standards before 
these events and the Barings Crisis provided regulators that opportunity.  
 
The collapse of Barings Bank and the Tequila crisis of 1994 brought the interdependence of 
national financial markets and financial globalization to the forefront of regulators’ and 
world leaders’ minds. The 1995 G7 Summit in Halifax, Canada on June 16 1995 placed 
improving the governance of international financial markets at the top of the agenda. The 
G7 Communiqué from the Halifax Summit stated the following: 
 
“The growth and integration of global capital markets have created both 
enormous opportunities and new risks. We have a shared interest in ensuring 
the international community remains able to manage the risks inherent in the 
growth of private capital flows, the increased integration of domestic capital 
markets, and the accelerating pace of financial innovation.”7 
 
By the time of the G7 Summit, the work of IOSCO had already begun. The G7 Halifax 
Summit Communiqué recognized this as demonstrated by the following:  
 
“Continued strengthening of these efforts has the full support of G-7 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. We look forward to the 
development and further enhancement of concrete international 
understandings, where necessary and appropriate, to the safeguards, 
standards, transparency, and systems necessary to reduce potential risks. 
In this context, we recognize the important initiatives being undertaken 
separately and jointly by various committees under the aegis of the BIS 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions as well as 
by national authorities.”8 
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Furthermore, as Ed Waitzer explains: 
 
“the Objectives and Principles Initiative was not a top down initiative but a 
bottom up initiative. We began work on the issue and the G7 knew about it 
because we [IOSCO’s Technical Committee] had informed our domestic 
political counterparts of what we were doing at the time. The G7 
Communiqué, which was written in advance by finance ministry bureaucrats 
who were aware of the work we were doing.”9  
 
Although the idea to create a regulatory framework identifying minimum standards for 
securities regulation was proposed in 1995, it took two years for the project to materialize. A 
number of issues contributed to IOSCO’s eventual development of IOSCO’s Principles in 
1997 and its eventual endorsement in 1998.  
4.2.2 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and The New International Financial Architecture 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee met in May 1997 in Cape Town, South Africa. At the 
meeting, IOSCO’s Technical Committee “agreed to recommend to the Executive 
Committee to set up an IOSCO Principles Task Force jointly chaired by the Chairmen of 
the Executive, Technical and Emerging Markets Committee.” The task force would “draft a 
reference document drawing together the statements of intention, recommendations, 
desirable regulatory practices and advice set out in the various Resolutions and reports, 
which have been adopted by the Organization.”10  
 
IOSCO’s taskforce that created IOSCO’s Principles was established at the same time as the 
Asian Financial Crisis and was endorsed in 1998. IOSCO’s Principles was created amidst 
efforts by the G7, the IMF and the World Bank to improve financial regulatory standards in 
more peripheral financial centers. This suggests that IOSCO’s Principles was created in 
response to the Asian Financial Crisis and in response to pressure from the G7 and the 
world’s dominant financial powers. However, as the previous section has already identified, 
the idea of creating IOSCO’s Principles was proposed in 1995 and IOSCO’s task force was 
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established before the Asian Financial Crisis began. In May 1997, Thailand, with the 
assistance of Singapore, spent billions of dollars defending the value of the Thai Baht against 
speculative attacks on its currency. In July 1997, the Thai Baht collapsed and the Asian 
Financial Crisis unfolded.11 As Michel Prada, former Chairman of the AMF and Chairman of 
the Technical Committee, explains, the creation of IOSCO’s Principles “started a little earlier 
to the [Asian financial] crisis and was sped up by the crisis.”12 
 
Improving financial regulation had emerged as an important policy issue out of the 1994 
Mexican Peso Crisis and, in the minds of securities regulators, the collapse of Barings Bank 
in 1995. The interests of central bankers, finance ministers, treasury bureaucrats, and 
financial regulators in the creation of an international financial regulatory regime was driven 
by the increasingly encompassing nature of financial markets, both between countries and 
between financial sectors. As Tony Neoh, Head of the Technical Committee and Head of 
the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission between 1996 and 1998 during the 
creation of IOSCO’s Principles, explains: 
 
“There was a realization in governments and finance ministers that 
markets were becoming increasingly interconnected. Even before my time 
as chairman there were essentially three strands of work. The first strand 
was that banking and securities markets were converging through the 
European Universal Bank model and, although Glass-Steagall separations 
were not full dismantled until 2000, separations between commercial 
banks and investment banks were already beginning to crumble.”13 
  
International standard-setters, the G7, IMF, and World Bank were also concerned about 
how to effectively resolve the unwinding of financial firms. There was a joint effort by these 
organizations to have greater information sharing between markets and regulators to stay 
better informed of the assumption of risk by all financial firms across borders.14 Securities 
                                                 
11 PBS.org, “Timeline of the Panic.” Accessed online at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/etc/cron.html as of 25 February 2012. 
12 Prada 2011  
13 Neoh 2011  
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regulators recognized emerging issues within their own regulatory perimeter.15 Bond and 
equity markets were becoming increasingly integrated in the rise of cross-border listings. The 
integration between national markets raised the necessity of creating an international 
financial standard for securities markets.16 Securities regulators were aware of the changing 
dynamics in international securities markets, and were interested in creating a set of 
international securities standards that would help raise financial standards in more peripheral 
jurisdictions.  
 
As noted above, the idea to create IOSCO’s Principles was proposed in 1995. IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee began work on the standard in May 1997. Neoh, then head of the 
Technical Committee and the first to suggest the idea of creating IOSCO’s Principles at a 
1996 Technical Committee meeting, notes the following:  
 
“We were not lent on as such. It is really a question of voluntary engagement by both 
sides. The Halifax declaration was the start of it all. The BCBS, IOSCO and IAIS were 
connected by efforts by the IMF and World Bank. They were proponents of 
regulatory standards. We were caught up in the ferment where there was tremendous 
consensus that there should be as much as possible consensus on international 
standards. There was a wind that was blowing that caught all of us. We were pushed 
along.”17 
 
Furthermore, as Prada noted earlier, the idea of creating IOSCO’s Principles was proposed 
prior to the crisis and sped up by the crisis.18 Finally, domestic politicians and legislatures 
were largely unaware of what their securities regulators were creating. When asked if 
regulators were being subjected to domestic political pressure, Andrea Corcoran, then 
Director of International Affairs at the U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), said: 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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17 Ibid. 
18 Prada 2011. 
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“Under U.S. law, the SEC and CFTC are considered to be independent agencies, 
that is they report to Congress not to the Executive. They are empowered to 
undertake day-to-day business without interference or direction (beyond their 
enabling statutes) from the government as a whole. In that the markets are global, 
most global interactions related to the implementation of national mandates are 
operational.  The State Department makes foreign policy, but agencies at many 
levels (environmental, commercial, legal) undertake day-to-day global operations.”19 
 
This demonstrates that IOSCO’s Technical Committee’s pursuit of international financial 
standards, through the creation of IOSCO’s Principles, was driven by its members and not 
from external political pressure. 
4.2.3 The Leadership of IOSCO’s Technical Committee Members 
IOSCO’s Principles was driven by the leadership of members of IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee. Tomasso Pado-Schioppa of Italy had participated in the BCBS’ process of 
creating the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision on behalf of the Bank of Italy. Pado-
Schioppa was recently transferred to Italy’s securities market supervisor, CONSOB, and was 
now a member of IOSCO’s Technical Committee. Neoh, of the Hong Kong SFC, suggested 
the idea of creating an international securities market standard to the Technical Committee, 
because he believed it was necessary to do so in response to the changing dynamics of global 
securities markets. Furthermore, some members, such as the AMF’s Prada, believed that it 
would give the organization strategic direction. Here is how Prada explains the situation: 
 
“There were a few people who were committed to giving a better strategic 
direction for IOSCO. The organization had delivered a few interesting 
standards in the past but failed to deliver some real objectives and principles. 
Together we considered that it was key for this organization to have an 
agreement between its members about the strategic direction we should aim 
towards.”20  
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The new international climate provided IOSCO the opportunity to create IOSCO’s Principles, 
as it was effectively endorsed by the world’s leading economic powers and international 
institutions.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles was also driven by the desire to raise the visibility, international presence, 
and reputation of IOSCO at a time when international financial standard setters were given 
visibility and the political capital to produce a regulatory initiative of substance. Prada 
described the motivations: 
 
“We were rather seeking recognition and support from the governments. At 
that time insurance regulators and securities regulators didn’t have the same 
visibility and credibility as banking regulators. Before 1999, the establishment 
of the FSF, Central Bankers and prudential regulators had long been 
recognized internationally and had been working together for many years. We 
had Basel I and Basel II, the national governments were fairly aware at the 
global level of banking regulators. They didn’t have the same sensitivity and 
same interest in securities regulation.”21  
   
Neoh agrees, saying that they hoped to “raise the level of visibility of IOSCO so that we 
could be taken seriously as an international organization promulgating standards.”22  
 
Policy leaders within IOSCO, such as Neoh, Prada, and Pado-Schioppa, were well aware of 
the reputation that IOSCO had in the international system. IOSCO was considered to be a 
relatively weak international financial regulatory organization, especially in comparison to 
the BCBS. The BCBS had already created an international financial regulatory standard 
through the creation of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in September 1997.  
 
Furthermore, a group of securities lawyers in the U.S. had compiled a set of financial 
regulatory principles for securities markets that would guide regulators in emerging securities 
markets, particularly Eastern European securities markets, to facilitate capital market 
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development. Bill Williams Jr., the initiator and Co-leader of the project with Michael Mann 
of the U.S. SEC, proposed to other established securities market lawyers that they create a 
document that would outline “what the issues are and what they should be considering.”23 
The group created Developing Securities Markets: Key Elements of a Legal Regime to set forth 
regulatory recommendations to foreign jurisdictions. The document was largely completed 
by 1996, and a final version was produced in February of 1997.24 The document gained 
prominence when the U.S. SEC effectively endorsed it by using it as part of its annual, 
month-long technical assistance programs.25 
 
IOSCO’s Principles was created by IOSCO’s Technical Committee in an effort to raise 
financial regulatory standards and in order to raise the profile of IOSCO. IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee members wanted to raise the profile of IOSCO to ensure that 
IOSCO’s Principles demonstrated to its members its commitment to improving states’ 
securities market regulatory frameworks.  
4.2.4 The Creation of IOSCO’s Principles 
Once the decision to create IOSCO’s Principles was made, IOSCO’s Technical Committee 
established a working group to oversee its production. The project was led by Andrew 
Procter, who was deputy to Neoh at the SFC of Hong Kong. Procter was asked to produce 
a draft of IOSCO’s Principles in 1997 and an arbitrary timeline for the next Annual Meeting 
that was set for Nairobi in September 1998. Meetings occurred almost monthly at the AMF 
in Paris, hosted by Fabrice Demarine.  The working group was predominantly comprised of 
the second-in-command of the members of the Technical Committee who were 
predominantly heads of international affairs departments at national securities regulators.26 
 
When interviewed, Procter identified the two crucial issues that IOSCO faced. First, 
securities regulators face a diverse range of regulatory issues unique to each securities market 
jurisdiction. Securities markets are characterized by financial innovation and diversification 
in the range of investment products and services offered within each market. As a result, 
                                                 
23 Williams Jr. 2012 
24 Sarah Ackerson et al. 1997  
25 Williams Jr 2012 
26 Procter 2011  
 127 
securities markets have developed unique characteristics through their historic development, 
which has occurred in isolation of other domestic markets. This meant that creating an 
international standard that would be applicable to all domestic jurisdictions was harder for 
securities supervisors than banking supervisors.  
 
Interviews with former senior members of IOSCO constantly revealed that the extent of 
regulatory coverage, and responsibility assigned to IOSCO and national securities regulators 
was significantly larger than that facing the BCBS and national banking regulators. As Neoh 
explains: 
 
“The differences between the BCBS principles is that it is directed at 
institutional supervision whereas ours are directed at market supervision… 
IOSCO has to deal with institutions, fund managers, hedge funds but at 
the same time they deal with stock markets, clearing systems and public 
firms. So they deal with a much larger canvas, which is incapable of being 
put in to a single regulatory framework. It is too difficult to coordinate all 
of the regulatory policies. All legal systems are different. The ways that 
they are regulated are very distinct.”27 
 
The consequence was that the creation of a comprehensive international regulatory standard 
was a complex task, because it was difficult to cover all necessary aspects of securities 
markets whilst not punishing those that failed to implement regulatory standards that did not 
apply to them.  
 
The second issue was the diversity of IOSCO’s membership. IOSCO had over 100 members 
at the time and its members had wide ranging degrees of sophistication and levels of market 
development. As Andrew Procter described, “you had a broad system of market supervisors 
from developed markets, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, to emerging 
markets, and everything in between regulating intermediaries, products, market infrastructure 
and conduct. There was a much broader spectrum of markets [than banking regulators 
faced]. That meant it was a lot more difficult making the membership more comfortable. 
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You also needed to produce a document that IOSCO’s members would be comfortable in 
signing.”28 Because IOSCO was a consensus-based organization, due to the voting rights of 
IOSCO’s President’s Committee (comprised of all of IOSCO’s members), IOSCO’s 
Principles needed to be inclusive enough of all of IOSCO’s members whilst creating a 
regulatory standard that was comprehensive and effective.  
 
In order to overcome these twin difficulties, Procter decided to pursue two governance 
strategies. When constructing the draft, Procter defined the limitations of IOSCO’s Principles 
by reading all of IOSCO’s reports, dated from its inception in 1983 through to 1997. This 
helped construct the specific areas relevant to an international securities regulatory standard 
upon which agreement had already been reached. After reading the reports, Procter 
proposed that IOSCO’s Principles would consist of three objectives and thirty principles. 
Procter did so because “it made a good harmonious number”29 and fell within the 
parameters of regulation that IOSCO’s work had defined as relevant to national securities 
regulators. IOSCO’s Principles were “copied and pasted from existing IOSCO documents”30 
and were then updated and reformed to reflect changes over time. In deriving the principles 
from existing regulatory work, they reflected regulatory issues that securities regulators had 
already agreed to as being important and necessary for effective regulation. As Procter put it, 
“because I had taken the thirty principles from the IOSCO reports nobody could say that it 
was outrageous.”31 This strategy helped reduce resistance to their creation.   
 
Discussing the Principles as aspirational was a key governance strategy that Procter utilized to 
ensure that IOSCO’s Principles were agreed to by the President’s Committee, and to obtain 
the support of key members such as the U.S. SEC. Procter explained the strategy in the 
following way:  
 
“No IOSCO members meet all of these principles and they should, therefore, 
should be treated as aspirational. That’s because I knew the Americans, for 
example would not sign on to something that was not consistent with their 
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existing framework. That’s why we talked about it as aspirational. This was all 
about making sure that the document wasn’t working against them. We 
asserted at the time that we did most of these things but we could all do 
better.”32 
 
IOSCO also sought to keep key members onside. Therefore, Procter chaired the Committee 
that drafted IOSCO’s Principles alongside Marisa Lago, then head of the OIA at the U.S. 
SEC, who edited the Principles in order to maintain the support of the United States. The 
core concern for regulators was reputational. They feared that their securities regulatory 
system, which was designed for a particular domestic economic and market context, would 
be held up against an international standard that may or may not effectively apply to them. 
As Procter noted, “there was a fear that IOSCO would publish something and, in a domestic 
context someone would say “this is the international standard and you don’t comply with 
it.’”33  
 
Procter’s political strategy was proving successful until the IMF, G7 and the newly-
established Financial Stability Forum (FSF) began discussing the formation of an external 
assessment regime that would measure countries’ compliance with IOSCO’s Principles. 
Originally, in 1998, IOSCO’s Principles provided a statement regarding the objectives of 
securities regulation, before listing the 30 principles of securities regulation and a brief 
description of the issues related to each. IOSCO’s Principles was not intended to be externally 
assessed by other institutions, but was supposed to provide guidance to self-assessments and 
for peer-assessments in association with IOSCO. This process spooked countries but 
IOSCO’s Principles was passed by all parties except for New Zealand.34 
 
In September 1998, IOSCO’s Principles was formally adopted through A Resolution of the 
President’s Committee on IOSCO Adoption of the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.35 
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Once passed, IOSCO spent the next four years resisting pressure from the IMF and World 
Bank to produce a methodology for assessment of compliance, turning the high-level 
principles into operational principles that could be objectively and consistently assessed by 
the IMF through its newly-established FSAP program. 
4.3 Explaining the Creation of IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation 
The creation of IOSCO’s Principles correlated with increased efforts by world economic 
leaders, through the G7, to improve the governance of international financial markets by 
strengthening international financial regulatory institutions and international financial 
standards. However, securities regulators had already begun work on international securities 
market standards. Securities regulators believed that it was necessary to raise financial 
regulatory standards in foreign jurisdictions, because of threats to the integrity of their 
domestic markets. IOSCO’s Principles was first proposed in 1995 in response to the collapse 
of Barings Bank, and in the wake of the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis. Securities regulators 
created IOSCO’s Principles in 1997 in response to the threats posed by under-regulated 
jurisdictions to the stability of dominant financial centers.  
 
Financial globalization, characterized by intensified integration between domestic securities 
markets, facilitated by technological innovation, drew regulators and world economic policy 
leaders’ attention to the task of improving the governance of international financial markets. 
Financial integration caused regulators to seek an international cooperative solution to the 
problems, and potential problems that regulators faced at home. International securities 
standards would help achieve this in two ways. First, international securities market 
regulatory standards would help raise financial standards in foreign jurisdictions and, it was 
hoped, would help reduce the frequency of financial instability in domestic securities markets 
caused by instability in foreign jurisdictions. Creating international securities market 
standards also helped raise the profile of IOSCO, which would help regulators from 
developed financial centers to promote and encourage the adoption of IOSCO’s Principles. 
Creating IOSCO’s Principles demonstrated that securities regulators were committed to 
raising the financial regulatory standards of its members.  
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The creation of IOSCO’s Principles is best explained by a transgovernmental network 
perspective. Interviews with senior securities regulators highlight that they were motivated to 
create IOSCO’s Principles in the interests of enabling securities market regulators from 
developed financial centers to more effectively govern their respective securities markets. 
Securities regulators faced a globalization dilemma, as their ability to govern domestic 
securities markets hinged on the ability of foreign regulators to effectively govern theirs, due 
to the integration of national securities markets. Unable to overcome this dilemma through 
domestic regulatory reforms, securities market regulators sought a governance solution 
through IOSCO’s Technical Committee. IOSCO’s Technical Committee created an 
international financial regulatory standard to establish an identifiable financial regulatory 
framework that reflected best-practice principles. This also demonstrates the validity of a PA 
analytical framework. Securities regulators were exercising the discretion granted to them by 
domestic legislatures to define how to effectively regulate domestic securities markets. 
IOSCO’s Principles was created to fulfill their domestic regulatory responsibilities delegated to 
them by their domestic legislature. Furthermore, securities regulators made sure that 
IOSCO’s Principles reflected their respective domestic regulatory frameworks.  
4.4 The Creation of IOSCO’s Methodology – October 2003 
IOSCO’s Methodology was passed in October 2003 by IOSCO’s members at the 
organization’s annual conference in Seoul, South Korea. IOSCO’s Methodology was “intended 
to provide guidance on the conduct of a self-assessment or third party assessment of the 
level of implementation of IOSCO’s Principles. IOSCO intended for the Methodology to 
illustrate IOSCO’s interpretation of its Principles.”36 IOSCO’s Methodology strengthened 
IOSCO’s Principles in two ways. First, IOSCO’s Methodology provided a more fine-grained 
analysis of IOSCO’s Principles that would provide further guidance to foreign regulators. 
Second, IOSCO’s Methodology provided an objective system of analysis to enable the IMF and 
World Bank to conduct assessments of compliance with IOSCO’s financial regulatory 
standards, as part of the post-Asian Financial Crisis NIFA led by members of the G7. 
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IOSCO’s Methodology was created by IOSCO’s Implementation Task Force. The 
Implementation Task Force was proposed at a meeting of IOSCO’s Technical Committee in 
Paris, France in December 199837 and was established at an Executive Committee Meeting in 
London in February 1999.38 The Implementation Task Force was comprised of members of 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee, Emerging Markets Committee, a representative from each 
Regional Committee, and the General Secretariat.39 IOSCO’s Implementation Task Force 
was the first to incorporate a complete cross-section of IOSCO’s decision-making organs 
and IOSCO’s membership. IOSCO’s Implementation Taskforce was created to assist its 
members in conducting self-assessments to establish a practical mechanism to assist the IMF 
and World Bank in their use of IOSCO’s Principles.40 The Task Force was originally limited to 
discussions of how to achieve these aims. However, it became strengthened after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.  At the first meeting of the Technical 
Committee after September 11, Andrea Corcoran, then Director of International Affairs at 
the U.S. CFTC, was asked to chair the Implementation Task Force by David Brown and 
Michel Prada, and began work on establishing IOSCO’s Methodology.41  
 
IOSCO had long-resisted pressure from the IMF and World Bank to create a Methodology for 
two reasons. First, IOSCO’s Technical Committee believed in establishing - international 
securities market standards that reflected the unique market and historical context of 
national securities markets. Securities regulators feared that the creation of a more precise 
international securities market standard would be too detailed to allow for differentiation 
between national contexts. Second, the diffusion of power within IOSCO and its internal 
governance mechanisms made it difficult for IOSCO to establish internal agreement.   
 
IOSCO’s long-held resistance to the creation of a Methodology was overcome after the events 
of September 11. September 11 caused regulators to see the benefits of the strengthened 
implementation of IOSCO’s Principles, and helped overcome internal disagreement over the 
necessity of creating a more comprehensive set of international financial standards. The 
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creation of IOSCO’s Methodology is best explained through an inter-state and 
transgovernmental network perspective.  
4.4.1 External Political Pressure 
IOSCO’s Principles was a relatively brief document that established what national regulatory 
frameworks should seek to achieve in their design and through statutory powers and national 
legislation. IOSCO’s Principles was not created to enable the IMF and World Bank to conduct 
external assessments of compliance with IOSCO’s international securities standards. In the 
years after the creation of IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO was subject to increasing pressure to 
enable the IMF and World Bank to conduct objective and comprehensive external 
assessments of compliance with IOSCO’s Principles, as part of its FSAP program. As Jennifer 
Elliot, a senior member of the IMF’s FSAP team discusses, “we were under additional 
pressure after the Asian Financial Crisis and we needed to build up capacity.”42 The IMF was 
subject to pressure after the Asian Financial Crisis by the IMF’s dominant member states, 
including members of the G7. Leading economic powers sought to place pressure on more 
peripheral jurisdictions, in order to improve financial supervisory standards. Leading 
economic powers began investing in international economic institutions, because the Asian 
Financial Crisis revealed the costs of under-regulated jurisdictions to the stability and 
profitability of their domestic financial centers.  
 
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, world economic leaders placed increased emphasis 
on the need for effective global financial regulatory oversight. Felice Friedman, former 
Member of the U.S. SEC’s OIA, notes, “the G7 finance ministers increased their interest in 
financial regulation during that time. A number of crises had led to governments recognizing 
the importance of financial market oversight to financial stability.”43 Paul Martin, former 
Finance Minister of Canada during the Asian Financial Crisis and the former Prime Minster 
of Canada, explains that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis there was “a lot more smoke than 
fire. It was really the Asian Financial Crisis that gave impetus to the creation of a global 
financial supervisory regime.”44  It was perceived that ineffective regulatory oversight was 
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contributing to greater global financial market volatility and was a contributing factor to a 
series of financial crises throughout the 1990s. In response, these leading economic powers 
focused their attention on strengthening the international financial regulatory regime, which 
sought to raise the financial supervision and regulatory standards of regulatory jurisdictions 
around the world.45  
 
The work of world economic leaders was muted prior to the crisis because the costs of 
under-regulated peripheral jurisdictions were not as apparent as they were after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. It was only after the Asian Financial Crisis that leaders forged an 
international supervisory regime comprised of the FSF, the IMF, and financial standard 
setting bodies such as IOSCO, the BCBS and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS). This became known as the NIFA.  
 
The NIFA was driven by the desire for transparency within financial markets in the wake of 
the Mexican Peso and Asian Financial Crises. As Paul Martin explains, “in the minds of the 
IMF transparency had been the mantra of the IMF for as long as I can remember. The 
Mexican Peso Crisis was caused by a lack of transparency [in the minds of the IMF and its 
staff]… What you’re talking about [the creation of international financial standards] is 
essentially a reaction to what was deemed as a lack of transparency… What you’re talking 
about [the creation of international financial standards] is essentially a reaction to what was 
deemed as a lack of transparency of the Mexicans i.e. reserves.”46 The G7 and the IMF 
created momentum for the formation of a series of financial standards and codes and the 
empowerment of the IMF to assess the level of compliance with those standards and codes. 
The regime sought to raise regulatory standards and ensure effective national financial 
regulatory supervision by promoting the formation of international regulatory standards and 
an assessment of compliance with those standards to be conducted by the IMF.  
 
As a result of pressure from the G7, the IMF and World Bank placed significant pressure on 
IOSCO to create a methodology. These institutions had made it clear that they were facing 
significant pressure to make good quality, consistent external assessments of compliance 
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with international regulatory standards, and that this drove them to create their own 
methodology if IOSCO failed to do so. In addition to the IMF and World Bank, IOSCO 
faced pressure from the newly established FSF. As David Brown, former Chairman of the 
Ontario Securities Commission and Chair of IOSCO’s Technical Committee from 2001 – 
2002, stated, “IOSCO started to review in a very serious way the principles of securities 
regulation to modernize them, to improve the quality of them and ultimately to enforce 
them in the ways that the FSF was looking for.”47  IOSCO faced external pressure from a 
range of institutions to create more effective financial regulatory standards.  
 
Furthermore, IOSCO’s participation in the newly-established FSF made it clear that 
members of the international regulatory community were concerned about IOSCO’s failure 
to create clear, consistent, and assessable standards that would raise regulatory standards in 
the securities sector. Brown stated that the OECD threatened to takeover IOSCO’s role as 
the international financial standard-setter for securities markets:  
 
“As Chairman of the Technical Committee I also sat on the FSF and I was quite 
conscious of the fact that if IOSCO didn’t step forward and assume control for 
setting international standards that somebody else would do it. The OECD was 
talking openly about developing international securities standards. So one way 
that I got IOSCO members that were reticent or reluctant at first was saying that 
if we don’t produce it somebody else will.”48 
 
The external threat to IOSCO was real, and was a critical factor in IOSCO’s creation of the 
Methodology at the time. As a consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis, and the creation of 
the FSF, and the NIFA, the demands and pressure placed on international financial 
standard-setters were immense. This was central to the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology, and 
the increased capacity that it created for IOSCO as an institution.  
 
In spite of this, IOSCO initially resisted efforts to create a more comprehensive international 
securities market standard. As Jennifer Elliot said, “[IOSCO] didn’t want to do a 
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methodology at all.”49 Tanis MacLaren, former member of the Ontario Securities 
Commission, also noted that IOSCO ignored the reality that IOSCO’s Principles was going to 
be used as an objective standard to assess compliance with international standards of best 
practice. Their initial resistance to creating a clear methodology reflected this.50 This was 
likely due to the fact that IOSCO’s Technical Committee had reiterated throughout the 
drafting of IOSCO’s Principles that they were aspirational standards. Procter confirmed this.51 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee intended to create high level principles to assist in the self-
assessment, or guided peer assessment of a country’s regulatory framework, for IOSCO 
members that would be translated into operational standards and principles in order to 
reflect local circumstances with different legal and market contexts. In the interim, IOSCO 
created a self-assessment questionnaire that provided a guided and structured assessment 
methodology, which could be conducted by securities regulators, in order to ensure that they 
are adequately compliant with IOSCO’s Principles, and to help identify areas of regulatory 
concern. IOSCO initially believed that it would facilitate compliance with IOSCO’s Principles 
with an internal self-assessment mechanism.  
 
The self-assessment process did not last long, as IOSCO eventually gave way to demands by 
the IMF, and World Bank in 2001. At a meeting at the World Bank in Washington DC with 
the IMF, World Bank, and the Implementation Task Force, IOSCO stated that it did not 
feel they needed an external assessment methodology. It was then that Tanis MacLaren 
recalls saying, “well, we have two choices, this has to be done, the G7 the FSF, is looking to 
the IMF and World Bank to do these assessments, they need an assessment methodology to 
know what the criteria is to be marked on, the choice is very simple. Either we do it, and if 
we don’t then they do it, and frankly if they do it they will do a fine job.”52 After a long 
period of resistance, it was the pressure of external events that led to the formation of a task 
force to create a methodology for assessing IOSCO’s Principles.  
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4.4.2 Explaining IOSCO’s Resistance to the Creation of IOSCO’s Methodology 
Why did IOSCO resist the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology from 1998 – 2001? Firstly, 
IOSCO’s resistance is explained by the culture of securities market regulators and their belief 
in the importance of establishing nationally distinct financial regulatory frameworks that 
reflect distinct local market, legal, and national circumstances. Securities regulators resisted 
efforts to create IOSCO’s Methodology because it would create clearly defined regulatory 
standards, at odds with the differentiated, diverse and complex nature of local securities 
market and their regulators. Neoh, a leader in the policy process explained the thinking at 
the time:  
 
“They [IOSCO’s Principles] seek to provide guidance, these are principles that 
should underpin certain regulations in certain jurisdictions in certain areas. 
We are not here to write regulation but to write basic philosophies… The 
subsequent frameworks on various matters came out of regulatory guidance 
in subsequent papers. IOSCO does not follow the same format as the BCBS 
as they have one set of guidance for banking principles.”53  
 
Securities regulators truly believed that differentiation between securities markets 
necessitated high-level principles that could be differentially applied to different national 
contexts to reflect local circumstances. Alan Cameron, former head of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and member of the Technical Committee, 
explains, “they were written at a high level to reflect that there was and should be differences 
in different countries to reflect different historical and legal contexts. If they were written 
prescriptively it would become a problem.”54 Thus, IOSCO resisted efforts to turn its high 
level principles into clear, objective principles through the Methodology with the belief that its 
principles should not become prescriptive. Tanis MacLaren, who is more critical of IOSCO’s 
pursuit of differentiated implementation of national financial regulatory principles, said, 
“there was a general trend of exceptionalism, a belief that every country's securities market is 
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different. It’s not like plain vanilla banking where one size fits all. While there’s some truth 
to that, it’s not as much as IOSCO likes to portray.”55  
 
IOSCO resisted granting responsibility to external assessors like the World Bank or IMF. It 
was believed that the process of turning IOSCO’s Principles from high-level principles into 
operational principles would misinterpret them and make them too prescriptive. As Prada 
stated, “there was the issue of whether the implementation should be in the hands of 
IOSCO only or whether it should be something the IMF and World Bank would participate 
in. There were a few of us who were slightly upset that people from outside would look in to 
the way securities regulators behaved.”56 Cameron noted that “we believed that they were 
going to be written for us by a bunch of bureaucrats and would be prescriptive in a way that 
a government officials make them.”57 Thus, IOSCO initially resisted turning its Principles in to 
clear operational principles to be externally assessed by the IMF. 
 
Secondly, securities regulators resisted the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology because of 
reputational concerns. As has been previously discussed, IOSCO’s Principles were not 
originally created in 1998 with the intention that they would form the basis of external 
assessments by international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. At the 
outset IOSCO’s Principles were intended to be aspirational benchmarks rather than a fixed 
standard by which countries could be graded for their level of compliance. As Corcoran, 
Chair of the Implementation Task Force of IOSCO Principles, explains, “originally the 
assessment methodology was intended as a means for individual jurisdictions to test national 
implementation against an external view of what constituted effective implementation of 
what were very high level principles.  Initially, the methodology was not developed to be a 
public rating system. It was supposed to provide assistance to people who were trying to 
design changes to their legislation and operations.”58 The idea that a methodology was to be 
created, placing the regulatory regime of its members under greater scrutiny, caused 
IOSCO’s members to become resistant.   
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Thirdly, IOSCO had difficulty convincing its broad and diverse membership. IOSCO’s 
difficulty stemmed from the fact that it is a consensus-based institution, which normally acts 
through the President’s Committee. This slows down the decision-making process 
necessitating regulatory initiatives that attract broad agreement. As Friedman, former Acting 
Director of the OIA at the U.S. SEC, explains, “to create something we created, resolutions 
that had to be agreed with by the President’s Committtee. To get [the resolutions] passed 
you had to get them past the President’s Committtee… It [the President’s Committee] is 
difficult and cumbersome but it is rather extraordinary.”59 The diffusion of power and the 
differentiation of markets made the process of achieving consensus difficult. As Procter 
highlighted, the issue for jurisdictions is that they sought to avoid the reputational 
embarrassment of failing to comply with international standards.60 Clear, objective 
assessment criteria that endorsed certain systems of regulation would embarrass jurisdictions 
or force adjustments on the jurisdictions even if they were considered unnecessary. 
 
The diffusion of decision-making power, the power of the United States, and the 
differentiation in the regulatory systems of its member countries meant that IOSCO, unlike 
the BCBS, was less conducive to the formation of a specific, clear and objective 
methodology to assess implementation.  
4.4.3 September 11  
IOSCO began negotiations on IOSCO’s Methodology from October 12, 2001, in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks on the United States. September 11 was a critical juncture because it 
caused IOSCO’s Technical Committee to recognize the importance of raising securities 
market regulatory standards by ensuring the effective implementation of IOSCO’s Principles 
by its members.61 The group determined to energize the ongoing work to develop guidance 
on implementation of IOSCO’s Principles, with the purpose of working toward more resilient 
financial systems globally. As Corcoran explains, regulators reinvigorated the vision of a 
Methodology against which to test implementation of IOSCO’s Principles after September 11 
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“because national regulators wanted to reinforce the strength of the global financial system 
and to have a process for robust and cooperative responses to events that could create 
financial turmoil.  Leaders of IOSCO wanted to put a lot more pressure on urging 
compliance with the Principles.” September 11 reminded regulators of the fragility of our 
system and of the importance of the ability to develop strong cooperative measures to 
address sometimes unknown risks in the increasingly interconnected global economy.  
 
September 11 also raised the importance of securities market supervision in the increasingly 
interconnected global economy. As Brown puts it, September 11 was an important trigger 
for change in IOSCO, from a “meet and greet” organization, to an effective international 
standard-setter. Brown states that critical to the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology “was the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. We had a meeting scheduled 10 days 
after that attack. [After September 11] [w]e recognized that there was a role for securities 
regulators to play in response to those terrorist attacks, particularly in response to the 
possibility that the terrorists were using the world’s capital markets to conduct terrorism.”62 
 
IOSCO had long resisted the creation of a Methodology, because of securities regulators’ belief 
in the necessity of nationally differentiated financial regulatory standards to reflect distinct 
national contexts. IOSCO also resisted the creation of a Methodology because of the diffusion 
of power within IOSCO, the reputational concerns of IOSCO members, and because the 
U.S. SEC didn’t want to see the creation of a comprehensive international securities market 
standard. These factors were overcome after the events of September 11. September 11 was 
a critical event in the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology because it highlighted the costs of 
failing to improve securities market regulation in foreign jurisdictions, and further 
demonstrated the dangers posed by under regulated peripheral jurisdictions.  
4.4.4 The Policy Process of Creating IOSCO’s Methodology 
The task force to create IOSCO’s Methodology was established at the first meeting of the 
Technical Committee after the September 11 terrorist attacks, in mid-October in Rome.63 
Corcoran, then Director of the OIA at the United States’ CFTC, was asked by the three 
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chairs of IOSCO (the Executive, Technical and Emerging Markets Committees) to head the 
taskforce to create the Methodology. Once the taskforce was established, Corcoran oversaw a 
long and arduous project to create a methodology that was considered acceptable to 
IOSCO’s members, and would be passed by the President’s Committee. The taskforce had 
representation from all committees within IOSCO (the Executive, Technical, Emerging 
Markets, Regional Committees, and the Self Regulatory Organization Consultative 
Committee). Once established, the taskforce took stock of existing regulatory principles by 
other international institutions, such as the OECD and the BCBS’ methodologies, to 
understand how principles could be explicated into operational principles. 64 
 
The taskforce, Chaired by Corcoran and staffed by representatives from jurisdictions sitting 
on each of the relevant IOSCO committees, established teams dealing with different sections 
of the principles. Once drafted, there was a two-part comment process that involved input 
from the expert committees of IOSCO and comments from all IOSCO members.  More 
than 400 comments were received and processed. Those comments were considered and 
informed the final draft. IOSCO’s Methodology was endorsed by the full membership of 
IOSCO at the 2003 Annual Conference in Seoul, Korea in October.  The overall process of 
creating IOSCO’s Methodology took two years. 
 
In contrast to the BCBS, IOSCO’s process was a bottom-up process involving all members 
in all states of development. Corcoran described how the BCBS principles were drafted by 
the Group of 10 (G10) for the G10 and then disseminated initially on a voluntary basis to 
banking supervisors around the world.  “The IOSCO requirements were not top-down 
requirements. They were articulated by the institution as a whole with the idea that they 
should be aspirational commitments for all countries.”65 The drafting process was very long 
and very difficult. Corcoran said, “at every moment it wasn’t clear that “consensus” was 
going to happen,”66 highlighting the difficulties that such an involved, bottom-up negotiation 
process would have.  
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The difficulties faced by the taskforce were two-fold. First, securities markets are 
characterized by extraordinary diversity in terms of overall structure, level of development 
and sophistication, and types of products that are sold or offered. As Corcoran put it: 
 
 “it was difficult to craft appropriate common denominators and it was 
difficult to take into account the different circumstances of different 
jurisdictions [in IOSCO’s Methodology]. We had to deal with the differences in 
how markets are constituted… some were very old, some had rules that 
preceded the rules of regulators, some were private mutual companies, some 
were organs of the governments who created them… it was a very complex 
situation.”67  
 
The second difficulty faced by IOSCO was the pressure that the Methodology and the newly-
established NIFA created for IOSCO’s members. Originally, IOSCO’s Principles aimed to 
provide assistance to countries that were seeking to improve their regulatory structure, and 
to raise the standards of regulation of IOSCO members. National jurisdictions had 
developed different approaches to accounting, capital adequacy, and other issues that meant 
that they were not ready to commit to a common approach even though they were willing to 
commit to common objectives. Through the creation of strict grading regimes after the 
Asian Financial Crisis, securities regulators became concerned about getting a good grade.68  
 
Thus, IOSCO members’ comments were driven by reputational concerns, and an effort to 
craft the document in a way that would not endanger their reputation through the external 
assessment of their system by the World Bank and IMF. Corcoran argues that this was not 
solely based on self-interest but driven by the fact that there were real differences between 
markets and regulatory systems. This problem was exacerbated by a feeling that external 
assessments were going to be unnecessarily prescriptive and that they would fail to 
incorporate real differences between jurisdictions.69 
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Once completed, IOSCO’s Methodology works through Principles 1 – 30, providing an outline 
of the principle, key issues, and key questions regarding the regulatory powers and authority 
of the regulator, before providing three categories of benchmarks to be assessed against: 
Fully, Broadly or Partly Implemented. The level of implementation is determined by the 
extent to which the assessor (the IMF or World Bank) answers affirmatively to the key 
questions related to the principle.70 As stated previously, IOSCO’s Methodology doesn’t define 
accepted systems or methods of securities regulation; instead, it provides an assessment of 
whether the regulator has the adequate regulatory power to cover the demands of the 
regulatory principle.  
 
Similar to the creation of IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s Methodology was critical for the 
evolution of IOSCO, not only for the obligations it placed on its members, but for how it 
increased the institutional capacity. As a result, IOSCO would assess the level of compliance 
of its members and would roll out its IOSCO Principles Assessment and Implementation Program, 
which would assist in members’ self-assessments of compliance, and technical assistance 
programs to enable members to comply. Furthermore, IOSCO’s Methodology, in concert with 
other institutional initiatives, led to an expanded secretariat, strengthened institutional 
financing, a formal communication strategy, and a new consultation policy. Thus, IOSCO’s 
Methodology played a critical role in strengthening the institutional capacity of IOSCO.  
4.4.5 The Nature of IOSCO’s Methodology 
IOSCO’s Methodology is still relatively non-prescriptive. IOSCO chose to define the regulatory 
goals rather than defining technical rules as to how those goals are implemented. This differs 
from the approach of the BCBS, who specifically define how capital adequacy requirements 
are calculated. IOSCO’s Methodology was created in a manner that allows for nationally 
differentiated implementation of international financial regulatory principles. IOSCO’s 
Methodology did not seek to push powerful regulators’ own regulatory model or system of 
regulation, but provided basic regulatory principles that would be incorporated within 
national financial regulatory frameworks.  When asked if the development process was about 
an effort by individual jurisdictions to push their own regulatory model or system of 
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regulation, Corcoran stated the following: 
 
 “there was no consensus on a single structure or model for regulation.  
National jurisdictions did not want the Principles to impose a structure 
provided the objectives of the Principles were served.  National differences 
were accommodated in many cases to reflect that jurisdictions in practice 
offered different types of financial services and faced different legal, political, 
and other circumstances.”71  
 
At the same time IOSCO members wanted to be good regulatory citizens of the world—to 
be able to combat financial crime and to cooperate in an emergency as well as on a day to 
day basis as effectively as possible—and therefore were prepared to invest in lengthy 
discussions to provide more guidance to members overall on how to do that. The nature of 
IOSCO’s Methodology reflected the ideational preferences of the community of securities 
regulators. Predominantly, this meant that international financial regulatory standards should 
allow for substantive variation between national regulatory frameworks. 
 
The U.S. SEC had begun a technical assistance program called the International Institute for 
Securities Market Development. The U.S. SEC offered technical assistance and training 
programs to the barrage of securities market supervisors who emerged in the wake of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the rise of securities markets throughout Western Europe. The U.S. 
SEC sought to improve regulatory regimes in securities markets through its technical 
assistance program. The program recognized the impact that differentiated stages of 
development, sophistication and the type of product offerings had on whether different 
regulatory frameworks were appropriate for each national market context.  The securities 
market project pursued by Bill Williams Jr. and the community of securities lawyers also 
endorsed this approach. During the process of creation the document, Developing Securities 
Markets: Key Elements of a Legal Regime, Williams became aware of flaws in the U.S. securities 
market regulatory regime and began work to promote reforms of U.S. securities law.72 U.S. 
securities regulators did not seek to export its regulatory regime to foreign markets because 
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they believed it was inappropriate to do so. As Michael Mann, the first Director of the U.S. 
SEC’s OIA, explains,  
 
“the SEC was interested in identifying what made a good securities market and 
what was critical to it. There was a huge tension within the SEC at the time. We 
believed we had the best markets and we wanted markets to emulate our style. 
But nobody in their right mind would have just passed those securities laws in to 
their law. Those laws were instituted in 1930s and evolved over time. It was a 
donkey that worked well but wasn’t elegantly created.”73 
 
Therefore, the nature of IOSCO’s Methodology was not driven by the pursuit of self-interest 
by its most powerful members. Instead, it was driven by the recognition that narrowly 
defining appropriate systems of securities regulation was ineffective and potentially 
dangerous.  
4.5 Explaining the Creation of IOSCO’s  Methodology 
IOSCO’s Methodology was created to obtain both the preferences of powerful states and the 
preferences of the community of regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. This 
chapter has identified that IOSCO resisted creating a Methodology from the establishment of 
IOSCO’s Principles in 1998 until October 2001. During this period, IOSCO was subject to 
political pressure from the World Bank and IMF. These institutions wanted IOSCO to 
create a more comprehensive methodology to enable them to conduct objective assessments 
of compliance with international financial standards as part of the NIFA after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The NIFA was characterized by a strengthened surveillance program, 
assessing countries’ compliance with international financial standards. This program was 
created through the IMF but was pursued by the world’s leading economic powers through 
the G7. G7 member states pursued a strengthened international financial regulatory regime 
through the IMF and World Bank because they perceived that the costs of under-regulated 
jurisdictions necessitated investment in strengthened financial regulatory institutions in the 
global economy. 
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September 11 was critical in the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology. September 11 helped to 
overcome regulators’ internal disagreement over whether it was appropriate to establish a 
more comprehensive international securities standards. As interviews with senior national 
securities regulators reveal, September 11 caused securities regulators to perceive the 
necessity of strengthening implementation of international securities standards. This shift 
cannot be accounted by a purely inter-state approach that focuses on the preferences of 
states. This points to the role of ideas and the impact of external events in shifting the policy 
preferences of the community of regulators.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized the creation and strengthening of international securities 
market standards through the creation of IOSCO’s Principles in 1998 and IOSCO’s 
Methodology in 2003. A review of the historical and political context of these two standards’ 
creation reveals some interesting and important political dynamics that are important in our 
understanding of international financial regulatory politics.  
 
First, the creation of IOSCO’s Principles was driven by the impact of intensified integration 
between national securities markets and the transmission of financial instability between 
national jurisdictions. This is demonstrated by the fact that the creation of IOSCO’s Principles 
was inspired by the 1994 Mexican Financial Crisis, the 1995 Barings Crisis and the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. The influence of these crises highlights that international financial 
standards are created to address negative spillovers caused by under regulated peripheral 
jurisdictions. Second, IOSCO’s Principles was created by the agency of securities market 
regulators, and not domestic political pressure or political pressure from states. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that interviews with regulators confirmed that regulators 
independently pursued IOSCO’s Principles. Regulators proactively created IOSCO’s Principles. 
Their primary motivation was to enable regulators to more effectively regulate their domestic 
securities markets and obtain their interest in fostering financial stability. Third, regulators 
within IOSCO’s Technical Committee demonstrated through the policy-making process that 
they were interested in assuring that IOSCO’s standards reflected their domestic regulatory 
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frameworks. Regulators, therefore, were conscious of the preferences of their domestic 
legislatures.  
 
An analysis of the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology highlights two further issues. First, 
international securities market standards were not solely driven by the preferences of 
securities regulators. Instead, securities regulators were subject to pressure from powerful 
states. Powerful states placed pressure on regulators through institutions within which they 
exercised greater control. Second, whilst IOSCO was subject to substantive pressure from 
the IMF and World Bank, the critical issue that caused regulators to create IOSCO’s 
Methodology was the events of September 11. The events of September 11 shifted the policy 
preferences of securities regulators, causing regulators to overcome any internal 
disagreement and to creating a more comprehensive international standard. September 11 
demonstrated to regulators the dangers and costs of under-regulated peripheral jurisdictions.  
 
This analysis demonstrates the validity of a PA approach to international securities 
standards. IOSCO’s Principles and IOSCO’s Methodology were created to obtain the policy 
goals delegated to securities market regulators by domestic legislatures. When securities 
regulators were unable to obtain these aims through domestic financial regulatory reforms, 
securities regulators from developed financial centers pursued international financial 
standards at the transnational level. Furthermore, securities regulators were conscious of 
creating international securities standards that reflected these domestic policy goals by 
ensuring that the international standard reflected domestic policy frameworks. The creation 
of IOSCO’s Principles highlights the influence and agency of the community of securities 
regulators in creating international standards that reflect their legislatures’ policy preferences 
The creation of IOSCO’s Methodology highlights the influence and power of national treasury 
departments and finance ministries, acting on behalf of the state, on outcomes at IOSCO. 
This demonstrates the role of multiple agents in the creation of institutional initiatives to 
strengthen implementation of IOSCO’s Principles.  
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Chapter 5  
The Creation and Strengthening of International 
Credit Rating Agency Standards 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the creation and strengthening of international credit rating agency 
standards. IOSCO’s Technical Committee created two international credit rating agency 
standards, including: IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs in September 20031 and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct in December 2004.2 IOSCO created IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs after domestic 
legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. had indicated that improving the regulation of rating 
agencies was a domestic policy priority. U.S. indicated that it sought to improve the 
regulation of rating agencies after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002 
respectively. The E.U. indicated that it sought to improve the regulation of rating agencies 
after the politicization of rating agencies in the wake of the collapse of Parmalat in late 2003 
and after rating agencies downgraded German public banks during the same period. 
Domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. had indicated that improving the regulation of 
rating agencies was a priority through a series of public initiatives including: public 
statements by domestic politicians, public hearings, the creation of committees reviewing the 
regulation of rating agencies, the drafting of public reports, and legislation requesting further 
technical advice from securities market regulators. 
 
Domestic legislatures had also indicated that they were unwilling to subject rating agencies to 
a direct regulatory regime. U.S. Congress (Congress hereafter) was unwilling to regulate 
rating agencies because rating agencies were afforded First Amendment, free speech 
protections by the U.S. courts.3 This strengthened the hand of rating agencies in their 
lobbying efforts of U.S. lawmakers. Consequently, Congress chose not to directly regulate 
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rating agencies until 2006. E.U. Parliament chose not to regulate rating agencies despite the 
recommendations of the European Commission to create an E.U. rating agency regulator. 
E.U. Parliament chose not to directly regulate rating agencies due to resistance by the U.K. 
and financial market interest groups and because it questioned the efficacy of a stand-alone 
E.U. regime. The U.S.’ decision not to regulate rating agencies would have weakened the 
effectiveness of an E.U. regime and could have proved costly to E.U. investors and E.U. 
publicly listed companies and issuers.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created by IOSCO’s Technical Committee to promote the 
adoption of common regulatory regimes for rating agencies. Securities regulators believed 
that competing systems of rating agency regulation were not in the interests of investor 
safety. Competing regulatory regimes would have led to competing systems of assessment of 
the creditworthiness of obligors across jurisdictions. IOSCO’s Technical Committee created 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs to establish common principles for upcoming U.S. and E.U. 
regulatory reforms. IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Code of Conduct, a 
voluntary self-regulatory framework for rating agencies, in order to establish a regulatory 
response to the policy problems posed by rating agencies whilst respecting the domestic 
political constraints in the U.S. and E.U. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was also created to 
promote the adoption of an internationally consistent regulatory regime for rating agencies 
across jurisdictions in the interests of investor safety. The effort was successful as both the 
U.S. and E.U. adopted regulatory regimes that were consistent with IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. 
 
The creation of IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards is explained by both a 
domestic politics and transgovernmental network perspective. A domestic politics 
perspective explains the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
because they were created in response to shifts in the policy preferences of domestic 
legislatures and their expressed policy preference for the improved regulation of rating 
agencies. The creation of IOSCO’s standards for rating agencies was contingent on shifts in 
the policy preferences of domestic legislatures and their decision to improve the regulation 
of previously unregulated financial market actors. The creation of IOSCO’s international 
credit rating agency standards is also explained by a transgovernmental network perspective. 
Securities market regulators exercised agency by creating international rating agency 
 150 
standards that established and promoted common regulatory approaches to rating agencies.  
Domestic legislatures did not express a preference for common regulatory regimes. Instead, 
these standards were created to obtain the principled professional interests of securities 
market regulators who sought to ensure consistent systems of assessment of 
creditworthiness across jurisdictions in the interests of investor safety.  
 
The political dynamics of international credit rating agency standards is best explained by a 
PA analytical framework. Securities market regulators responded to the domestic legislatures’ 
expressed policy preferences for improving the regulation of rating agencies. After domestic 
legislatures had expressed their preferences, securities market regulators exercise their 
discretion by creating an international securities market standard to promote the 
coordination of national regulatory frameworks by establishing common regulatory 
principles. 
 
IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards were strengthened by the decision of 
domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. to create a direct regulatory regime for rating 
agencies. The U.S.’ decision to directly regulate rating agencies in 2006 is explained by the 
policy preferences of domestic political actors. The initial impetus for a direct regulatory 
regime in the U.S. was the narrow political interests of two Pennsylvanian Congressmen, 
Paul Kanjorski and Michael Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick and Kanjorski’s 2006 Credit Rating 
Agency Duopoly Relief was proposed to facilitate market access for Egan-Jones, a 
Pennsylvania-based rating agency. The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act also reflected 
a strengthening consensus of the need for the direct regulatory regime to reduce conflict of 
interest issues and to improve disclosure practices. Despite this, the regulatory regime 
remained weak because of resistance by members of Congress and continuing judicial 
constraints on the U.S. SEC’s rule-making authority. It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis to 
substantively shift the domestic political context to favor the direct regulation of rating 
agencies and to enable the Congress and the U.S. SEC to establish a comprehensive 
regulatory regime under the existing 2006 act and under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank hereafter), which was signed in to law in July 
2010. 
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The E.U.’s decision to directly regulate rating agencies is also explained by change in the 
policy preferences of domestic political actors due to shifts in the E.U. domestic political 
context. The E.U. chose not to regulate rating agencies after its review of rating agencies 
from 2002 – 2005.  It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis to create a direct regulatory regime 
for rating agencies, because it shifted the domestic political context in favor of subjecting 
rating agencies to a comprehensive direct regulatory regime. The 2007/2008 financial crisis 
changed the domestic political incentives of U.S and E.U. politicians.4 
 
The strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct is explained 
by a domestic politics perspective. The strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s 
international standards for rating agencies was dependent on shifts in the domestic political 
context and the preferences of domestic political actors.  
5.2 The U.S. and E.U.’s Review of Rating Agency Regulation 
This section summarizes the U.S. and E.U.’s review of rating agency regulation after the 
politicization of rating agency regulation in the U.S. and E.U. from 2001 – 2003. This section 
will demonstrate that U.S. and E.U. domestic legislatures expressed a preference for 
improving the regulation of rating agencies. At the same time, U.S. and E.U. domestic 
legislatures indicated that they were unwilling to directly regulate rating agencies due to 
domestic political and judicial constraints.  
5.2.1 The United States’ Regulatory Review of Rating Agencies after Enron and WorldCom 
Congress indicated that improving the regulation of rating agencies was a policy priority after 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Congress conducted 
hearings, drafted reports and requested technical advice from the U.S. SEC on the issue of 
rating agencies oversight. U.S. lawmakers heavily criticized rating agencies for their failure to 
warn investors of the impending collapse of Enron and WorldCom and the maintenance of 
investment grade ratings of Enron up to four days before its collapse. Senators suggested 
that it was time to regulate rating agencies. In March 2002, Senator Libermann stated that, “I 
think it's appropriate, as we try to learn the lessons of Enron, to ask if the agencies should 
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have some sense of accountability, some oversight, from the SEC perhaps, to ensure they 
properly perform their function as watchdogs.”5 The Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs held hearings on Enron and the Ratings Agencies in March 20026 and Senate Staff 
compiled a report called, “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Market 
Watchdogs,” in October 2002.  
 
The Senate Staff report recognized that Enron provided insufficient quality information to 
rating agencies and that this was the primary cause of rating agencies’ failure to accurately 
assess the creditworthiness of Enron. This was rating agencies’ main argument in Senate 
hearings. For instance, Ronald Barone of Standard & Poors stated, “Senator, this was not a 
ratings problem. This was a fraud problem.”7 The Senate Staff Report concludes that, in 
spite of this, the primary problem was that rating agencies’ failure to undertake effective duty 
of care. The report states the following:  
 
“the credit rating agencies’ approach to Enron fell short of what the public had a 
right to expect, having placed its trust in these firms to assess corporate 
creditworthiness for the purpose of federal and state standards. It is difficult to 
wonder whether the lack of accountability – the agencies’ practical immunity to 
lawsuits and non-existent regulatory oversight – is a major problem.”8  
 
The report concludes that this shouldn’t preclude greater accountability9 and recommended 
that the SEC set specific conditions for the designation of credit rating agencies as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). The report states that it 
should be dependent on whether rating agencies adopt appropriate standards and 
considerations when reaching ratings, that their staff be adequately trained and that the U.S. 
SEC be responsible for monitoring rating agencies’ ongoing compliance with these 
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standards.10 The Senate report highlights that U.S. Senators and their staff felt that rating 
agencies’ failure was, in part, due to the lack of regulatory oversight.  
 
On July 30 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed in to law. The law reformed financial 
industry ‘gatekeepers’ including accountants and auditors for publicly listed stocks. Credit 
rating agencies were not included in the bill. Instead, Congress requested the U.S. SEC to 
report back to Congress with recommendations on the regulatory environment for rating 
agencies. The SEC produced a report on rating agency oversight to fulfill Congress’ request 
under Section 702 (b) of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in January 2003.11 The U.S. SEC’s 
report was designed to address “the role of credit rating agencies and their importance to the 
securities markets, impediments faced by credit rating agencies in performing that role, 
measures to improve information flow to the market from rating agencies, barriers to entry 
into the credit rating business, and conflicts of interest faced by rating agencies.”12  
 
The staff report stated that rating agencies lacked appropriately skilled staff, but that rating 
agencies believed that reputational concerns were adequate for rating agencies to maintain a 
high level of staff training.13 The report also reflected the views of buy-side firms and market 
analysts who sought greater transparency in the ratings process including disclosure of the 
basis of ratings decisions.14 The report highlights that there are concerns over the exemption 
of rating agencies from disclosing material, nonpublic information. The U.S. SEC previously 
had sought to subject rating agencies to the 1940 Investment Advisers Act that would 
require rating agencies to disclose material, nonpublic information. Rating agencies, 
however, were granted an exemption by U.S. courts because they were considered 
‘publishers’ and were therefore not subject to the act. Rating agencies took part voluntarily 
but the U.S. SEC did not have statutory authority on this issue.15 Some U.S. securities 
regulators were concerned that requiring rating agencies to disclose a rating change to issuers 
ahead of time created an opportunity for insider trading by issuer insiders.16 Finally, the 
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report highlights that the issuer-pays system used by rating agencies produces potential and 
alleged conflicts of interest issues in the industry but that the rating industry believed that it 
demonstrated its ability to effectively manage these issues in the past.17  
 
Five months later on June 4 2003, the U.S. SEC produced a Concept Release, entitled Concept 
Release: Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Law.18 This was 
intended to establish what appropriate regulatory actions could be taken to address the 
concerns raised in the staff report. The 2003 concept release sought comment from industry 
members and the public on the issues that were raised in the 2003 report, and provided 
potential regulatory actions in this issue area. The 2003 concept release echoed that of 
previous concept releases in 1992 and 1997 in that it proposed three alternative systems of 
regulatory reform: direct oversight, elimination of the NRSRO designation, and a review of 
designation policies to establish standards for the designation of NRSROs to ensure that 
they maintain adequate internal organizational standards to deserve the designation.19  
 
The report identified the core issues regarding the function and regulation of rating agencies. 
The primary concern was the flow of information available from issuers that rating agencies 
were responsible for assessing and that inadequate disclosure requirements reduced the 
effectiveness of the ratings process.20 The U.S. SEC noted that a number of reforms had 
already been undertaken to address these concerns through Sarbanes-Oxley.21  
 
The U.S. SEC’s concept release identified the core issues relating to the regulation of rating 
agencies and what should be incorporated in a regulatory framework to govern rating 
agencies. When the concept release was published in June 2003, staff at the U.S. SEC had 
not established a clear position on whether it was necessary or appropriate to directly or 
indirectly regulate rating agencies.22 Furthermore, the U.S. SEC was conscious that despite 
Congress’ public support for the direct regulation of rating agencies, Congress was unlikely 
to grant the U.S. SEC the statutory authority to do so. The U.S. SEC was awaiting clear 
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Congressional leadership on the issue before stating a public view of what form of regulation 
the U.S. SEC supported. 
5.2.2 Explaining the U.S.’ Decision Not to Directly Regulate Rating Agencies 
After the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, Congress publicly appeared to seek legislative 
reforms that would subject rating agencies to direct regulation. Instead, Congress chose not 
to directly regulate rating agencies and delegated the task of determining whether and/or 
how rating agencies would be regulated to the U.S. SEC. What explains the Congress’ 
unwillingness to directly regulate rating agencies? Three factors explain the failure of the U.S. 
to legislate a direct regulatory regime for rating agencies, including: rating agencies being 
afforded First Amendment Right protections, traditional lobbying efforts by the rating 
agency industry, and a lack of consensus between legislators and regulators on the necessity 
of directly regulating rating agencies.  
 
First, Congress failed to regulate rating agencies in the wake of Enron and WorldCom 
because Congress faced important judicial constraints, which limited their ability to create an 
effective regulatory regime for rating agencies through legislative reform. Rating agencies 
were afforded First Amendment right protections by the U.S. courts. U.S. Courts had 
effectively shielded rating agencies from liability and accountability because rating agencies 
had successfully made the argument that ratings are “the world's shortest editorials”23 and 
should be afforded similar protection from liability as journalists.  
 
The rating industry had hired Floyd Abrams, Senior Partner at Cahill Gordon & Reindel, 
who had become the first authority on First Amendment, freedom of speech rights in the 
U.S., and had been involved in the most definitive Supreme Court cases in the United 
States.24 Annette Nazareth, former U.S. SEC Commissioner responsible for rating agency 
regulation from 2005, explained that Floyd Abrams, acting as counsel for U.S. credit rating 
agencies, strategically chose which cases to settle with claimants and which cases to contest 
to build a set of legal precedents. As Annette Nazareth explains, this “ensured that credit 
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ratings were opinions and were therefore above reproach.”25 A key reservation of Congress 
was that they could be accused of constitutional and congressional overreach if legislative 
reforms were struck down by the U.S. court system.  
 
Second, rating agencies lobbied Congress to protect against the creation of a direct 
regulatory regime. Rating agencies’ claim to First Amendment right protections were a 
crucial part of the rating agencies’ lobbying efforts. As the Huffington Post’s Ben Protess and 
Lagan Sebert discuss, rating agencies have repeatedly “quashed or watered down potential 
government rules by arguing that, much like a newspaper editorial, ratings are protected by 
the constitutional right to free speech, according to a Huffington Post Investigative Fund 
review of congressional testimony, SEC documents and lobbying reports.”26 Rating agencies 
were able to convince legislators and regulators that regulatory regimes for rating agencies 
would be rendered ineffective if they trampled on their First Amendment rights. 
Congressman Paul Kanjorski, argued that Congress must be “very sensitive to the First 
Amendment issue posed in these debates."27  
 
Third, there was not a clear consensus on the necessity of creating a direct regulatory regime 
for rating agencies. As the U.S. SEC’s Concept Release makes clear, the U.S. SEC did not 
take a public position or endorse one of the three regulatory options it had identified. As 
Howard Davies (former Chairman of the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority) and 
David Green state, “Majority opinion among the regulators was that the [rating] agencies 
should themselves be responsible for policing conflicts of interest and ensuring the integrity 
of their analysis.”28 In 2005, Annette Nazareth stated in public testimony to Congress that 
the U.S. SEC “believed a strong and effective industry-led regime could prove to be a 
constructive and reasonable approach to address a number of concerns involving the credit 
rating industry that have been raised in recent years by Congress, the Commission, and 
others, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions.”29 Some securities 
regulators favored the continuation of the self-regulatory regime.  
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An interview with a senior U.S. SEC regulator reveals two reasons why some U.S. securities 
regulators favored a self-regulatory regime for rating agencies. First, the U.S. SEC already 
retained a lot of power over ratings agencies, which enabled the U.S. SEC to address 
regulatory concerns without being given direct authority by Congress. The interviewee stated 
that the Trading and Markets Division at the U.S. SEC dealt with rating agencies and 
communicated the regulatory concerns of the SEC for rating agencies. The interviewee 
stated, “there was no formal regulation but that doesn’t mean that we didn’t have a lot of 
power… There was a lot of informal power, which, for regulators, was good because it was 
concentrated within the SEC.”30  
 
Second, some U.S. securities regulators believed that oligopolistic rating agencies had some 
important policy benefits. The interviewee stated that for public bond issues and stock 
listings, “when it’s an oligopoly you don’t get to chose. If you don’t have a choice on which 
rating agencies you hire you don’t have the same conflict of interest.” The real regulatory 
concern “was monopolistic slacking but [we felt there was] no real conflict of interest with 
issuers.”31 Some staff in the U.S. SEC reached the conclusion that Enron was a unique case 
caused by rating agencies’ failure to adequately investigate the statement of accounts and 
financial position of the firm due to monopolistic slacking rather than inherent conflicts of 
interest.32 Monopolistic slacking refers to the fact that firms who have a monopolistic 
position in the market do not invest sufficient resources or do not effectively monitor the 
quality of its product. In the case of rating agencies, monopolistic slacking impacts the 
quality of rating agencies’ assessments and can impact the quality of information investors 
receive.  
 
After both the U.S. Congress and U.S. SEC began to review the regulation of rating agencies 
until the creation of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, the U.S. continued to favor 
the regulatory status quo and did not legislate credit rating agency reform. In response, the 
U.S. SEC created a domestic Code of Conduct as a measure to fill the regulatory void left by 
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Congress’ unwillingness to legislate rating agency measure whilst addressing some of the 
core concerns that regulators and domestic politicians had expressed.  The U.S. SEC 
proposed the idea in March 2004.33  
 
As discussed previously, bills were introduced to regulate rating agencies but were defeated. 
As previous scholarship has noted, rating agencies were able to forestall Congressional 
action by successfully making the case that they were afforded First Amendment right 
protections by the U.S. courts and that legislative reforms could impinge on these rights.34 
Finally, securities regulators were not entirely convinced of the necessity for the direct 
regulation of rating agencies.  
5.2.3 The European Union Rating Agency Regulatory Reform Process 
The European Union began investigating the regulation of rating agencies in April 2002. In 
April 2002, European finance ministers requested a report on the regulation of rating 
agencies through the informal Oviedo EcoFin council.35 The impetus for reform was the 
collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the U.S., the FSF’s concerns, policy developments in 
the United States and IOSCO’s work on rating agencies during this time.36 The issue was 
given greater impetus by two other events that brought the regulation of rating agencies to 
the E.U.’s attention. First, Parmalat, Italy’s dairy giant, collapsed in late 2003 with no 
effective warning by rating agencies. Second, Germany began lobbying for the regulation of 
rating agencies after Standard & Poors downgraded Germany’s public banks due to their 
future pension obligations.37 As Klaus C. Englen explains, “The German government, faced 
with a domestic revolt against damaging rating decisions by Standard & Poor’s, is under 
mounting pressure to control what is perceived as an excessive level of American rating 
power.”38 Furthermore, as Christopher Bruner and Rawi Abdelal state, “European 
parliamentarians have grown resentful of the perceived lack of understanding that the U.S.-
based agencies have shown toward different accounting standards and corporate financing 
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customs”39 and “increasingly complained about industry concentration, the U.S.-centric 
orientation of the major agencies, [and] the ‘protectionist overtones’ of the NRSRO 
system.”40 The E.U. also appeared ready to regulate rating agencies in the wake of public 
scandal and growing resentment of rating agencies.  
 
In June 2003, the European Parliament granted the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs’ request that a report be produced for regulatory recommendations regarding credit 
rating agencies. The report was to be chaired Giorgos Katiforis. In November 2003, two 
months before the final draft of the Katiforis report, U.S. based credit rating agencies 
downgraded German state banks to junk status because of their future pension obligations. 
As Engelen states, “to large segments of Germany’s political and financial establishment, 
Standard & Poor’s rating action amounted to a declaration of war.”41 The European 
Parliament’s proposal to require rating agencies to register with an E.U. authority was driven, 
in part by, Germany’s concerns about U.S. rating agencies and in an effort to counter the 
Anglo-Saxon ratings of American-based rating agencies.42 The final draft of the Committee’s 
report was produced in January 2004 and its recommendations were put forth in a resolution 
on the role and methods of rating agencies in February 2004. In the final report, the 
Committee recommended the following:  
 
“Registration with a European authority would help redress the imbalance 
between Europe and the US… Registration would imply accountability, 
implemented by periodic reporting to the European ratings authority and 
supervision over the conditions of effectiveness of rating activity, 
implemented by an active dialogue between the management of the agencies 
and the regulator.”43  
 
The European parliament did not act on the recommendations of the Katiforis report. 
Instead, as Bruner and Abdelal summarize, “the European Parliament has directed the 
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European Commission to report back by July 2005 with its view on regulation of the 
agencies. The Commission, in turn, looked to the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators for advice.”44 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) didn’t 
produce its final recommendations until March 2005 in a report, CESR’s Technical Advice to 
the European Commission on Possible Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies.45  
5.2.4 Explaining the E.U.’s Decision Not to Regulate Rating Agencies 
As this chapter has established, Congress chose not to legislate rating agency regulation and 
instead chose to establish an industry-led, voluntary Code of Conduct initiative in March 
2004. The E.U. Parliament was presented with the Katiforis report in early 2004, which 
recommended that the E.U. establish an European credit agency oversight body. The E.U. 
Parliament chose to delay a decision on whether to regulate rating agencies in early 2004, 
requesting a report from CESR instead.  
 
The E.U. parliament chose to not to legislate rating agencies in early 2004, despite the 
recommendations of the Katiforis report, for two reasons. First, the domestic political 
balance of power did not support Germany’s efforts to regulate rating agencies. The 
European financial industry opposed the direct regulation of rating agencies at the time of 
the initial regulatory review and had expressed these concerns during the drafting of the 
Katiforis report.46 The U.K. opposed the direct regulation of rating agencies and, at the time, 
the U.K. had more influence than Germany in European financial regulatory affairs.47 
 
Second, although there is no clear evidence that the E.U.’s decision not to legislate rating 
agency regulation in early 2004 was because of the U.S.’ decision not to legislate rating 
agency regulation; it was likely influential in the E.U.’s decision. A formal regulatory regime 
would have led to differentiated assessments of creditworthiness between jurisdictions. E.U. 
policymakers could have inadvertently put E.U.-based issuers at a disadvantage as investors 
questioned the transparency and accuracy of European-based ratings due to fears of 
government intervention in the ratings process. In 2004, a report by France’s AMF stated 
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the following: “the only forum for dealing effectively with these issues is the upcoming 
international talks between regulators. The agencies’ organisational structures… do not lend 
themselves easily to analysis from a strictly domestic viewpoint.”48 This was also indicated by 
CESR when, during their recommendations to the European Commission, they argued that 
a direct regulatory oversight regime “poses a danger, if it is different from regulatory 
initiatives taken in other systems, that ratings from EU CRAs would be viewed differently 
from those produced by non-EU CRAs, thereby creating an un-level playing field.”49  This 
indicates that the E.U. had concerns about establishing a differentiated regulatory regime.  
5.3 The Creation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created in September 2003 to establish a common policy 
platform for regulatory reforms in light of the U.S. and E.U.’s review of the regulation of 
rating agencies. IOSCO’s Technical Committee was driven to create IOSCO’s Principles for 
CRAs by their principled professional interests. Securities regulators believed competing 
systems of rating agency regulation was not in the interests of investor safety. IOSCO’s Code 
of Conduct was created in December 2004 to establish an effective and internationally 
consistent regulatory response to the policy problems posed by rating agencies whilst 
respecting the domestic political constraints in the U.S. and E.U.  
5.3.1 IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created in September 2003 to promote the creation of 
common regulatory regimes for rating agencies across jurisdictions. Securities regulators 
were concerned about the threat of differentiated regulatory regimes for rating agencies. As 
one regulator involved in the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct stated, “it’s pretty fair to say that the impetus for [the credit rating agency] task force 
was to get in the way of contradictory global approaches to the regulation of rating 
agencies… We didn’t want jurisdictions to go out and do whatever.”50  
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IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was derived from the work of IOSCO’s Task Force for CRAs, 
which was established in response to the U.S. and E.U.’s decision to review the regulation of 
rating agencies. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs reflect the outcomes and recommendations of 
IOSCO’s Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies that was released at the same time as 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs in September 2003.51 IOSCO’s Report on the Activities of Credit 
Rating Agencies states that the two core issues that rating agencies face is conflicts of interests 
and disclosure practices.52 IOSCO’s Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies states the 
following: 
 
“Perhaps the single greatest concern facing CRAs is identifying and 
addressing potential and actual conflicts of interest that may inappropriately 
influence the rating process… Securities regulators, CRAs and other market 
participants should be aware of the nature of these conflicts and consider 
mechanisms by which the effects of potential and actual conflicts may be 
eliminated or mitigated.”53 
 
The report also states that the rating agencies rely on the information provided from the 
issuer itself, and that “sufficient and accurate information from issuers” is critical to the 
ratings decision and that information deficits will be to “the detriment of market 
transparency.”54  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was created to establish “high-level objectives for which rating 
agencies, regulators, issuers and other market participants should strive in order to improve 
investor protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the securities markets 
and reduce systemic risk.”55 E.U. and U.S. regulators, as members of the Technical 
Committee, created IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs to coordinate regulatory approaches. 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs identified what regulatory frameworks should be addressed but 
remained non-committal on how those principles should be implemented. IOSCO’s 
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Principles states, “The Technical Committee proposes to await future consideration of these 
alternatives in the major jurisdictions and take account of preferences of other sector 
supervisors before considering its preferred method of implementation. The Technical 
Committee proposes to review these developments within 18 months.”56 IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee established four principles to improve rating agency oversight including: 
principles for the quality and integrity of the rating process, independence and conflicts of 
interest, transparency and timeliness of rating disclosure, and confidential information.57  
 
At the heart of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs were the principles regarding the management 
conflicts of interest. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs also states the following:  
 
“CRAs should adopt written internal procedures and mechanisms to (1) 
identify, and (2) eliminate, or manage and disclose, as appropriate, any actual 
or potential conflicts of interest that may influence the opinions and analyses 
CRAs make or the judgment and analyses of the individuals the CRAs 
employ who have an influence on ratings decisions. CRAs are encouraged to 
disclose such conflict avoidance and management measures.”58  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs also states, “CRA ratings decisions should be independent and 
free from political or economic pressures and from conflicts of interest arising due to the 
CRA’s ownership structure, business or financial activities, or the financial interests of the 
CRA’s employees.”59 Securities regulators created and endorsed these principles to ensure 
that rating agencies monitor and improve their regulation of conflicts of interest. They were 
also created and endorsed to ensure that rating agency regulation did not subject rating 
agencies to regulation that placed political pressure to grant sovereigns favorable ratings. 
This principle was explicitly included in order to endorse a non-interventionist approach to 
rating agencies.60 German lawmakers had historically favored bond issuers and publicly listed 
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companies to have the right of review when rating agencies issued their credit ratings and 
wanted issuers to have time to prepare markets for impending rating downgrades.61 
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs also encouraged greater transparency of the ratings process. 
First, IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs stated that “CRAs should adopt and implement written 
procedures and methodologies to ensure that the opinions they issue are based on a fair and 
thorough analysis of all relevant information available to the CRA.”62 Second IOSCO’s 
Principles for CRAs states that “CRAs should publish sufficient information about their 
procedures and methodologies so that outside parties can understand how a rating was 
arrived at by the CRA” and “publish historical default rates of CRA rating categories and 
whether the default rates of these categories have changed over time.”63 These principles 
were included to promote greater disclosure practices by rating agencies to improve 
transparency of the ratings process. It would also appear that these principles were included 
to respond to Germany and the Katiforis report’s criticism that rating agencies were 
insensitive and demonstrated a lack of understanding of European accounting standards and 
corporate financing customs.64 By disclosing how rating agencies reached their ratings, it was 
left to the markets to judge whether the information utilized to reach each rating was 
effective in assessing the creditworthiness of obligors.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs established a common platform for national regulatory regimes 
amidst the review of the regulation of rating agencies in the U.S. and E.U. IOSCO’s Principles 
for CRAs achieved this by identifying the core issues that should be addressed in designing 
effective regulatory regimes for rating agencies. This was driven by regulators’ interest in 
promoting common regulatory regimes and common assessments of creditworthiness across 
jurisdictions.  
5.3.2 The Creation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct  
IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in December 2004 after a 
consultation document was produced in October 2004. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct produced a 
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set of measures that “should be included in individual CRA codes of conduct, and the 
elements contained in the Code Fundamentals should receive the full support of CRA 
management and be backed by thorough compliance and enforcement mechanisms.”65 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct, a voluntary self-regulatory framework for rating agencies, was 
created in order to establish an effective and internationally consistent regulatory response to 
the policy problems posed by rating agencies whilst respecting the domestic political 
constraints in the U.S. and E.U.  
 
The creation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct can be understood within the context of the U.S. 
and E.U.’s regulatory review process. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was created after the U.S. 
SEC chose to create a domestic Code of Conduct for credit rating agencies from March 
200466 because Congress appeared to be unwilling to legislate rating agency regulation.67 In 
the E.U., the European Parliament rejected the recommendation of the Katiforis Report to 
establish a European credit rating agency oversight body, around the same time that the U.S. 
SEC chose to create an industry-led voluntary Code of Conduct framework. The European 
Parliament chose to delay the decision on whether and/or how to regulate rating agencies by 
asking CESR to report back by July 2005 with their recommendations. The European 
Parliament likely chose to delay the decision because an E.U.-based regulatory oversight 
regime “poses a danger, if it is different from regulatory initiatives taken in other systems, 
[because] ratings from EU CRAs would be viewed differently from those produced by non-
EU CRAs, thereby creating an un-level playing field.”68 The community of securities market 
regulators created IOSCO’s Code of Conduct within IOSCO’s Technical Committee to 
establish a globally consistent regulatory regime for rating agencies whilst taking account of 
U.S. and E.U. domestic political constraints.  
 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct reflected the recommendations of the September 2003 Report on the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies and IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
established what aspects of the rating agency business that rating agencies should address 
through internal codes of conduct that were backed by senior management. IOSCO’s Code of 
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Conduct identifies four areas of interest that internal codes of conduct should address 
including: rating agency independence and conflicts of interest, the ratings process and 
information provided by the issuer, public dissemination of ratings and timing, preferential 
access to rating agencies by subscribers, barriers to entry for new CRAs, and unsolicited 
ratings.69 IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was intended to form the basis of internal codes of 
conduct implemented by rating agencies themselves but the Code of Conduct left the option of 
formal regulation open. The Code of Conduct stated the following:  
 
“CRAs and regulators should consider whether or not additional measures 
may be necessary to properly implement the Principles in a specific 
jurisdiction, and the Technical Committee may revisit the Code 
Fundamentals in the future should experience dictate that modifications are 
necessary.”70  
 
Regulators were keenly aware that direct regulation could be forthcoming at some point in 
the future.71 
5.3.3 The E.U.’s Rating Agency Regulatory Regime: CESR and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
When CESR reported back to the E.U. Parliament, CESR recommended that the 
implementation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct matched with CESR’s monitoring of its 
implementation by rating agencies operating within the E.U. would be sufficient to deal with 
the regulatory issues raised by rating agencies. This demonstrates the effectiveness of 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in coordinating regulatory regimes for rating agencies across the 
U.S. and E.U.  
 
CESR’s March 2005 report analyzed a number of regulatory issues surrounding rating 
agencies. CESR’s report and its recommendations are consistent with IOSCO’s Principles for 
CRAs, highlighting the same regulatory issues that IOSCO’s Report on the Activities of Rating 
Agencies address. The report utilized a survey of industry members and regulators in concert 
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with its own analysis to highlight critical issues regarding the regulation of rating agencies 
and potential regulatory solutions.72   
 
First, the report highlights that the issuer pays system in the credit rating industry may give 
rise to real or perceived conflicts of interest. As such, it recommends that rating agencies 
disclose conflicts of interest, establish internal policies and procedures to protect against 
conflicts of interests and to look to the existing Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and 
emulate the conflict of interest policies of investment firms.73 Second, CESR recommends 
that rating agency methodologies be clearly stated, accurately disclosed and strongly applied 
to allow investors to judge the accuracy of rating agencies’ assessments of debt worthiness.74 
CESR believes it is necessary that sufficient information about the methodology be disclosed 
to investors.75 The report states,  
 
“CESR believes that there is no need or opportunity of explicitly regulating the 
content of methodologies used by credit rating agencies in elaborating credit 
rating, since this kind of regulation would seriously risk to erode individual 
quality and independence of the credit rating agencies analysis, and consequently 
to harm the quality of information flow in securities market, like it is suggested 
also by almost an unanimity of responses in this sense by market operators to 
the CESR's consultation.”76  
 
Third, the report highlights problems associated with the use of inside information. 
However, the report states that the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) covers the use of all 
forms of inside information. The report recommends that the MAD should provide greater 
clarity with special interest in the use of inside information in rating agencies, that legal 
harmonization be facilitated in this area, and that rating agencies disclose potential uses of 
inside information.77 The report also recommends that smaller rating agencies be provided 
access to common pools of information to create a level playing field between smaller and 
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larger rating agencies.78 Fourth, on the issue of publishing misleading or inaccurate 
information, CESR concluded the MAD makes it an offence to publish misleading or 
inaccurate information and that rating agencies have sufficient market incentives to not do 
so.79  
 
The report is littered with references to IOSCO’s Code of Conduct and repeatedly states that 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct addresses most of the regulatory issues identified in the report. 
When discussing a formal regulatory system for monitoring rating agencies, CESR expresses 
concerns that doing so may create barriers to entry (even though smaller rating agencies 
favored this approach) and increase the costs of ratings. CESR also believed that formal 
regulatory oversight could grant rating agencies an unfair level of creditability by granting 
credit ratings a seal of approval. The report states that the majority of industry participants 
did not support the idea of creating a direct regulatory regime. Finally, the report states that 
an E.U. regime could create a dual system of ratings for E.U. listed firms and other rated 
products.80 The report concludes the following:  
 
“When it comes to the enforcement issue, a clear majority of CESR 
members is of the view that there is an argument for the wait and see 
approach, where no recognition system is set up at present, and the effects 
of the Code are let to work. The introduction of the IOSCO Code states 
that the IOSCO Technical Committee may revisit the Code in the future 
should experience dictate that modifications are necessary. Overall, this is 
the preferred option by the respondents to the consultation.”81 
 
In January 2006, the Commission concluded that existing financial services directives, and 
implementation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct would be sufficient at the time.82 The European 
Commission endorsed CESR’s approach to CRAs in a letter to the Director General of 
CESR, Docters van Leuwen, in March 2006.83 The E.U.’s adoption of IOSCO’s Code of 
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Conduct demonstrates the influence of IOSCO’s policymaking process in effectively 
coordinating the regulatory framework for rating agencies in the two dominant financial 
centers.  
5.4 The Strengthening of IOSCO’s International Credit Rating Agency Standards 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was initially implemented through voluntary self-regulatory 
codes of conduct. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct established a template for national and regional 
self-regulatory initiatives and began to be implemented by rating agencies around the world. 
IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards began to be strengthened in 2006 when 
the United States established the first direct regulatory regime of rating agencies under the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. The 2006 Act remained limited because of the continued 
threat that rating agencies’ First Amendment right protections would limit the applicability 
of U.S. SEC rules.  
 
The implementation of IOSCO’s international standards for rating agencies was 
substantively strengthened after the 2007/2008 crisis when the U.S. and E.U. chose to 
subject rating agencies to direct regulation. It became clear early in the crisis that the 
domestic political context of the U.S. and E.U. had shifted to favor the direct regulation of 
rating agencies. The first indication was in November 2008 at the G20 Summit in 
Washington D.C. At the summit, G20 leaders agreed to “exercise strong oversight over 
credit rating agencies, consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of 
conduct.”84 The G20 reaffirmed their commitment at the London G20 Summit in April 
2009 when the G20 agreed “to extend regulatory oversight and registration to Credit Rating 
Agencies to ensure they meet the international code of good practice, particularly to prevent 
unacceptable conflicts of interest.”85 The U.S. regulated rating agencies under Section C of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The European Union regulated rating agencies under a series of 
laws passed through the European Parliament, culminating in CRAIII.  
 
The strengthening of IOSCO’s international standards for credit rating agencies can be 
explained by shifts in the domestic political context of the U.S. and E.U. In the U.S. the 
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creation of a direct regulatory regime in 2006 is partly explained by the narrow political 
interests of a U.S. Congressman. The creation of the 2006 direct regulatory regime is also 
explained by the gradual acceptance by Congress of the necessity of regulating rating 
agencies. In the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the U.S. and E.U. domestic 
legislatures faced a different set of political incentives after widespread reports of conflict of 
interest issues in securitized debt markets and rating agencies’ systemic under valuation of 
risk. After the strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s international standards for rating 
agencies, securities regulators endorsed the direct regulation of rating agencies in March 2009 
and assessed the compliance of national regulatory reforms for rating agencies with 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs in February 2011.  
 
The strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct is best 
explained through a domestic politics framework. Although securities market regulators 
created international rating agency standards to promote the continued harmonization of 
national regulatory frameworks, the decision to regulate agencies was driven by shifts in the 
domestic political context and changes in the policy preferences of domestic political actors.  
5.4.1 The United States’ Pre-Crisis Direct Regulatory Regime 
The U.S. governed rating agencies through voluntary codes of conduct until 2006. In 2006, 
the U.S. SEC was given formal statutory authority to govern rating agencies under the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act. The Congress’ decision to directly regulate rating agencies is 
largely explained by the narrow domestic political interests of two U.S. Congressmen from 
Pennsylvania: Paul Kanjorski and Michael Fitzpatrick. 
 
The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act emerged out of a bill introduced by 
Pennsylvanian Rep. Fitzpatrick.86 The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was originally 
called the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act.87 Rep. Fitzpatrick introduced the bill in 
the interests of Egan-Jones Ratings Company, a Pennsylvania-based ratings firm that sought 
to gain entry and expand their market share in the U.S. ratings market. The central aim of 
Rep. Fitzpatrick’s bill was to encourage competition in the ratings industry by redefining the 
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definition of NRSROs. The bill encouraged increased competition by removing the U.S. 
SEC’s requirement that they be “nationally recognized” and considered by financial markets 
to be “an issuer of credible ratings.”88 The 2006 bill defined NRSROs as a credit rating 
agency that: “(A) has been in business for at least the 3 consecutive years and is (B) 
registered under section 15E.”89 The 2006 Act slightly strengthened the requirements by 
adding that an NRSRO is defined as: ‘‘(A) has been in business as a credit rating agency for 
at least the 3 consecutive years immediately preceding the date of its application for 
registration under section 15E; (B) issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional 
buyers.”90 The 2006 bill was originally motivated by Congress’ wish to remove regulatory 
barriers to rating agencies become NRSROs and to promote competition in the rating 
agency market.  
 
The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act also strengthened the regulation of rating 
agencies by requiring NRSROs to register with the U.S. SEC. As the report on the original 
draft of the legislation states, the bill sought to “enhance transparency of the ratings industry 
by mandating that NRSROs disclose in their registration applications… the methodologies it 
uses… and the conflicts its business model raises and the manner in which it manages those 
conflicts.”91 Registration required rating agencies to submit a report outlining their 
procedures and methodologies, policies and procedures to prevent the misuse of material, 
nonpublic information, its organizational structure, whether they maintain a code of ethics 
(to identify any conflicts of interest for rating issuance), a list of the 20 largest issuers and 
subscribers and to submit credit rating performance statistics.92  
 
The Act required NRSROs to maintain written policies to prevent the misuse of material, 
nonpublic information and to protect against conflicts of interest. The 2006 Act required the 
U.S. SEC to assess them by their implementation of internal conflict of interest policies and 
credit rating performance statistics. The Act also prohibits anticompetitive practices such as 
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threatening to lower ratings if the issuer didn’t obtain other CRA services.93 The Act 
specifically prohibits the U.S. SEC from regulating the substance of credit ratings or the 
procedures and methodologies that the rating agencies use to reach a rating.94 The 2006 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act essentially granted the U.S. SEC the statutory authority to 
monitor compliance with rating agencies’ written codes of conduct and take actions against 
rating agencies or NRSROs if they failed to monitor and implement those codes of conduct. 
The measures to strengthen regulatory oversight caused Rep. Kanjorski to vote against the 
bill that he was integral in creating.95 
 
The 2006 Credit Rating Reform Act granted the U.S. SEC some authority to regulate rating 
agencies. A number of issues remained outside the regulatory purview of the U.S. SEC. 
Rating agencies were still exempt from any liability for ratings decisions and the U.S. SEC 
was unable to intervene in how ratings decisions were arrived at. When the bill was originally 
proposed, it met resistance when the U.S. SEC sought to implement it in 2006. The U.S. 
SEC’s efforts to create final rules to enact the law were published on June 5 2007.96 
Throughout the process, the rating agency industry’s allies in Congress tightly circumscribed 
the SEC’s final rules. A coalition of Senators, led by Chuck Schumer of New York, again 
expressed concern over the U.S. SEC’s rules. Schumer stated: “the law required the SEC to 
enforce “narrowly tailored” regulations.”97 Senate members Chuck Schumer, Mitch 
McConnell and Rep. Paul Kanjorski repeatedly warned that the legislation must not breach 
rating agencies’ First Amendment rights.98 The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was 
relatively weak and would soon be surpassed by Subtitle C of Dodd-Frank that was signed in 
to law on July 21st 2010.  
5.4.2 Post-Crisis Credit Rating Agency Regulatory Reform: The United States 
The 2008 financial crisis and rating agencies’ failure to adequately assess the creditworthiness 
of underlying borrowers within the securitized debt market led to the creation of a 
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comprehensive direct regulatory regime under Subtitle C of Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank 
differed from the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act because it placed statutory 
obligations on rating agencies to fulfill certain regulatory requirements, rather than requiring 
rating agencies to adopt internal policies to address regulatory concerns.  
 
Dodd-Frank establishes a number of requirements for rating agencies’ methodologies: 
 
• Ratings methodologies must be approved by the rating agency’s Board of Directors,  
 
• They disclose any underlying assumptions used in reaching a final rating decision, 
any data used in the rating assessment process, the use of third party diligence 
services, and any change in its methodologies and; 
 
• Rating agencies are required to disclose the quality and reliability of information 
used during the ratings process 
 
Dodd-Frank requires rating agencies to publish the ratings performance of its ratings in each 
asset class and establishes the Office of Credit Ratings within the U.S. SEC to oversee the 
rating agency industry.  
 
After Dodd-Frank passed, the U.S. SEC has since published a number of rules, including the 
requirement of rating agencies to establish standards, training and experience relative to the 
complexity of the securities they analyze, test its credit analysts on credit rating procedures 
and that one individual with three or more years experience participate in ratings.99 The U.S. 
SEC has established rules requiring rating agencies to publish performance statistics for 1, 3 
and 10 years, to disclose how often credit ratings are reviewed and to make historical 
performance statistics for all ratings to be made publicly available. CRAs are also required to 
publish, on a six-month delayed basis, rating action histories for a randomly selected sample 
of 10% of its issuer-paid credit ratings in each of the following five rating classes.100 The U.S. 
SEC requires that rating agencies disclose quantitative and qualitative information in a 
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standardized form that would identify potential limitations of the rating, the five main 
assumptions underlying the methodology, and identify the probability that an issuer will 
default.101 Finally, the U.S. SEC requires that rating agencies publish a 100% history of its 
credit ratings in order to identify any changes from initial ratings.102 
 
The domestic political context of the U.S. substantively shifted after the 2008 financial crisis. 
The systemic failure of rating agencies to adequately assess the creditworthiness of obligors, 
particularly in securitized debt markets, meant that judicial and legislative preferences had 
shifted in favor of creating a comprehensive regulatory regime for rating agencies. Dodd-
Frank explicitly states that rating agencies are financial “gatekeepers.” Dodd-Frank states the 
following: 
 
“Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical services on 
behalf of clients, much as other financial “gatekeepers” do, the activities of 
credit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character and should be 
subject to the same liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, 
and investment bankers.”103 
 
George Miller, Executive Director of the American Securitization Forum noted in his 
testimony to the SEC during the CRA Roundtable Discussions in 2009 that rating agencies 
were no longer defending their First Amendment protections in their 2009 testimony.104 In 
the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, U.S. courts began disassembling rating agencies’ 
First Amendment protections. In a 2009 ruling, the U.S. District Court ruled in the case of 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., “the First Amendment does not 
apply when a rating agency disseminates ratings to a select group of investors and not the 
public at large.”105  
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Due to the removal of First Amendment rights protections, Dodd-Frank removed the 
liability shield granted to rating agencies.  The enforcement and penalty provisions of Dodd-
Frank “shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the same manner and to 
the same extent as such provisions apply to statements made by a registered public 
accounting firm or a securities analyst under the securities laws.”106 Furthermore, Dodd-
Frank states that individuals can seek damages when a credit rating agency “knowingly or 
recklessly failed – (i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect 
to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk; or (ii) 
to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements (which verification may be based 
on a sampling technique that does not amount to an audit) from other sources that the credit 
rating agency considered to be competent and that were independent of the issuer and 
underwriter.’’107  
 
This highlights how the crisis facilitated an ideational shift in the perspective and policy 
preferences of U.S. legislators and the judiciary, leading to the creation of a credible and 
substantive direct regulatory regime for rating agencies.  
5.4.3 Post-Crisis Credit Rating Agency Regulatory Reform: The European Union 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the E.U.’s Commission on Internal Markets and Services 
willingly accepted the recommendation of CESR to regulate agencies by monitoring their 
compliance with IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. In May 2008, E.U. securities regulators were asked 
to review rating agency regulation in light of the events in U.S. financial markets in late 2007, 
and produced its final review of CRA regulation in May 2008. CESR concluded the 
following: “there is no evidence that regulation of the credit rating industry would have had 
an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings of US subprime backed securities and 
hence continues to support market driven improvement.” The European Securities Market 
Experts (ESME) committee, comprised of private financial market actors, reached the same 
conclusion in March 2008. ESME concluded the following: “Given the global nature of the 
business of CRAs and the existing U.S. law, we have doubts as to whether the development 
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of a separate E.U. law would produce any particular benefits.”108 ESME’s report concludes 
that the costs of stronger regulation outweigh the costs but supports stronger 
implementation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct.109  
 
The European Commission rejected the conclusions of its experts in November of 2008 and 
decided that strong, effective legislated supervision was necessary to correct deficiencies in 
the operation and conduct of credit rating agencies. After receiving advice from CESR and 
ESME, the Commission concluded the following: “Self-regulation based on voluntary 
compliance with the IOSCO code does not appear to offer an adequate, reliable solution to 
the structural deficiencies of the business.”110 Commissioner of Internal Markets and 
Services at the time, Charles McCreevy, said the following: 
 
“I am flabbergasted at the naivety of anyone who thinks these same credit 
rating agencies should be trusted to abide by a non-legally enforceable 
voluntary code of conduct drawn up under palm trees – A code that has 
proven itself to be toothless, useless, and worthless time and time again. Fool 
me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me.”111  
 
The European Parliament was no longer willing to accept a self-regulatory approach to 
rating agencies even after its own European regulators sought to continue the previous 
regime. In November 2011, the E.U. Parliament proposed what has become known as CRA 
III after a series of E.U. Commission proposals from November 2008.112  
 
The Commission proposed a regulatory framework requiring rating agencies to be registered 
with CESR and the competent authority of the Home state in which the credit rating agency 
is registered, to tackle conflicts of interest, rating agencies’ internal governance structure and 
staffing demands.113 In May 2011, the European parliament granted European Securities 
Market Authority (the replacement organization for CESR) the authority to regulate, oversee 
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and require the registration of rating agencies within the Union. Under the legislation, rating 
agencies are required to register with European Securities Market Authority (ESMA). Rating 
agencies registered are subject to on-site inspections and requests for information. ESMA is 
empowered to revoke the registration of, and impose fines on, the rating agencies it 
regulates. Rating agencies are required to establish internal control systems to guard against 
conflicts of interest, periodically review its methodologies, and supply information to a 
central repository. This aims to facilitate unsolicited ratings to spur rating agency market 
competition and to provide information on historical performance through default incidence 
and rating change data.114 Rating agencies are also required to provide an inventory of 
existing and potential conflicts of interest for their rating services and for ancillary services to 
rating agencies.115 
 
Under the legislation rating agencies must be registered for three classes of credit ratings: 
sovereign and public financing ratings, structured finance ratings, and corporate ratings.116 
The rating methodologies of rating agencies are subject to review and approval by ESMA.117 
Rating agencies are required to disclose their rating methodologies including the qualitative 
and quantitative factors that are key variables in determining credit ratings. ESMA assesses 
whether that methodology is being applied consistently and systematically. As Germany’s 
national securities regulator, The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), explains, 
“the legislation states that ESMA as the competent supervisory authority may not interfere 
with the content of credit ratings or methodologies. While there is a certain contradiction in 
the provisions named above, it is clear that ESMA only has the authority to control rating 
methodologies within extremely narrow bounds.”118 Finally, similar to the United States, 
E.U. legislation will “expose credit rating agencies to potentially unlimited liability where 
they breach the regulation intentionally or with gross negligence."119  
 
The E.U. originally proposed that bond issuers would be required to rotate rating agencies 
every three to six years but was forced to back down from its position due to a strong 
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backlash by members of the financial industry and by some members of the European 
Parliament.120 Rating agencies such as Standard & Poors argued that this would lead to less 
stable ratings, confidentiality issues and a disruption in capital raising.121 It appears that E.U. 
and U.K. politicians agreed.122 In 2008, the E.U. also backed down from a proposal that 
required analysts to be rotated to ensure that individuals didn’t rate the same entity for four 
years.123 The rule was only applied to securitized debt products and not to government 
issued bonds or for publicly listed issuers. The E.U. was also forced to back down from a 
proposal that rating agencies would be subject to blackouts during bailouts. The E.U. did 
agree to require rating agencies to establish a calendar for when ratings decisions will be 
reached and published. Furthermore, rating agencies would be required to “publish ratings 
only after close of business and at least one hour before the opening of trading in the EU,” 
explains Reuters.124 
 
Similar to the U.S., the E.U.’s domestic political context shifted after the 2008 financial 
crisis. As Stefano Pagliari argues, the continued political salience of the issue of rating agency 
regulation created new incentives for domestic politicians, which led to the creation of direct 
regulatory regimes for rating agencies.125 This led the E.U. to establish a comprehensive 
direct regulatory regime that established statutory obligations requiring rating agencies to 
adequately disclose information relating to conflicts of interest, to ensure that conflicts of 
interest were dealt with, and to ensure the integrity of ratings decisions.  
5.5 IOSCO After the Crisis: Promoting Continued Cooperation and Coordination  
During and after the 2007/2008 financial crisis, IOSCO promoted the continued 
cooperation and coordination of national regulatory frameworks. IOSCO promoted 
continued cooperation and cooperation by updating IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in May 2008,126 
producing a note titled International Cooperation in Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies in March 
                                                 
120 Leftly 2012  
121 Standard & Poor’s 2012  
122 Leftly 2012  
123 European Securities Markets Experts 2008, p. 21 
124 Reuters 2011.  
125 Pagliari 2013 p. 223 – 224 
126 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2008a 
 179 
2009,127 and generating a report titled Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles 
Regarding the Activity of Credit Rating Agencies in January 2011.128  
 
IOSCO updated its Code of Conduct in May 2008129 amidst a wider regulatory review process. 
In October 2007, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors requested the FSF to 
conduct a review of the causes of the financial market crisis and to propose a set of 
recommendations. This review included a review of the regulation of rating agencies.130 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee updated its Code of Conduct for two reasons. First, IOSCO 
likely responded to pressure from the G7 to review its Code of Conduct to ensure that it 
responded to the regulatory issues that arose during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Securities 
regulators sought to remain relevant and appear to be on top of the regulatory issues that 
emerged during the financial crisis.131 This is demonstrated by IOSCO’s focus on the unique 
regulatory issues raised by securitized debt products. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct took aim at the 
core practices of rating agencies that caused inaccurate assessments of creditworthiness 
during the crisis. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct states that “A CRA and its employees should not, 
either implicitly or explicitly, give any assurance or guarantee of a particular rating prior to a 
rating assessment. This does not preclude a CRA from developing prospective assessments 
used in structured finance and similar transactions.”132 Furthermore, “A CRA should 
prohibit its analysts from making proposals or recommendations regarding the design of 
structured finance products that a CRA rates.”133  
 
Second, IOSCO’s Technical Committee sought to respond to turmoil in the securitized debt 
market. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was reviewed and updated after the Technical Committee 
reviewed the role of rating agencies in structured finance markets.134 The revised Code of 
Conduct urged rating agencies to disclose ratings methodologies and the historic performance 
of their ratings. The updated Code of Conduct also urged rating agencies to indicate the 
limitations of its ratings and to publish its cash flow and loss analysis so that investors could 
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better understand the risk profile of their investment portfolio.135 IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
was updated in an effort to improve transparency in the notoriously opaque securitized debt 
market with the hope that it would improve confidence in securitized debt markets to calm 
market volatility at the time.  
 
Paul Blustein contends that IOSCO was given direction by the FSF during the 2007/2008 
financial crisis throughout the FSF’s review of financial regulation and through the FSF’s 
Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience.136 An analysis 
of the FSF’s preliminary report,137 the interim report,138 and the final report139 in combination 
with an interview with a senior U.S. regulator140 does not provide clear evidence of this.  
Blustein highlights the FSF recommended that structured financial “products should be 
rated using a different system than the one used on corporate bonds. This went considerably 
further than IOSCO’s own taskforce, which had only recommended that credit rating 
agencies “study” whether to change their systems.”141 IOSCO’s updated Code of Conduct does 
not include a recommendation that rating agencies establish differentiated rating symbols, 
but instead proposes the following: 
 
“A CRA should assess whether existing methodologies and models for 
determining credit ratings of structured products are appropriate when the risk 
characteristics of the assets underlying a structured product change materially. 
In cases where the complexity or structure of a new type of structured product 
or the lack of robust data about the assets underlying the structured product 
raise serious questions as to whether the CRA can determine a credible credit 
rating for the security, CRA should refrain from issuing a credit rating.”142 
 
This indicates that IOSCO resisted pressure from the FSF and continued to endorse rating 
agency regulation on the basis of promoting transparency through disclosure.  
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In March 2009, IOSCO’s Technical Committee produced a note called International 
Cooperation in Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies.143 The note stated the following:  
 
“Given that CRAs played such a prominent role in the recent financial 
market crisis, many jurisdictions are now considering ways to regulate 
CRAs. However, as jurisdictions adopt regulations for the oversight of 
CRAs, the issue of regulatory fragmentation becomes a concern for CRAs, 
investors and regulators. Because the IOSCO CRA Code is viewed as the 
international consensus regarding the regulatory issues stemming from the 
activities of CRAs and the processes by which CRAs develop credit ratings, 
the IOSCO CRA Code can serve (and is serving) as a template for 
regulation of CRAs.”144 
 
After it was clear that rating agencies would be subject to direct regulatory regimes, the 
Technical Committee focused on ensuring that regulatory regimes were effectively 
coordinated. IOSCO’s Technical Committee promoted the use of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct 
and IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs to form the basis of national regulatory frameworks. IOSCO 
promoted cooperation between its members through the Standing Committee on Credit 
Rating Agencies, which was established in February 2009.145  Within the new Standing 
Committee, as Commissioner Ellisse B. Walter of the U.S. SEC revealed, IOSCO members 
were investigating how they could “better coordinate their oversight efforts, given that the 
largest CRAs operate in multiple jurisdictions and frequently use analysts and resources 
based in different offices when making a rating, and how IOSCO can facilitate this 
coordination and information sharing.”146 Through the Technical Committee, IOSCO’s 
members were kept aware of developments in the major regulatory reform processes in the 
U.S., E.U, Australia, Japan and Brazil.  
 
In February 2011, IOSCO produced a report titled, Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of 
Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies. The report discussed regulatory 
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implementation of the four objectives of rating agency regulation that IOSCO’s 2003 
Principles for CRAs had identified.147  The report stated that securities regulators recognized 
that formal regulatory oversight of rating agencies was needed to supplement IOSCO’s Code 
of Conduct.148 The report reviews regulatory reforms after the crisis in many jurisdictions 
including the U.S., E.U., Japan, Mexico and Australia, and concludes by stating the 
following: “Despite the differences among the jurisdictions, however, in each jurisdiction 
reviewed, the IOSCO CRA Principles appear to be the building blocks upon which CRA 
regulatory programs have been constructed.”149 The report indicates that direct regulatory 
regimes for credit rating agencies in the jurisdictions assessed were created consistent with 
IOSCO’s 2003 Principles for CRAs.  
 
IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs were strengthened after the 2008 financial crisis through the 
creation of direct regulatory regimes in systemically important jurisdictions. IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee responded to shifts in the domestic political context of the U.S. and 
E.U. by promoting cooperation and coordination in the regulation of rating agencies. 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee promoted regulatory coordination through IOSCO’s newly 
established Standing Committee on Credit Rating Agencies and by encouraging countries to 
establish regulatory reforms that were consistent with IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter analyzed the creation and strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs in 
September 2003 and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in December 2004. This chapter has 
demonstrated that IOSCO’s international rating agency standards came about after the U.S. 
and E.U. chose to review the regulation of rating agencies. These international rating agency 
standards were created in order to promote the continued harmonization of national 
regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and E.U. IOSCO’s Technical Committee believed it was 
in the interests of investors to maintain common regulatory regimes for rating agencies 
because it would ensure common assessments of creditworthiness across jurisdictions. 
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IOSCO’s Technical Committee responded to the regulatory review process in the U.S. and 
E.U. by working together at the transnational level to create common regulatory principles 
for rating agencies.  
 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was created in December 2004 to establish a common regulatory 
regime for rating agencies that took account of domestic political constraints in the U.S. and 
E.U. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct established an internationally consistent regulatory regime that 
addressed the core regulatory issues cited in the U.S. and E.U. review process and the 
regulatory issues identified by IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs. IOSCO’s Code of Conduct filled the 
regulatory void left by the U.S. and E.U.’s decision not to regulate rating agencies around 
2004.  
 
The creation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct is explained by a 
domestic politics and transgovernmental network perspective. The creation of IOSCO’s 
international credit rating agency standards is explained by a domestic politics perspective 
because their creation was contingent on shifts in the policy preferences of domestic 
legislatures. Furthermore, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created international credit rating 
agency standards after domestic legislatures indicated that they sought to improve the 
regulation of rating agencies. The U.S. sought to improve the regulation of rating agencies 
after the politicization of rating agencies after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 
and 2002 respectively. At the same time, Congress indicated that they were unwilling to 
directly regulate rating agencies due to domestic political and judicial constraints. The E.U. 
sought to improve the regulation of rating agencies in response to U.S. regulatory reforms, 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the collapse of Parmalat in late-2003 and due to the 
lobbying efforts of Germany after rating agencies downgraded German state banks in late-
2003. The E.U. also indicated that they were unwilling to regulate rating agencies directly. 
 
The creation of IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards is also explained by a 
transgovernmental network perspective. IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s 
Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct to promote the coordination of common 
regulatory frameworks for rating agencies. IOSCO’s Technical Committee was motivated to 
promote the coordination of national regulatory frameworks because securities market 
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regulators believed that competing systems of rating agency regulation was not in the 
interests of protecting investors. Competing systems of regulation would create dual systems 
of assessing the creditworthiness of obligors. The influence of the transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators is demonstrated by the E.U.’s adoption of IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct as the basis for regulating rating agencies from 2005.  
 
The political dynamics of the creation of international credit rating agency standards is 
consistent with a PA analytical framework. The creation of international credit rating agency 
standards was contingent on domestic legislatures decision to favor the regulation of rating 
agencies. Furthermore, IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards reflected the 
domestic political constraints of legislatures in dominant financial centers. Once domestic 
legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. indicated that improving the regulation of rating agencies 
was a domestic policy priority, domestic securities market regulators exercised their 
discretion and created an international regulatory standard that coordinated and established 
an internationally consistent regulatory framework for rating agencies. 
 
The implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs was strengthened by the decision of the 
U.S. and E.U. to create direct regulatory regimes for rating agencies. The U.S. created a 
direct regulatory regime in 2006 under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. The initial 
impetus for the act was to promote competition in the rating agency industry by removing 
the requirement that NRSROs be “nationally recognized”. The bill was driven by the narrow 
domestic political preferences of two Pennsylvanian Congressmen, Rep. Fitzpatrick and Rep. 
Kanjorski. These Congressmen were acting in the interests of Egan Jones (a Pennsylvania-
based rating agencies). The bill also included provisions to subject rating agencies to greater 
accountability, but the application of these rules were limited by continued Congressional 
resistance and the continued protection of rating agencies under First Amendment right 
protections. It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis to shift the U.S. domestic political context 
to support the creation of a comprehensive direct regulatory regime. Widespread reports of 
conflicts of interest and the systemic undervaluation of risk by ratings shifted the policy 
preferences of U.S. politicians and the U.S. judiciary to improve the accountability and 
oversight of rating agencies under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The E.U. echoes the U.S. 
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domestic political context. It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis to shift E.U. domestic 
policy preferences in favor of the direct regulation of rating agencies.  
 
The strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct is explained by a domestic politics perspective. The creation of direct regulatory 
regimes was in response to domestic political imperatives. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct were strengthened by the creation of direct regulatory regimes for 
rating agencies in the U.S. and E.U. In the U.S., the creation of a direct regulatory regime 
was driven by the narrow political interests of two Pennsylvanian Congressmen. A 
comprehensive direct regulatory regime was driven by substantive shifts in the preferences 
of the U.S. domestic legislature and judiciary due to the centrality of rating agencies to the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. The E.U. chose to regulate rating agencies after it became 
apparent that rating agencies were central actors in the build up of systemic risk in the global 
financial system. 
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Chapter 6  
The Creation of IOSCO’s Hedge Fund Standards 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the creation of IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds in June 2009 and 
IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010. The creation of 
IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards was made possible by shifts in the policy 
preferences of domestic legislatures in dominant financial centers after the 2007/2008 
financial crisis.  
 
Before the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the majority of IOSCO’s Technical Committee either 
regulated or sought to regulate hedge funds. IOSCO’s Technical Committee members were 
responding to the increased exposure of retail investors to hedge funds, known as the 
‘retailization’ of hedge fund investment. IOSCO’s Technical Committee was unable to 
establish international hedge fund standards because domestic legislatures in dominant hedge 
fund jurisdictions were unwilling to directly regulate hedge funds. The U.S. SEC sought to 
require hedge fund advisers to be registered, but was unable to under existing statutory 
authority and Congress was unwilling to grant securities regulators the statutory authority to 
do so.  The U.S. SEC’s failure to gain domestic statutory authority and the U.K. Financial 
Services Authority’s (FSA’s) opposition to hedge fund regulation meant that IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee was restricted to creating reports and regulatory principles that related 
to investment funds that securities regulators had pre-existing statutory authority to regulate 
including: a report titled Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by 
Retail investors in (Funds-of) Hedge Funds,1 Principles for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios,2 and a 
report titled The Regulatory Environment for Hedge Funds: A Survey and Comparison, which 
                                                 
1 Technical Committee of IOSCO, 2003a  
2 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2007  
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analyzed the current regulatory environment of hedge funds in different jurisdictions.3 The 
failure of IOSCO’s Technical Committee to create international financial standards for 
hedge funds before the crisis demonstrates the exercise of control by domestic legislatures. 
 
IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds were 
created after domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. indicated that they were willing to 
subject hedge funds to direct regulation in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The 
U.S. was willing to regulate hedge funds after the crisis because of the symbolism of Bear 
Stearns’ hedge funds triggering the financial crisis in 2007, the highly publicized arrest of 
Bernie Madoff and Madoff’s hedge fund-based Ponzi scheme, and because of a shift in the 
domestic balance of power in favor of institutional investor groups over the alternative 
investment fund industry.4 The E.U. was willing to regulate hedge funds, and expend 
significant political capital to subject the U.K. hedge fund industry to E.U. regulation, 
because a growing coalition of European states favored the direct regulation of hedge funds 
in the wake of the crisis.  
 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee, through IOSCO’s Task Force on Unregulated Entities, 
created IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for 
Hedge Funds to coordinate national regulatory frameworks before the upcoming legislative 
and rule-making process. IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds agreed to require hedge funds or 
hedge fund managers to register with the national regulator and subject hedge funds or 
hedge fund managers to ongoing supervisory requirements including conflict of interest and 
business conduct rules, disclosure to investors, and prudential regulation. IOSCO’s Task 
Force on Unregulated Entities also took the opportunity to identify common regulatory 
requirements that were necessary to effectively regulate hedge funds. IOSCO’s Systemic Risk 
Data Requirements for Hedge Funds was created to identify common data requirements that 
would enable regulators to monitor the systemic risk posed by hedge funds and hedge fund 
managers. The common data requirements were intended to assist regulators when 
cooperating with foreign regulators in monitoring globally active hedge funds. After the 
creation of IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for 
                                                 
3 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2006  
4 Helleiner and Pagliari 2010; Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011 
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Hedge Funds, U.S. and E.U. incorporated the recommendations from IOSCO’s Task Force 
on Unregulated Entities in their respective legislative and rulemaking process. IOSCO’s 
Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds 
coordinated the aspects of the U.S. and E.U.’s legislative frameworks for hedge funds that 
were necessary to enable regulators to fulfill their domestic regulatory responsibilities.  
 
The E.U.’s legislative process resulted in the creation of a regionally differentiated regulatory 
regime for hedge funds, which many consider to be discriminatory to U.S.-based hedge 
funds. The regime also establishes higher regulatory requirements for E.U. hedge fund 
managers and foreign hedge fund managers marketing to E.U. investors. The E.U.’s hedge 
fund regime acts against the interests of U.S. hedge fund managers, E.U. hedge fund 
managers, and the profitability and competitiveness of the E.U. hedge fund industry. It does 
not threaten the ability of domestic securities regulators’ ability to fulfill their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities because securities regulators are able to monitor the systemic risk 
posed by hedge funds through information sharing regimes and common reporting 
requirements. This exemplifies a case what Helleiner and Pagliari call “cooperative 
decentralization”.5 The creation of a regionally distinct regulatory regime highlights the 
different roles, and sources of influence, of domestic legislatures and the transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators. 
 
The creation of IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements is explained by both a domestic politics and transgovernmental network 
perspective. The creation of IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards was contingent on 
shifts in the policy preferences of domestic legislatures in dominant financial centers. 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee only created international regulatory principles once 
domestic legislatures had indicated that they were willing to regulate hedge funds after the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. IOSCO was unable to establish international hedge fund 
standards before the crisis because domestic legislatures from dominant hedge fund 
jurisdictions were unwilling to subject hedge funds to a direct regulatory regime. In the U.S., 
this was in spite of the U.S. SEC’s preference for regulating hedge funds due to the increased 
exposure of retail investors to hedge fund investment. Globally, a majority of securities 
                                                 
5 Helleiner and Pagliari 2010, p. 193; Helleiner Forthcoming 
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regulators favored the direct regulation of hedge funds. It took the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
to shift the policy preferences of U.S. and E.U. domestic legislatures due to the politicization 
and highly public role of hedge funds in the financial crisis.  
 
IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards are also explained by a transgovernmental 
network perspective. Technical Committee exercised their discretion in creating international 
regulatory principles. Through the Task Force on Unregulated Entities, national securities 
market regulators identified common regulatory principles that were incorporated in national 
regulatory frameworks that would enable them to effectively regulate globally active hedge 
funds. Common disclosure and information requirements would enable regulators to more 
effectively monitor hedge funds and facilitate information exchange between national 
securities market regulators.  
 
This is consistent with a PA analytical framework. Domestic legislatures exercise control 
over securities market regulators by withholding and creating new forms of statutory 
authority, thereby restricting outcomes at IOSCO’s Technical Committee. As demonstrated 
in the case of the E.U.’s regulatory framework for hedge funds this may result in different 
legislative frameworks as domestic politicians respond to domestic political imperatives. 
When domestic legislatures delegate domestic securities market regulators new forms of 
statutory authority, securities market regulators exercise their discretion to create new 
international financial standards to coordinate national regulatory frameworks to enable 
securities market regulators to more effectively fulfill their domestic regulatory 
responsibilities. 
6.2 International Hedge Fund Regulation: 1998 - 2001 
Hedge fund regulation drew the attention of world economic leaders, policy makers and 
regulators in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and a year later in 1998 after the 
collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). In response to the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the G7 and the IMF concluded that hedge funds were not a central actor in the Asian 
Financial Crisis and that the central problem was East Asia’s mismanaged currencies and 
economies. The issue re-emerged a year later in the U.S. when the CFTC sought to regulate 
 190 
OTC derivative markets and require hedge funds to disclose their positions. Six months 
later, the CFTC’s concerns were realized when LTCM collapsed in September 1998.  
 
Following LTCM’s collapse, policymakers and regulators recommended improvements to 
counterparty risk management by hedge funds and regulated firms. Regulators also 
recommended that hedge funds improve disclosure practices to allow regulators to identify 
the systemic risk they posed to regulated firms. Despite the recommendations of domestic 
regulators and the conclusions of international standard setting bodies, Congress failed to 
pass legislation to require greater disclosure practices by hedge funds. Hedge funds, banks 
and securities firms effectively responded to the concerns of regulators and Congress by 
establishing self-regulatory regimes. This succeeded in holding off direct regulatory regimes. 
As a result, the international regulatory landscape reflected the policy preferences of the U.S. 
domestic legislature and the domestic balance of power. 
6.2.1 The East Asian Financial Crisis, the CFTC’s Concept Release and the Collapse of LTCM 
World leaders and policymakers began investigating the regulation of hedge funds in the 
wake of the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the collapse of LTCM in the U.S. After 
the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asian leaders, other policymakers from the developing 
world, France and Germany, all began lobbying for the creation of direct regulatory regimes 
for hedge funds.6 East Asian governments blamed the collapse of their domestic currencies 
squarely at hedge funds. In response to pressure from East Asian countries, the IMF 
produced a report titled Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics. The report concluded the 
following: “the analysis…does not suggest a strong case for supervisory and regulatory 
measures such as these targeted specifically at hedge funds.”7 As Pagliari discusses, the IMF’s 
interpretation of hedge funds’ role in the crisis reflected the preferences of the U.S., where 
the largest hedge fund industry is domiciled. The U.S. and other industrialized countries 
concluded that the issue wasn’t with hedge funds but the economic and financial supervisory 
policies of East Asian Economies.8 
 
                                                 
6 Fioretos 2010, p. 708; also see Barry Eichengreen 2003 
7 Cited in Stefano Pagliari 2013; Eichengreen et al 1998, p. 4 
8 Stefano Pagliari 2013, p. 229 citing Eichengreen 2003 
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In the U.S., proposals for hedge fund regulation emerged when the U.S.’ CFTC issued a 
Concept Release on 7 May 1998. The concept release was aimed at exploring ways to 
improve management controls of hedge fund lenders, appropriate oversight mechanisms for 
OTC derivatives markets, and disclosure mechanisms that would provide greater 
transparency to the positions of hedge funds in derivatives markets.9 The CFTC’s proposal 
to create regulation for OTC derivatives markets was famously pioneered by CFTC 
Chairperson Brooksley Born and was infamously crushed by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, the U.S. Treasury’s Larry Summers,10 and the U.S. SEC’s Arthur Levitt.11 Larry 
Summers’ testimony to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry in July 
1998 argued that the CFTC didn’t have the statutory authority to introduce these rules.12  
 
Four months after the CFTC’s concept release, the concerns of CFTC and CFTC 
Chairperson Brooksley Born came true when the U.S.-based hedge fund, LTCM, collapsed 
in September 1998. This caused U.S. policymakers to begin investigating the regulation of 
hedge funds. The U.S. President’s Working Group (PWG) was requested to investigate the 
regulatory issues posed by hedge funds after the collapse of LTCM.13 The PWG was a multi-
agency taskforce that included the Treasury Department, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the U.S. SEC, and the CFTC. During the drafting of the report, 
Brooksley Born announced her intention not to be nominated for a second term as 
Chairperson of the U.S. CFTC.14 After clearing any resistance from the U.S. CFTC, the 
PWG produced its report in April 1999.  
 
The PWG’s report concluded that LTCM’s collapse was due to LTCM’s failure to manage 
counterparty risk and not due to the use of trading strategies common to the hedge fund 
industry.15 This led the PWG to recommend that the hedge fund industry review and reform 
internal risk and counterparty risk management practices. The report noted that banking 
                                                 
9 U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission 1998  
10 Summers 1998; see PBS 2009 
11 Levitt 1998; also see PBS 2009 
12 Summers 1998. The harsh response to Brooksely Born’s efforts to further regulate OTC derivatives markets 
is well documented, as was the efforts of senior Clinton Administration officials and other financial regulators 
to push Brooksley Born out from the CFTC. See PBS 2009 
13 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 1999  
14 U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission 1999  
15 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 1999 
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regulators had issued guidance to address banks’ funding and counterparty risk exposure to 
hedge funds.16 The U.S. SEC had issued a non-public report to broker-dealers “addressing 
the strengths and weaknesses of their particular credit risk management, structure, credit 
control procedures, and implementation of credit and other policies.”17 The PWG report 
also states the following: “currently, the scope and timeliness of information made available 
about the financial activities of hedge funds are limited.  Hedge funds should be required to 
disclose additional, and more up-to-date, information to the public.”18  
 
The United States and United Kingdom then approved an international study of the risks 
posed by Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLIs) and potential policy recommendations by the 
FSF. The FSF’s report was released in April 2000 and provided three policy 
recommendations: 
 
1. Hedge funds should review and reform their counterparty risk management and 
ensure they are in line with internationally promulgated standards by IOSCO and 
the BCBS  
 
2. Regulators should improve the quality and quantity of disclosure practices by 
ensuring that the exposure of regulated funds and public companies to HLIs be 
adequately disclosed; 
 
3. Regulators should enhance oversight of investment funds providing credit to hedge 
funds in order to mitigate the systemic risk HLIs posed to the wider financial 
system.19  
 
The FSF’s report echoed the policy recommendations of the PWG report. The FSF’s report 
endorsed internal self-regulatory responses by HLIs to address the issues raised by the 
collapse of LTCM and a review of the regulatory environment of regulated firms’ exposure 
to HLIs. The BCBS produced a report in January 1999 that reviewed “deficiencies identified 
                                                 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., p. 35 – 36 
18 Ibid., p. 32  
19 Financial Stability Forum 2000  
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in the internal controls and risk management practices of the banks that were counterparties 
to LTCM.”20 The Basel Committee’s report identified ways in which banks could improve its 
risk management practices “when dealing with HLIs as counterparties.”21 As Pagliari 
highlights, France and Germany, long-time supporters of hedge fund regulation,22 had 
proposed the creation of a central information repository on banks’ exposure to hedge 
funds. The proposal was rejected by the FSF.23 
 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee’s response to the issues raised by the collapse of LTCM was 
to create a special taskforce addressing the regulatory issues posed by HLIs. The special 
taskforce produced a single report in November 1999 called, Hedge Funds and Other Highly 
Leveraged Institutions.24 The report highlighted the existing work of the PWG, the FSF, and the 
BCBS’ January 1999 report analyzing bank interactions with HLIs.25 Mirroring the work of 
existing domestic and international regulatory reports, IOSCO’s report on hedge fund 
regulation focused its analysis on the “exposure of organized markets.”26 The report states 
the following: “the overall risk exposures of market participants, such as HLIs, can adversely 
affect the ability of such participants to meet their obligations to their counterparties. If large 
enough, these risks may adversely affect the market itself.”27 The report, therefore, 
encouraged securities supervisors to review prudential risk management measures across the 
whole regulated sector.28 The report also encouraged improved disclosure by HLIs but noted 
that regulators faced difficulties in improving disclosure practices. Disclosure requirements 
were established for public companies but hedge funds were private entities. Because hedge 
funds were private entities, there were some unique legal and regulatory barriers to 
establishing disclosure requirements for the hedge fund industry. IOSCO’s report drew the 
same conclusions as existing reports by the U.S.’ PWG, the FSF and work by the BCBS. 
IOSCO’s report also reflected the policy preferences of the U.S. and U.K. 
 
                                                 
20 Technical Committee of IOSCO 1999, p. 1 
21 Technical Committee of IOSCO 1999, p. 1 
22 See Fioretos 2010 
23 Stefano Pagliari 2013, p. 233 
24 Technical Committee of IOSCO 1999 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 8 
27 Ibid., p. 8  
28 Ibid., p. 37  
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Despite the recommendations of the PWG, the FSF and IOSCO, that domestic legislatures 
should improve disclosure practices by HLIs or hedge funds, efforts to improve disclosure 
practices were defeated by Congress. Two bills were introduced in 1999. The Hedge Fund 
Disclosure Act was introduced by Rep. Richard Baker and the Derivatives Market Reform Act was 
introduced by Congressman Edward Markey. Both bills were never passed during the 106th 
Congress.29 As Pagliari identifies, the defeat of derivatives disclosure bills was assisted by the 
private self-regulatory initiatives of the hedge fund and wider financial industry. The financial 
industry effectively responded to regulators and policymakers’ concerns about limitations to 
their current counterparty risk model by establishing the Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group (CRMPG), comprised of twelve major banks and securities firms.30 IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee was critical of CRMPG’s concerns about the PWG’s recommendation 
that HLIs be subject to stronger disclosure requirements.31 The private financial sector also 
participated in the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure and worked towards 
establishing a voluntary framework for hedge funds to improve disclosure.32 These self-
regulatory regimes helped to stave off new statutory powers to require hedge funds to 
disclose information about their positions and counterparty risk exposures to domestic 
regulators.  
 
After the Asian Financial Crisis and the collapse of LTCM, the recommendations of the 
FSF, BCBS and IOSCO reflected the recommendations of the U.S.’ PWG. The main focus 
of these reports was on improving counterparty risk management by regulated banks and 
securities firms. After the PWG endorsed improved disclosure practices by HLIs or hedge 
funds, IOSCO also endorsed this effort. However, due to the effective self-regulatory 
response by banks and hedge funds through the CRMPG and Multidisciplinary Working Group 
on Enhanced Disclosure, hedge funds managed to evade direct regulation and statutory 
disclosure requirements. IOSCO fell silent on the issue for two years until 2001. 
                                                 
29 Stefano Pagliari 2013, p. 236 citing Robotti, 2007 
30 Technical Committee of IOSCO, 1999, p. 2  
31 Technical Committee of IOSCO 1999, p. 23 – 24  
32 Pagliari 2013, p. 236 citing Robotti, 2006; Eichengreen 2003 
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6.3 The Re-Emergence of Hedge Fund Regulatory Reform: 2001 – 2008 
Hedge fund regulatory reform re-emerged in 2001 due to two key issues: terrorist financing 
and the “retailization” of hedge fund investment. September 11 and concerns over terrorist 
financing meant hedge funds were subject to greater scrutiny. However, it was the 
“retailization” of hedge fund investment that caused the U.S. SEC and IOSCO to investigate 
the issue of hedge fund regulation. During this period, the U.S. SEC sought the authority to 
require hedge funds to be registered to improve regulatory oversight. Congress was unwilling 
to grant them clear statutory authority and the U.S. Court of Appeals struck their efforts 
down. In the U.K., the FSA sought to expand retail investors’ exposure to hedge funds 
rather than limit them. Because domestic legislatures were unwilling to grant regulators the 
statutory authority to regulate hedge funds, IOSCO was limited to producing reports on the 
exposure of retail investors to hedge funds, and a survey of hedge fund regulation in the 
jurisdictions of IOSCO members. This time period highlights the role and exercise of 
control of domestic legislatures over the preferences of securities regulators in IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee.  
6.3.1 U.S. and U.K. Hedge Fund Regulatory Preferences: 2001 – 2008 
Hedge funds returned to the front of policymakers’ minds in the wake of the September 11 
terrorist attacks and the issue of terrorist financing. The 2001 Patriot Act aimed to reduce 
the use of financial institutions for the purposes of terrorist financing and money laundering. 
This goal subjected hedge funds to further regulatory scrutiny. All financial institutions, 
including hedge funds, were required to maintain accurate identification records of investors 
and report any suspicious activity. The Patriot Act strengthened the U.S. SEC’s market 
surveillance powers and helped to protect against financial crime and fraud in the hedge fund 
industry, which was previously subject to little regulatory oversight.33  
 
Hedge fund regulation also returned to the spotlight from 2001 onwards due to the 
“retailization” of hedge funds. The “retailization” of hedge funds refers to the increased 
exposure of retail investor funds, or Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) as they are known, 
to hedge funds. CIS’ investment in hedge funds rose from around US$100 billion to around 
                                                 
33 Santangelo 2012  
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US$600 billion in 2007 and hedge funds’ assets under management rose from around 
US$600 billion to around US$1500 billion.34 Some regulators were concerned that hedge 
fund investors were no longer restricted to high net worth individuals but included pension 
funds, small investors and institutional investors. 
 
The U.S. SEC responded to the changing dynamics in the hedge fund industry by proposing 
a Final Rule in December 2004 that would overturn an existing loophole in the 1940 
Investment Advisers Act, enabling hedge fund managers to escape registration with the U.S. 
SEC.35 The rule would require hedge fund managers, not hedge funds, to register with the 
U.S. SEC. The hedge fund industry was outraged by the U.S. SEC’s effort to subject hedge 
fund managers to registration requirements. In response, Bulldog Investors, led by Philip 
Goldstein, challenged the statutory authority of the U.S. SEC and their right to require the 
registration of hedge fund managers. Judge Randolph, from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
struck down the U.S. SEC’s hedge fund registration powers in June 2006, citing the U.S. 
SEC’s lack of statutory authority in the decision.36  
 
In 2007, the U.S.’ PWG requested two private sector committees, the Asset Managers’ 
Committee and Investors’ Committee, to produce a report providing a set of 
recommendations focusing on disclosure, valuation, risk management, operations and 
business practices and conflict of interest issues for hedge funds. The report was released in 
January 2009 after the crisis. The private sector committees created non-binding 
recommendations for the industry to emulate in these policy issue areas.37 Despite the U.S. 
SEC’s concerns, the U.S. continued to favor the use of private self-regulatory regimes to 
govern hedge funds. The absence of clear Congressional statutory authority on the issue 
meant hedge funds remained unregulated before the crisis.  
 
In contrast to the U.S., U.K. hedge fund managers were registered under the 1986 Financial 
Services Act. Hedge funds themselves were not regulated under existing legislation. Hedge 
                                                 
34 Authorité des Marchés Financiers 2007, p. 7  
35 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2004a  
36 Fioretos 2010, p. 708; also see Rappeport 2007; For a summary of the case and judgment see U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 2006 
37 Morphy 2009  
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fund managers, however, were not subject to ongoing prudential supervisory requirements 
regarding the current exposure or systemic risk posed by hedge funds. Rather than 
expressing concerns about the “retailization” of hedge fund investment, the U.K. FSA was 
more interested in allowing retail investors to have greater exposure to hedge funds. In 
March 2007, the U.K. FSA proposed to bring alternative investment funds under the 
category of well-regulated collective investment funds, thus allowing investments to increase 
from 20 – 100% of assets under management.38 The plan was delayed due to complications 
surrounding tax treatment of funds of hedge funds.39 The plan was scrapped as the financial 
crisis began and as details of the Bernie Madoff fraud scandal became public.40  
 
From 2001, hedge fund regulatory reform re-emerged as an issue for policymakers due to the 
“retailization” of hedge funds; the exposure of retail investors to the risk posed by highly 
leveraged hedge funds. The U.S. SEC moved to require hedge funds to register with the U.S. 
SEC but was defeated by the U.S. Court of Appeals’ Judge Randolph. Congress and the 
PWG continued to favor the use of indirect self-regulatory initiatives to regulate hedge funds 
and the exposure of retail investors to hedge funds. In the U.K., both the U.K. FSA and the 
U.K. Parliament showed no interest in strengthening regulatory oversight of hedge funds. 
The U.K. FSA sought to allow retail investors to increase their exposure to hedge funds. 
Members of the alternative asset management industry effectively responded to the concerns 
of regulators and policymakers by establishing industry standards that covered most aspects 
of hedge fund management and operations.41  
6.3.2 IOSCO’s Pre-Crisis Hedge Fund Regulatory Reports and Principles 
IOSCO began conducting research into the regulatory environment of hedge funds and 
retail investors’ exposure to hedge funds in the early 2000s. In 2001, IOSCO established a 
special taskforce and produced its first report in 2003, titled Regulatory and Investor Protection 
Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail investors in (Funds-of) Hedge Funds. The 2003 report 
analyzed the emerging regulatory issues created by increased retail participation in hedge 
                                                 
38 U.K. Financial Services Authority 2007a  
39 U.K. Financial Services Authority 2007b  
40 U.K. Financial Services Authority 2010  
41  See Hedge Fund Matrix 2012  
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funds.42 The report questioned whether the risks posed by CIS funds’ investment in hedge 
funds necessitated tighter regulation including the regulation and authorization of hedge 
funds and their managers.43 IOSCO stated that it was crucial that hedge funds adequately 
disclosed their trading strategies and practices so that investors would be aware if their 
fund’s investment in hedge funds met their investing needs. The report went on to identify 
further risks including the valuation of hedge fund portfolios and liquidity risks posed by 
investment in hedge funds due to the lock-in period that hedge funds routinely utilize to 
enable them to execute their trading strategies.44 IOSCO’s report was not taken further and 
did not result in regulatory principles.  
 
In 2005, IOSCO’s Standing Committee on Investment Funds or Standing Committee 5 
(SC5) to update the 2003 report by producing a report that mapped the regulatory 
approaches of taken by the different members of IOSCO’s SC5 to the regulation of hedge 
funds.45 The report, The Regulatory Environment for Hedge Funds: A Survey and Comparison, 
highlights that the regulatory approaches of different jurisdictions to the regulation of hedge 
funds is highly differentiated. The survey does establish that the majority of SC5 members 
have mandatory registration requirements for hedge fund managers. The notable exception 
is the U.S. SEC and the U.K. FSA. Furthermore, hedge fund managers are subject to 
ongoing regulatory requirements including disclosure requirements, organizational and 
operational standards, and conflict of interest and other conduct of business rules. Finally, 
national regulators have established valuation requirements for funds of hedge funds.46 
 
The survey noted concerns over the valuation and pricing of hedge funds causing IOSCO to 
publish a report and regulatory recommendations on this topic in November 2007.47 The 
report, Principles for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios, recommended that internal 
governance systems be established to protect against the impact of conflicts of interest on 
accurate pricing models and that appropriate pricing mechanisms be established for complex 
                                                 
42 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2003a 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2006, p. 1  
46 Ibid. 
47 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2007  
 199 
instruments.48 This report was aimed at the hedge fund industry with the hope that, in the 
absence of meaningful regulation in the U.S. and U.K., its recommendations were heeded 
and emulated either in practice or through industry standards. IOSCO would later take part 
in an industry standards project in November 2008 with the launch of the Hedge Fund Matrix 
that listed all of the existing industry standards for each relevant issue area.49 IOSCO’s final 
report on funds of hedge funds also identifies the liquidity risk posed by maturity 
mismatches between hedge funds and the underlying funds due to their differing redemption 
rights.50 
 
IOSCO’s reports on hedge funds pushed the boundaries of the statutory authority of 
securities regulators in the U.S. and U.K. The 2003 report questioned whether it was 
necessary to regulate hedge funds and their managers in the light of the risk they posed to 
retail investors. In spite of questioning whether it was necessary, IOSCO restricted its 
international securities standards for hedge funds to the valuation of hedge fund portfolios 
for CIS. IOSCO’s standards were restricted to financial firms that securities regulators in the 
U.S. and U.K. were responsible for regulating. The U.S. SEC sought authority for hedge 
funds but Congress was unwilling to grant it the statutory authority to do so. Furthermore, 
the U.K. Parliament and U.K. FSA were unwilling to regulate hedge funds. This highlights 
the exercise of control by domestic legislatures over outcomes at IOSCO.  
6.4 Hedge Fund Regulation After the Crisis 
During the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the policy preferences of the U.S. and E.U. shifted in 
favor of directly regulating hedge fund managers. The U.S. and E.U.’s shift in policy 
preferences culminated in the G20’s announcement on April 2nd, 2009 in a communiqué that 
stated the following:  
 
“hedge funds or their managers will be registered and will be required to 
disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or 
regulators, including information on their leverage and information necessary 
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for an assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually or 
collectively… They will be subject to oversight to ensure that they have 
adequate risk management.”51 
 
The G20’s endorsement of direct regulation for hedge funds indicates that the policy 
preferences of the U.S. and E.U. had shifted after the 2007/2008 financial crisis in favor of 
the direct regulation of hedge funds. In response, IOSCO’s Technical Committee produced 
its Principles for Hedge Funds two months later in June 2009 and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010. These principles were created to establish 
common regulatory principles and to inform regulators’ approach to the upcoming 
legislative and rule-making process.  
6.4.1 The U.S.’ Preference for the Direct Regulation of Hedge Funds  
The U.S. was now willing to subject hedge funds to direct regulatory regimes because the 
domestic context and, subsequently, domestic policy preferences had changed. Hedge funds 
became politicized due to the symbolism of Bear Stearns’ hedge funds triggering the 
financial crisis in 2007 and because of Bernie Madoff’s hedge fund-based Ponzi scheme’s 
that collapsed in late 2008. The domestic political context had also shifted to favor 
institutional investment firms over the alternative investment industry. 
 
Regulatory reforms were successfully established in the United States due to the 
politicization of hedge funds during the crisis. The beginning of the crisis is associated with 
the collapse of two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns. Hedge funds were further 
politicized once details of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme entered the public consciousness 
and became symbolic of the public’s perception of Wall Street excess. Congress began 
legislating hedge fund reform after the arrest of Bernie Madoff.52 Members of Congress who 
had raised concerns about hedge fund regulation before the crisis noted how the domestic 
political context had substantively changed as a result of the crisis. As Senator Grassley 
explains, "There wasn't much of an appetite for this sort of legislation before the financial 
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crisis. I hope attitudes have changed and that Congress takes up this important legislation 
without delay."53  
 
The U.S.’ preference for the direct regulation was also caused by the increased political 
influence of institutional investors at the expense of the hedge fund and investment bank 
industry.54 Powerful institutional investors such as CalPERS sought the full and effective 
implementation of U.S. financial regulatory reforms to increase the transparency of financial 
markets. This would enable regulators to better identify emerging risks and preserve 
regulatory independence.55 Institutional investors were well positioned to take a dominant 
position in the post-crisis regulatory reform process because they represented the interests of 
a majority of household investors who suffered from the mismanagement of risk by hedge 
funds and investment banks, which directly led to the crisis and the loss of household 
savings. Changing domestic political dynamics empowered the U.S. SEC within the PWG as 
they had a pre-existing regulatory framework that could be applied to address the perceived 
regulatory shortfalls of the existing regime. The new domestic political context enabled the 
U.S. SEC to realize their pre-crisis policy preferences for the regulation of hedge funds.56 
This shift in the policy preferences of domestic legislatures culminated in the Obama 
Administration drafting legislation that required hedge funds to be registered with the U.S. 
SEC, which was delivered to Congress in July 2009. A final suite of legislation was passed in 
to law under the Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed in July 2010. 
6.4.2 European Union Hedge Fund Reform  
In the E.U., France, Germany and a majority of E.U. members were now willing to expend 
political capital to ensure that the U.K.-based hedge fund industry was subject to direct 
market oversight and supervision. The U.K. relented, accepting hedge fund regulatory 
reform through the European Commission despite its protestations.  
 
As Pagliari discusses, the E.U. Commission on Economic and Monetary Affairs and its 
Commissioner Charles McCreevy resisted early efforts to regulate hedge funds directly. As 
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the crisis progressed, the European Parliament, led by the European Socialists, began 
lobbying for the regulation of hedge funds. In late 2008, Germany criticized the U.K. and 
U.S. for blocking Germany’s efforts to improve the transparency and supervision of hedge 
funds before the crisis. France drew further attention to the issue stating in an October 2008 
session to the European Council that, “no financial institution should escape regulation and 
supervision.”57 As the crisis unfolded, the European Parliament passed a measure that 
required the European Commission on Economic and Monetary Affairs to draft legislative 
proposals for the regulation of hedge funds. The measure was passed by a large majority of 
the European Parliament.58 
 
The U.K. resisted efforts to regulate hedge funds before and during the financial crisis. The 
U.K. was forced to accept E.U.-wide hedge fund regulation in 2010 despite its resistance to 
what it considered to be draconian measures. The U.K. was defeated by the overwhelmingly 
pro-reform coalition within the E.U. The E.U.’s pro-reform coalition was strengthened by 
indications that the U.S. was willing to regulate hedge funds after the crisis. The Obama 
Administration was in the process of drafting legislation that would require hedge funds to 
be registered with the U.S. SEC in July 2009.59 This facilitated the proposal of the Alternative 
Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD) in April 2009,60 the approval of the Directive 
in May 2010 and the passage of the legislation in June 2011.61 
6.4.3 IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Fund Regulation and the Effective Coordination of U.S. and E.U. 
Rulemaking Processes 
IOSCO established a Task Force on Unregulated Financial Entities on November 24, 2008 
“in order to support the initiatives undertaken by the G20 to… achieve needed reforms in 
the world’s financial systems following the recent financial crisis.”62 IOSCO’s Task Force on 
Unregulated Financial Entities produced two reports on Hedge Fund Oversight in 2009: a 
Consultation Document in March 200963 and a Final Report in June 2009. The final report 
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outlined IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds.64 In February 2010, IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee published Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds.65 IOSCO’s international 
hedge fund standards were created after it was clear that domestic legislatures in the U.S. and 
E.U. had indicated that they were willing to regulate hedge funds. IOSCO’s international 
hedge fund standards were intended to outline common regulatory principles to be 
incorporated in the upcoming legislative and rulemaking processes.  
 
IOSCO’s 2009 Consultation Paper discusses the regulation of hedge funds and the threat 
that hedge funds pose for the stability of the global financial system in light of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. The report highlights that the risks posed by hedge funds are due 
to the lack of transparency, reporting and disclosure risks, compensation risks, leverage, 
market behavior and/or trading strategy risk.66 The report states that in spite of the fact that 
hedge fund investors are often sophisticated high net worth investors, information 
asymmetry continues to be a problem and the lack of transparency increases the risk of 
market abuse and fraud.67 The Task Force notes that the compensation structures of hedge 
funds can lead hedge fund managers to assume greater risks and inflate valuations of hedge 
fund portfolios, posing risks to the financial system and individual investors.68  
 
The Task Force notes that leverage poses risk to financial stability by increasing losses to 
investors and lenders and by contributing to disorderly pricing of markets as funds rapidly 
unwind their positions.69 Finally, the report states that hedge funds can cause market 
disruptions when large concentrations are forcibly unwound, and through settlement stresses 
caused by hedge funds’ unwinding of large and complex positions.70 Through these risks, 
hedge funds can have deleterious impacts on the global financial system contributing to the 
build-up of systemic risk and financial instability.  
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These reports highlight a change in policy preferences in the wider policymaking community. 
preferences towards the direct regulation of hedge funds as institutions, rather than their 
investment managers. The report states,  
 
“[I]t seems that new trends towards a more direct regulatory oversight 
approach (addressed to the managers and the fund) are emerging in the 
international community. The recently issued G-30 Report recommends 
that ― Managers of private pools of capital that employ substantial 
borrowed funds should be required to register with an appropriate 
national prudential regulator (....). The prudential regulator of such 
managers should have authority to require periodic regulatory reports and 
public disclosures of appropriate information regarding the size, 
investment style, borrowing, and performance of the funds under 
management.” 71 
 
The report highlights that self-regulatory initiatives were not enough, noting that industry 
standards are not being applied thoroughly or consistently. The report states that 60% of 
hedge funds surveyed, in a November 2008 survey, supported the Hedge Fund Working 
Group’s industry standards but that less than 10% were prepared to sign up to the 
standard.72  
 
As a result of the March 2009 Consultation Document and the G20’s endorsement of hedge 
fund regulation in April 2009, IOSCO produced a Final Report on the regulation of hedge 
funds in June 2009. IOSCO’s Final Report establishes Principles for Hedge Funds. Those final 
six principles were:  
 
1. Hedge funds and/or hedge fund managers/advisers should be subject to mandatory 
registration; 
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2. Hedge fund managers/advisers which are required to register should be subject to 
ongoing supervisory requirements; 
 
a. Organizational and operational standards; 
 
b. Conflicts of interest and other conduct of business rules; 
 
c. Disclosure to investors; and 
 
d. Prudential regulation 
 
3. Funds of hedge funds be subject to mandatory registration and incorporate 
appropriate risk management practices;  
 
4. Hedge fund managers/advisers should provide information to the relevant regulator 
information for systemic risk purposes;  
 
5. Regulators take account of industry standards where relevant; and 
 
6. Regulators should have the authority to cooperate and share information in order to 
facilitate efficient and effective oversight of globally active managers/advisers and/or 
funds to help identify systemic risks, market integrity and other risks arising from the 
activities or exposures of hedge funds.73  
 
A majority of jurisdictions had already adopted or had committed to adopting Principles 1 - 
5. As the 2005 survey of hedge fund regulation reveals, a majority of securities market 
regulators already required hedge fund managers and funds of hedge funds to be registered, 
and hedge fund managers and funds of hedge funds were subject to ongoing supervisory 
requirements.74 The notable exception was the U.S. and U.K. However, the U.S. and E.U. 
had indicated that they were willing to require hedge funds and hedge fund managers to be 
                                                 
73 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2009a  
74 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2006  
 206 
registered and subject to ongoing supervisory requirements before June 2009. The final 
report notes that Congress was likely to “consider legislation in 2009.”75 As noted earlier, the 
E.U. had already proposed AIFMD in April 2009. After the 2007/2008 financial crisis, there 
was a consensus that hedge funds should provide information for systemic risk purposes as 
indicated by the G20’s statement two months earlier.76  
 
Members of IOSCO’s Task Force on Unregulated Financial Entities took the opportunity to 
share their views on what national regulatory frameworks to govern hedge funds should 
incorporate and discussed how these principles could be implemented. For instance, the 
Task Force noted the registration requirements for hedge fund managers should be 
proportional and that de minimis exceptions be included in national regulatory frameworks.77  
De minimis exceptions were included in the final legislative framework of the U.S. and E.U. 
De minimis exceptions establish a level, determined by the size of assets under management, 
at which hedge funds are subject to regulation and registration requirements. 
 
For instance, in the U.S., under amendments to the 1940 Private Investment Advisers under 
Section 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. and foreign hedge fund managers were required to 
be registered with the U.S. SEC.  The Private Investment Advisor Act required hedge fund 
managers to register with the U.S. SEC by eliminating the private adviser exemption. The 
Private Investment Advisers Act previously provided an exemption from registration with 
the SEC for any investment adviser who had fewer than 15 clients and is not considered to 
be an investment adviser to the general public. Each fund was previously counted as one 
“client”. The Private Investment Advisers Act overturned this. One client related to a single 
investor. The Act required all U.S. investment advisers to private investment funds, with 
more than $150 million under management, to register with the U.S. SEC.78 Foreign advisers 
were only exempt if they had no place of business in the U.S., retained fewer than 15 clients 
in the U.S., had less than $25 million assets under management attributable to U.S. clients, 
do not hold themselves out generally to the U.S. public as an investment adviser, and do not 
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advise registered investment companies or registered business development companies.79  By 
being subject to the Private Investment Advisers Act, U.S. hedge fund managers were 
required to prepare disclosure statements, appoint a Chief Compliance Officer, adopt a 
formal compliance program, adopt a written code of ethics, develop a books and records 
policy, ensure the compliance program is adequately resourced, and establish fundamental 
operating committees.80  
 
Under the E.U.’s AIFMD, all alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) will be required 
to register with a home national securities market authority within the E.U. The AIFMD 
provides a de minimis exemption for those funds with less than €100 million in funds or €500 
million if Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) are subject to a 5 year redemption limit and 
have no leverage.81  
 
The report also identified what information should be disclosed to regulators as part of the 
registration process and what information should be included to enable regulators to assist in 
the monitoring of systemic risk.82 This process was developed further and became a central 
focus in national regulators’ development of national reporting standards for hedge funds. 
The process culminated in IOSCO publishing Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds 
in February 2010.83 IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds identified 
common information and reporting requirements for hedge funds. Creating common 
information and reporting requirements for hedge fund was critical to securities regulators’ 
ability to effectively monitor internationally active hedge funds and the systemic risk that 
hedge funds posed.  
 
In the U.S., Section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires hedge fund managers to disclose 
data to the U.S. SEC to assist the newly-established Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) in their monitoring and assessment of systemic risk.84 Hedge funds were required to 
disclose information to the U.S. SEC and FSOC through Form PF. This information was to 
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be kept confidential.85 Large private fund advisers are required to provide more detailed 
information than smaller fund advisers. The U.S. SEC requires that large hedge fund 
advisers disclose aggregate information regarding their hedge funds, including exposures by 
asset class, geographical concentration of investments held by funds and the monthly value 
of portfolio turnover by asset class. Large private fund advisers that advise at least one 
“qualifying hedge fund” (a hedge fund with a net asset value of at least $500 million) must 
report certain information relating to that fund’s exposures, leverage, risk profile and 
liquidity.86 The U.S. SEC’s Final Rule for Form PF states, the following: 
 
To this end, our staffs have consulted with the United Kingdom’s [FSA], 
[ESMA], [IOSCO] and Hong Kong’s [FSC]… IOSCO, in turn, used the 
guidelines established in the FSA survey [of hedge funds], together with its 
own report on hedge fund oversight, in coordinating a survey of hedge funds 
conducted by IOSCO’s members (including the SEC and CFTC) as of the 
end of September 2010… Form PF includes many of the types of 
information collected through the FSA survey and proposed to be collected 
in the ESMA template, and a number of changes we are making from the 
proposal further align Form PF with these international approaches to private 
fund reporting.87 
 
The U.S. SEC’s final rules for private fund reporting highlight how the U.S., E.U. and Hong 
Kong had worked together to establish common reporting requirements and that IOSCO 
was an important institution within this process. Regulators were conscious that, because 
hedge funds are internationally active and are consistently engaged in cross-border 
investment, it was necessary to effectively coordinate their national regulatory frameworks. 
According to Jim Hamilton, Dan Waters of the U.K. FSA stated the following:  
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“the global nature and cross-border reality of hedge fund and other market 
components must be kept in mind. There is a need to create a proportionate 
and effective regulatory approach that recognizes the global nature of the 
hedge fund industry and the practical realities of how alternative investment 
fund management, including its supporting services, inevitably involves cross-
border markets and jurisdictions.”88 
 
Securities regulators were mindful of the importance of establishing effective forms of 
regulatory cooperation to monitor hedge funds.  
 
In the E.U., the delegated regulation directive also states that the report should include an 
accurate “review of the activities of the AIF with a description of the principal risks and 
investments or economic uncertainties that it faces. That disclosure should not result in the 
publication of proprietary information of the AIF which would be to the detriment of the 
AIF and its investors.”89 The E.U.’s AIFMD seeks to calm early fears that E.U. disclosure 
requirements would force hedge fund managers to disclosure proprietary information. The 
U.S. SEC’s Final Rule for Form PF also indicates that the E.U.’s information and reporting 
requirements were developed in concert with the U.S. SEC’s rulemaking process. 
6.4.4 E.U. Legislation and the Adoption of a Differentiated National Regulatory Framework 
Although securities regulators effectively coordinated their national regulatory frameworks in 
matters of common concern to securities regulators, there are a number of aspects to the 
E.U.’s regulatory framework for hedge funds (under AIFMD) that differs from the U.S.’ 
legislative and regulatory framework.  
 
First, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to disclose their use of leverage and empowers the 
Commission to set leverage limits restricting individual managers’ leverage in exceptional 
circumstances.90 Second, the E.U. AIFMD establishes capital adequacy requirements. Capital 
adequacy requirements are set at 25% of fixed overhead costs and €150,000 (or €300,000 for 
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internally managed funds) plus 0.02% of the value of the fund that exceeds $250 million.91 
The AIFMD demands greater disclosure requirements of the hedge fund industry including 
the firm’s investment strategy, risk management, and expenses.92 The EU’s AIFMD goes 
above and beyond the regulatory demands of the US’ regulatory statutes and the U.S. SEC’s 
final rules by granting securities regulators the authority to set leverage limits and by forcing 
AIFMs to disclose their investment strategy and expenses.  
 
The most controversial aspect of the E.U. AIFMD is the extraterritorial application of E.U. 
law to non-E.U. fund managers marketing alternative investments funds in the E.U. In order 
for non-E.U. AIFMs to be accepted for private placement by ESMA (responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the AIFMD), they must be subject to the regulatory 
authority of their home jurisdiction. That home jurisdiction must (a) have cooperation 
arrangements with the host jurisdiction of the AIFM, (b) have a cooperative tax information 
agreement in place with the member states into which the Alternative Investment Fund is to 
be marketed in line with article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention,93 and (c) not be on 
the list of 'non-cooperative' countries on the FATF list regarding anti-money laundering or 
terrorist financing protections.94 Alternative investment fund managers must be registered in 
a home jurisdiction by 21 July 2013. Whilst the U.S. has cooperation agreements with many 
of the E.U.’s jurisdictions, it had not agreed to a cooperative agreement with ESMA, as 
required under AIFMD, as of May 2013. Until the creation of a passport regime in 2013, 
non-EU alternative investment funds are required to fulfill the E.U.’s disclosure 
requirements.  
 
This prompted the Alternative Investment Management Association CEO, a hedge fund 
industry and lobby group, Andrew Baker to state: 
 
“The proposed third country provisions do not appear to reflect advice 
the European Commission received from ESMA on implementing 
AIFMD. The Commission is contemplating a requirement that EU and 
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non-EU regulators sign co-operation, agreements which are legally binding 
on both parties. These would be extremely problematic if not impossible 
to conclude if the Regulation prescribes that the cooperation agreements 
ensure that third country regulators enforce EU law in their territories.  It 
could be extremely difficult for many regulators to be able to sign up to 
that.”95 
 
Consequently, in its current state, the E.U.’s mutual recognition regime demands regulatory 
equivalency between the home jurisdiction of the hedge fund and the E.U. E.U. hedge fund 
regulation is considered by most to be protectionist and will result in a loss of choice for 
E.U. investors.96 The U.K.’s Treasury claimed a small victory in negotiating a measure “to 
ensure that managers of hedge funds and private equity providers will be regulated in an 
internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way, with third country fund managers 
able to qualify for a passport into the EU.”97 Despite the success of the U.K. in lobbying for 
a passport regime, E.U. regulation establishes a substantively different regulatory regime for 
hedge funds.  
 
U.S.-based hedge fund managers are required to comply with E.U. transparency and 
disclosure requirements regarding trading strategies, expenses, remuneration, leverage and 
risk. U.S. hedge fund managers will also be required to report to ESMA and provide 
information on their current levels of leverage. The E.U.’s decision to establish a regional 
regulatory regime rather than a mutual recognition regime will force U.S.-based hedge funds 
and hedge managers to establish hedge funds for E.U. investors, rather than allowing them 
to market U.S.-based hedge funds to E.U. investors.  
 
The E.U.’s differentiated financial regulatory framework for hedge funds highlights the role 
of domestic legislatures and limitations to the influence of securities market regulators. The 
E.U.’s regulatory requirements act against the interests of the mainly London-based 
European hedge fund industry, the interests of U.S.-based hedge funds, and the profitability 
of the hedge fund industry as a whole. The E.U.’s stronger regulatory requirements do not 
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affect the ability of domestic securities regulators to fulfill their domestic regulatory 
responsibilities.  
 
It is unclear what the preferences of securities market regulators are. However, it is likely 
that U.S. securities regulators would have preferred common regulatory regimes that did not 
discriminate against U.S. hedge fund advisers. The U.K. FSA criticized the E.U.’s approach 
to the regulation of hedge funds. According to Hamilton, Dan Waters of the U.K. FSA 
stated that the “[E.U.] Directive must embrace a global approach that recognizes the cross-
border nature of the hedge fund industry and does not restrict investor choice with 
unjustifiable geographic restrictions. At a hedge fund regulation forum, he called 
“misplaced’’ the Directive’s restrictions on the delegation of management services, custody 
and depositary activity. He similarly scored the blanket prohibitions on the marketing of 
non-European funds to professional investors.”98 The E.U.’s decision to demand higher 
regulatory requirements of E.U. hedge funds and hedge fund managers and foreign hedge 
fund managers marketing hedge funds to E.U. investors was taken by domestic legislatures 
and was outside the sphere of control of securities market regulators. As indicated by the 
previous section, securities market regulators effectively coordinated the aspects of hedge 
fund regulation that would enable regulators to fulfill their domestic regulatory 
responsibilities under existing legislation.  
 
As Helleiner and Pagliari discuss, the hedge fund regulatory process is characterized by 
“cooperative decentralization.” Cooperative decentralization is “centered upon the 
development and promotion of broad principles-based international regulatory standards as 
well as activities such as information-sharing, research collaboration, international early 
warning systems, and capacity building.”99 Helleiner later describes cooperative 
decentralization as “uneven implementation across jurisdictions as well as the 
territorialization of new central market nodes being cultivated by the standards.”100 The 
E.U.’s hedge fund legislative framework highlights a case of cooperative decentralization. 
The E.U. has created a nationally distinct regulatory framework for hedge funds whilst 
securities regulators, working through IOSCO’s Technical Committee have established 
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cooperative responses to regulatory reforms to enable them to fulfill their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities.  
6.5 Conclusion  
The political dynamics of IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards are explained by both 
a domestic politics and transgovernmental network perspective. The politics of pre-crisis 
international hedge fund standards highlights the central role of domestic legislatures. 
IOSCO’s failure to establish international hedge fund standards before the 2007/2008 
financial crisis was because domestic legislatures in the U.S. and U.K. were unwilling to 
regulate hedge funds. After the collapse of LTCM, U.S. and international regulators 
recommended improvements to the disclosure of hedge funds to investors and financial 
regulators. When Congress took up the measure, the bills were defeated by the successful 
lobbying efforts of the financial industry. As a result, IOSCO and other international 
financial regulatory bodies stayed silent on the issue. The issue re-emerged in 2001 when 
retail investors increased their exposure to hedge funds. The U.S. SEC sought to require 
hedge funds to become registered with the U.S. SEC, but Congress remained unwilling and 
the judicial system concluded the U.S. SEC did not have the adequate statutory authority. 
Because Congress did not grant the U.S. SEC the statutory authority to regulate hedge funds 
and because the U.K. Parliament and U.K. FSA chose not regulate hedge funds, IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee was limited to creating regulatory principles relating to regulated CIS 
funds including: the valuation of hedge funds,101 a report on the risks of retail investor’s 
investment in hedge funds,102 and a report on the regulatory environment of hedge funds.103 
 
After the crisis, the domestic political context of the U.S. and E.U. shifted causing domestic 
legislatures to change their policy preferences in favor of the direct regulation of hedge 
funds. Domestic politicians in the U.S. and E.U. faced a different set of political incentives 
after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The highly publicized role of hedge funds in triggering 
the crisis, beginning with the collapse of Bear Stearns’ hedge funds in 2007, and the arrest 
and prosecution of Bernie Madoff had the effect of politicizing hedge fund regulation. 
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Furthermore, the domestic political balance of power shifted in favor of institutional 
investors rather than the alternative investment fund industry. This shift in the domestic 
political balance of power favored pro-reform interests groups over status quo interests 
groups. As a result, Congress was willing to regulate hedge funds and the E.U. was willing to 
expend significant political capital to ensure the U.K. hedge fund industry was subject to 
direct regulation through the AIFMD. This outcome re-emphasizes the work of Pagliari, 
Fioretos and Quaglia, who have argued that the decision to regulate hedge funds in the U.S. 
and E.U. has been driven by shifts in domestic political contexts.  
 
After domestic legislatures in the U.S. and E.U. had indicated their preference for directly 
regulating hedge funds in early 2009, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s 
Principles for Hedge Funds in June 2009 and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge 
Funds. As this chapter has demonstrated, the creation of IOSCO’s international hedge fund 
standards was driven by the principled professional interests of the transgovernmental 
network of securities market regulators. Securities market regulators sought to effectively 
coordinate their national regulatory frameworks before the upcoming rulemaking process to 
enable them to effectively monitor international active hedge funds. Common information 
and reporting requirements enabled securities market regulators to exchange information 
freely and effectively. Although the creation of IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards 
was contingent on shifts in the policy preferences of domestic legislatures in the U.S. and 
E.U., securities regulators exercised the discretion granted to them by domestic legislatures 
to establish international hedge fund principles to promote the coordination of national 
regulatory frameworks.  
 
The political dynamics of IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards is consistent with a 
PA analytical framework. The creation of international hedge fund standards was contingent 
on domestic legislatures from dominant jurisdictions favoring the regulation of hedge funds. 
Securities market regulators exercised the discretion granted to them within the PA 
relationship established between domestic legislatures and securities market supervisors to 
create international hedge fund standards. Those international hedge fund standards were 
created to enable domestic securities regulators to effectively execute their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion: A Principal-Agent Approach to 
Explaining the Creation and Strengthening of 
International Securities Market Standards 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has addressed the question: what explains the creation and strengthening of 
IOSCO’s international securities market standards? To do so, this thesis has analyzed the 
creation and strengthening of IOSCO’s international securities market standards including: 
 
1. IOSCO’s Principles for Memoranda of Understanding (to facilitate the prosecution 
of cross-border financial crime) created in September 1991 and its strengthening 
with the creation of IOSCO’s MMoU in May 2002 
 
2. IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Market Regulation created in 
September 1998 and its strengthening with the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology in 
October 2003  
 
3. IOSCO’s Principles for Credit Rating Agencies created in September 2003 and 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies created in 
December 2004 and their strengthening through the creation of direct regulatory 
regimes for rating agencies in the U.S. and E.U. before and after the 2007/2008 
financial crisis 
 
4. IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation of Hedge Funds created in June 2009 and 
IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds in February 2010; 
 
 216 
This chapter will review the answers to this thesis’ central research question before reviewing 
the contribution of this thesis to existing IPE literature analyzing international financial 
regulatory politics. This chapter will conclude by highlighting future research agendas for the 
study of international securities market regulation.  
7.2 Key Findings: Explaining the Creation and Strengthening of International 
Securities Market Standards 
This thesis’ analysis of international securities standards reveals that the creation and 
strengthening of international securities market standards are derived from the role and 
influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic 
legislatures and states. The extent to which the creation and strengthening of international 
securities market standards are derived from each actor’s role and influence is differentiated 
across issue areas and across time.  
 
This thesis argues that international securities market standards fall into two distinct 
categories. The first category of international securities market standards reflects the role and 
influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators within IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee. This set of international securities market standards is created in 
response to threats to the integrity of developed financial centers from under-regulated or 
ineffectively regulated financial centers. IOSCO’s Technical Committee is driven to create 
this set of standards in order to enable securities market regulators to fulfill the regulatory 
responsibilities of their respective domestic securities market. This set of standards was 
created in response to the consequences of financial globalization and the intensified 
integration between national financial markets. Regulators’ ability to govern domestically is 
contingent on their ability to govern internationally by exporting domestic regulatory 
frameworks to foreign jurisdictions through international financial standards and by 
establishing cooperative information sharing and mutual legal assistance mechanisms with 
foreign regulators. Two of IOSCO’s international financial standards fit this category:  
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1. IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs in September 1991  
 
2. IOSCO’s Principles endorsed in September 1998  
 
The second category of international securities market standards reflects the role and 
influence of both domestic legislatures and the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators. This category of international securities market standards is created to 
promote the coordination of national regulatory frameworks between dominant financial 
centers. This category of standards were created after domestic legislatures had indicated 
their preference in favor of regulating, or improving the regulation of, previously unregulated 
financial market actors.  This set of standards is contingent on shifts in the policy 
preferences of domestic legislatures. The transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators demonstrate agency in the creation of international financial standards to promote 
the coordination of national regulatory frameworks. The transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators are driven to create these standards by principled professional 
interests. Two of IOSCO’s international financial standards fit this category: 
 
1. IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs in September 2003 and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct in 
December 2004. 
 
2. IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds in June 2009. 
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The political dynamics of the creation of four of IOSCO’s international securities market 
standards is summarized in Table 7.1 below: 
 
Table 7.1 The Political Dynamics of the Creation of four of IOSCO’s International Securities 
Market Standards  
Issue Areas 
 
 
 
 
Cross-Border 
Financial Crime 
and Insider 
Trading 
 
 
National Securities 
Market Regulatory 
Frameworks 
 
 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
Principles for 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
September 2003 
 
Principles for the 
Regulation of Hedge 
Funds 
 
June 2009 
 
 
Standards 
and Date of 
Creation 
 
Principles for 
Memoranda of 
Understanding  
 
September 1991 
 
Objectives and 
Principles of 
Securities Market 
Regulation  
 
September 1998 
Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating 
Agencies  
December 2004 
Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements for 
Hedge Funds  
February 2010 
 
 
Explanatory 
Framework 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Domestic Politics 
and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Domestic Politics and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
 
This thesis has also identified that three of IOSCO’s international securities market 
standards have been strengthened. Two of IOSCO’s standards (IOSCO’s Principles and 
IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs) have been strengthened through the creation of institutional 
initiatives that were created to promote the adoption and strengthened implementation of 
IOSCO’s standards. IOSCO’s MMoU was created in May 2002, to strengthen the 
implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs and IOSCO’s Methodology was created in 
October 2003 to strengthen the implementation of IOSCO’s Principles. IOSCO’s Principles for 
CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was strengthened through the creation of direct 
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regulatory regimes for rating agencies in the U.S. and E.U. These three cases highlight the 
role and influences of three different political actors.  
 
First, IOSCO’s MMoU demonstrates the influence of the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators within IOSCO’s Technical Committee. As Chapter 3 discusses, 
IOSCO’s MMoU was created by IOSCO’s Technical Committee in response to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001. September 11 revealed important 
limitations to the bilateral network of MoUs and the ability of securities regulators to identify 
the perpetrators of cross-border financial crime. IOSCO’s MMoU was created to address 
these gaps by improving global coverage and standardizing MoU agreements between 
securities market regulators. IOSCO’s MMoU was first proposed by a non-U.S. regulator at 
the first meeting of IOSCO’s Technical Committee, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
in October 2001. IOSCO’s Technical Committee’s recognition of the limitations to the 
bilateral network of MoUs and the immediacy of their response to the events of September 
11, demonstrates that the strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was driven by the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. Furthermore, IOSCO’s MMoU 
was driven by regulators’ concerns about the ability of individuals to commit acts of cross-
border financial crime without detection. This demonstrates that IOSCO’s MMoU was 
driven by the principled professional interests of the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators.  
 
Second, IOSCO’s Methodology was driven by the preferences of powerful states and the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. As Chapter 4 discusses, the 
creation of IOSCO’s Methodology reveals that IOSCO was subject to external political 
pressure to create a more comprehensive and objective international standard for securities 
market regulators to enable the IMF and World Bank to conduct external assessments of 
compliance with IOSCO’s Principles. The IMF and World Bank were pressured by the G7 to 
improve compliance with international financial regulatory standards and raise financial 
regulatory standards, as part of the NIFA in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Powerful 
states recognized the costs of under-regulated and ineffectively regulated financial centers on 
developed financial centers after the Asian Financial Crisis. This led financial ministries to 
play an active role in the international financial regulatory regime and caused IOSCO to 
 220 
create IOSCO’s Methodology, in spite of its reservations about creating a comprehensive, ‘one-
size-fits-all’ model of securities market regulation. At the same time, IOSCO’s Methodology 
was created as a result of September 11, causing IOSCO’s Technical Committee to recognize 
the importance and benefits of strengthening the adoption of IOSCO’s financial standards. 
September 11 demonstrated to securities market regulators the dangers of a comparatively 
weak regulatory regime for the stability and integrity of their respective securities market. 
IOSCO’s Methodology was also driven by transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators and their principled professional interests.  
 
Third, the strengthened implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for CRAs and IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct through the creation of direct regulatory regimes for rating agencies in the U.S. and 
E.U. demonstrates the role and influence of domestic legislatures.  As Chapter 5 discusses, 
the creation of direct regulatory regimes in the U.S. and E.U. was driven by shifts in the 
domestic political context and policy preferences of domestic legislatures. The initial impetus 
for the U.S.’ creation of a direct regulatory regime was the narrow political interests of two 
Pennsylvanian Congressmen, Michael Fitzpatrick and Paul Kanjorski. Fitzpatrick and 
Kanjorski initiated the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act to promote competition and 
reduce regulatory barriers to entry for rating agencies in the interests of Egan-Jones (a 
Pennsylvanian based rating agency). The regulatory regime remained weakened because 
rating agencies were still afforded First Amendment rights protections and continued 
Congressional resistance to substantive regulatory oversight. It took the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis to shift the domestic political context in favor of a comprehensive direct regulatory 
regime for rating agencies. Widespread reports of conflicts of interest in the securitized debt 
market and the under valuation of risk by rating agencies meant that domestic politicians 
faced a different set of incentives after the financial crisis than before. Furthermore, U.S. 
courts began dismantling the First Amendment Rights protections afforded to rating 
agencies before the crisis. The E.U. created a direct regulatory regime after the 2007/2008 
financial crisis because the U.S. had established a direct regulatory regime, as a result of 
rating agencies’ central role in the financial crisis.  
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The political dynamics of the strengthening of three of IOSCO’s international securities 
market standards are summarized in Table 7.2 below: 
 
Table 7.2 The Political Dynamics of the Strengthening of IOSCO’s International Securities 
Market Standards  
 
This thesis’ analysis concludes that the role and influence of political actors in the creation 
and strengthening of international securities market standards is differentiated across issues 
and across time. This thesis has argued that a Principal-Agent analytical framework is able to 
account for the role and influence of different political actors. A Principal-Agent relationship 
exists between securities market regulators and domestic legislatures. Domestic legislatures 
delegate domestic securities market regulators the task of regulating domestic securities 
markets within the current legislative framework and existing statutory authority. Domestic 
legislatures exercise control over securities market regulators through public statements by 
domestic politicians, public hearings, the drafting of public reports, and the creation or 
withholding of statutory authority. Domestic legislatures also grant regulators’ discretion to 
establish international securities market standards in order to fulfill the regulatory 
responsibilities they are delegated. Securities regulators exercise this discretion by creating 
Issue Areas 
 
 
 
 
Cross-Border 
Financial Crime 
and Insider 
Trading 
 
 
National Securities 
Market Regulatory 
Frameworks 
 
 
Credit Rating 
Agencies 
 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
 
 
Strengthening 
of 
International 
Securities 
Market 
Standard 
 
Multilateral 
Memorandum of 
Understanding  
 
May 2002 
 
Methodology for 
Assessing 
Implementation of 
IOSCO’s Objectives 
and Principles of 
Securities Market 
Regulation  
 
October 2003 
 
 
The creation of 
direct regulatory 
regimes in the U.S. 
and E.U. before 
and after the 
2007/2008 
financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
Explanatory  
Framework 
 
 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
Inter-State and 
Transgovernmental 
Network Theory 
 
 
Domestic Politics 
Theory 
 
N/A 
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international regulatory standards that reflect their statutory authority domestically and 
export those regulatory frameworks to foreign jurisdictions. Finally, domestic legislatures use 
multiple agents to monitor outcomes. Multiple agents are created to overcome the hidden-
information problem and ensure that all agents are acting consistently with their preferences. 
Finance ministries act as another agent, monitoring the actions of securities market 
regulators at IOSCO. When finance ministries feel securities market regulators need to 
strengthen the implementation of international securities market standards, finance 
ministries place pressure on securities market regulators through international financial 
institutions that they exercise control over.  The nature of the delegation chain is represented 
in Figure 7.1 below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The Delegation Chain in International Securities Market Regulation 
 
A PA analytical framework accounts for the differentiated sources of international securities 
standards. A PA analytical framework also establishes when and under what conditions 
international securities standards are derived from domestic legislatures, states, and the 
transgovernmental network of securities regulators acting through IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee. The transgovernmental network of securities market regulators are influential in 
the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards, when those 
standards are intended to enable securities market regulators to fulfill their domestic 
regulatory responsibilities, as defined by their pre-existing statutory authority and their 
principled professional interests. Domestic legislatures are influential when international 
securities standards are created to address the regulation of previously unregulated financial 
Delegation  Discretion 
 
 
Finance 
Ministries  
IOSCO's 
Technical 
Committee 
Domestic 
Legislatures 
Domestic 
Securities 
Regulators 
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market actors. Domestic legislatures define the perimeter of international financial standards 
through the granting or withholding of statutory authority from domestic securities market 
regulators and by indicating their interest in improving the regulation of previously 
unregulated financial market actors. Finally, states are influential when they perceive that the 
costs of under-regulated or ineffectively regulated financial centers are higher than the 
current level of institutional enforcement.  
7.3 Contributions to IPE and IR Literature 
This thesis makes a number of important contributions to IPE and IR literature. This thesis 
addresses three empirical gaps in existing IPE literature, analyzing international financial 
regulatory politics. First, although IPE scholars have analyzed IOSCO’s Principles for MOUs, 
IOSCO’s Code of Conduct, and IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds, they have not yet analyzed 
IOSCO’s Principles, IOSCO’s Methodology, IOSCO’s MMoU, and IOSCO’s Systemic Risk Data 
Requirements for Hedge Funds. These international securities standards are important 
international financial standards and reveal significant political dynamics in international 
securities market regulation. 
 
As Chapter 3 highlights in its analysis of IOSCO’s MMoU, the institutional initiative was 
created immediately after September 11, and the idea of creating IOSCO’s MMoU was 
proposed by a non-U.S. regulator at the first meeting of IOSCO’s Technical Committee in 
October 2001. This demonstrates that the transgovernmental network of securities market 
regulators drove the strengthening of IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs. This counters Beth 
Simmons’ hypothesis that IOSCO would establish a multilateral information sharing 
agreement in response to U.S. interests, reducing the costs of under-regulated financial 
centers due to its impact on the stability and profitability of U.S. financial markets. Simmons 
states that IOSCO’s information sharing regime will be strengthened, “primarily to facilitate 
the detection of systemic risks that pose potentially far greater negative externalities for the 
dominant financial center.”1 Instead, IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs was strengthened in 
response to the threat of cross-border financial crime and was not driven by the preferences 
                                                 
1 Simmons 2001, p. 614 
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of the U.S., acting as a unitary actor, but by the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators.  
 
 As Chapter 4 discusses, an analysis of IOSCO’s Principles highlights the central role of the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators. Chapter 4 highlights that 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee created these standards in response to the increasing 
integration of national securities markets, and the threats that under-regulated jurisdictions 
posed to the stability of their respective domestic securities market. From the interviews with 
securities regulators involved in the creation of IOSCO’s Principles, it is apparent that this 
international standards was not created as a reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis, and that 
the financial standards project at IOSCO had begun before the crisis. An analysis of the 
creation of IOSCO’s Methodology reveals that IOSCO was subject to external political 
pressure from the World Bank and IMF in the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology. At the same 
time, the creation of IOSCO’s Methodology was tied to the events of September 11 and was 
part of IOSCO’s effort to improve the adoption and implementation of IOSCO’s standards.  
 
As Chapter 6 discuses, an analysis of IOSCO’s Principles for Hedge Funds and IOSCO’s Systemic 
Risk Data Requirements for Hedge Funds reveals that the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators worked through the Task Force on Unregulated Entities to 
establish common data requirements that would enable regulators to monitor the systemic 
risk posed by hedge funds. Given that hedge funds are internationally active, it is useful for 
securities regulators to establish common reporting requirements that would enable 
regulators to exchange for information freely and easily in order to monitor systemic risk. 
Existing analysis by Pagliari, Fioretos, and Quaglia focus on the role and influence of shifts 
in the domestic political context in explaining the creation of international hedge fund 
standards and overlooks the role of the transnational policy making process.2 This thesis 
recognizes that shifts in the domestic political context of dominant jurisdictions was a 
necessary condition for the creation of international hedge fund standards. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that a majority of securities regulators in IOSCO’s Technical 
Committee preferred the direct regulation of hedge funds before the crisis. However, 
IOSCO’s Task Force on Unregulated Financial Entities played an important role in the post-
                                                 
2 Fioretos 2010; Pagliari 2013; Pagliari 2011; Quaglia 2011 
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crisis regulatory reform process by establishing common reporting requirements. The 
coordination of information and reporting requirements between securities market 
regulators had a recognizable and marked impact on national rulemaking process in the U.S. 
and E.U., which implemented national regulatory reforms. 
 
Second, of the international securities standards analyzed by existing literature, this thesis 
reveals new and important outcomes and political drivers in the creation of international 
securities market standards. As Chapter 3 discusses, the creation of a cooperative solution to 
the issue of cross-border financial crime through the creation of IOSCO’s’ Working Group 
No.4, and IOSCO’s Principles for MoUs, was driven by the transgovernmental network of 
securities market regulators rather than the U.S. SEC alone as Bach and Newman portray. 
Bach and Newman state that the U.S. SEC pioneered the idea of using MoUs to combat 
insider trading. Bach and Newman stated the following:  
 
“Beginning in the mid-1980s, the SEC promoted transgovernmental 
cooperation among the world’s securities regulators as a solution to growing 
arbitrage opportunities in global financial markets. A series of high-profile 
cross-border cases of insider trading originating in jurisdictions lacking 
comprehensive regulation exposed the growing vulnerability of US markets. 
The SEC confronted the challenge by negotiating a series of MoUs with 
regulators from major markets.”3  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the actual story is more nuanced. The U.S. SEC did 
pioneer the concept of using an MoU to combat cross-border financial crime and the U.S. 
SEC did negotiate MoUs with foreign regulators. At the same time, European regulators 
were also interested in using MoUs and negotiating international regulatory principles for 
MoUs to combat cross-border financial crime. Furthermore, in discussing international 
regulatory principles, the community of securities market regulators within Working Group 
No. 4 identified common barriers to the effective use of information sharing and mutual 
legal assistance mechanisms for the prosecution of cross-border financial crime. This 
contradicts Bach and Newman’s argument that the U.S. SEC was responsible for the 
                                                 
3 Bach and Newman 2010, p. 510 
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adoption of insider trading laws and the use of MoUs. European securities market regulators 
were important actors in establishing an international regulatory regime that centered on the 
use of MoUs to combat cross-border financial crime. The story is not as U.S.-centric as Bach 
and Newman originally portray.  
 
As Chapter 5 discusses, IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was created because of the unwillingness of 
U.S. and E.U. legislatures to establish a direct regulatory regime for rating agencies. IOSCO’s 
Code of Conduct was created to establish an internationally consistent regulatory regime for 
rating agencies that took in to account U.S. and E.U. domestic political constraints. This 
differs from Stefano Pagliari’s account of the creation of IOSCO’s Code of Conduct. Pagliari 
argues that IOSCO’s Code of Conduct was created because securities market regulators favored 
the use of self-regulatory regimes to govern rating agencies.4 This is true. But, regulators’ 
primary concern was in creating an internationally consistent regulatory regime for rating 
agencies because of regulators’ fears that competing systems of regulation would create dual 
systems of assessment of creditworthiness. Securities regulators did not believe that this was 
in the interests of protecting investors. Existing literature analyzing rating agency regulation 
has also overlooked the fact that the direct regulation of rating agencies in the U.S. under the 
2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was driven by the narrow political interests of 
Pennsylvanian Congressmen Fitzpatrick and Kanjorski. As Chapter 5 highlights, the first 
direct regulatory regime in the U.S. was created to promote competition in rating agency 
markets. Fitzpatrick and Kanjorski were acting in the interests of Egan-Jones. Continued 
resistance from Congress and rating agencies, and the looming threat of being struck down 
by the U.S. court system weakened the bill.  
 
The third empirical limitation that this thesis addresses is that IPE studies of international 
securities market standards have tended to analyze single empirical case studies or multiple 
cases studies in a single time period. This approach has led to IPE scholars to focus on the 
influence of a single political arena in the creation of international financial standards, 
because that political arena exercised influence during that singular time period. This has led 
existing literature to explain international financial standards through the role and influence 
of one of three competing political arenas: inter-state, domestic, and transnational. This 
                                                 
4 See Pagliari 2013; Pagliari 2011 
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thesis’ analysis of international securities market standards over the lifetime of the issue, 
from the genesis of securities market regulatory cooperation in 1983 through to the post-
2007/2008 financial regulatory reform process, reveals that international financial standards 
are derived from different political contexts across time.  
 
This thesis’ analysis of four of IOSCO’s international securities market standards highlights 
some important theoretical limitations to existing literature. Existing theoretical frameworks 
are unable to account for the fact that the creation and strengthening of international 
securities market standards is derived from different political arenas and driven by different 
political actors. It is, therefore, necessary to establish an integrative approach that can 
account for the role and influence of different political actors in the creation and 
strengthening of international financial standards. This thesis has argued that a PA analytical 
framework is able to account for the differentiated sources of international securities market 
standards. PA theory does so by establishing when and under what conditions the creation 
and strengthening of international securities market standards are derived from the 
transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, or states.  
 
In establishing when and under what conditions each political actor plays a role in the 
creation and strengthening of international securities market standards, a PA analytical 
framework can provide a basis to better account for the role of each actor in these processes. 
This thesis reveals that the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators creates 
international securities market standards to export the national regulatory frameworks of 
developed financial centers to under-regulated or ineffectively regulated financial markets. 
Securities regulators are driven to do this because of the increased integration of national 
financial markets and their interests in fulfilling their domestic regulatory responsibilities. 
Securities market regulators do not create these standards because of the threat of legislative 
intervention, or increased oversight by the domestic legislature, but because it was the right 
thing to do.5 Securities market regulators also create international securities market standards 
to promote the coordination of national regulatory frameworks between developed financial 
                                                 
5 Communicated by Michael Mann who stated, “there was definitely criticism from Congress that this was a 
priority but I do not regard that as pressure. The only pressure I recall was to do the right thing.” Michael 
Mann, 2012  
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centers. Securities market regulators do so because differentiated national regulatory 
frameworks threaten the interests of investor protection (as was the case in the creation of 
IOSCO’s international credit rating agency standards) and the stability of developed 
securities markets (as was the case in the creation of IOSCO’s international hedge fund 
standards). This highlights that securities market regulators create international standards 
because it is in their principled professional interests. 
 
Domestic legislatures play an important role in establishing the perimeter of international 
financial standards. This thesis has highlighted the importance of pre-existing statutory 
authority in creating international financial standards. The decision to regulate previously 
unregulated financial market actors rests in the hands of domestic legislatures who are 
responding to domestic political pressures. In the case of IOSCO’s international credit rating 
agency standards, IOSCO’s Technical Committee created IOSCO’s Code of Conduct to 
establish an internationally consistent regulatory regime for rating agencies that took in to 
account the U.S. and E.U.’s preference for the indirect regulation of rating agencies. 
IOSCO’s international hedge fund standards were only created after dominant hedge fund 
jurisdictions had indicated their willingness to directly regulate hedge funds. This has been 
highlighted by a number of domestic scholars.6 This thesis provides further evidence for this 
perspective within domestic politics literature. Furthermore, this thesis highlights the role of 
statutory authority in acting as a mechanism of control over securities market regulators and 
draws greater attention to how securities regulators are constrained by their domestic 
counterparts.  
 
This thesis also reveals that states become involved in international securities market 
standards when they feel that the international financial regulatory institution is not doing 
enough to promote the implementation of international securities market standards. 
Consistent with Simmons’ argument,7 states strengthen the international regulatory regime 
when they perceive that the costs of under-regulated financial markets outweigh the costs of 
establishing stronger institutions to promote compliance with international financial 
standards. This thesis also draws attention to the fact that states use other, more senior 
                                                 
6 Pagliari 2013; Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2011  
7 Simmons 2001 
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international financial institutions – within which they exercise greater control – to achieve 
this.8  
 
This thesis also makes two important contributions to PA theory within IO literature. First, 
this thesis analyzes the “black box” of regulators’ preferences when regulators are acting 
within the zone of discretion. As Chapter 2 discussed, existing PA theory presumes, rather 
than analyzes, the preferences of regulators within international financial regulatory 
institutions. This thesis has analyzed what caused regulators to create international financial 
regulatory standards whilst acting with the “zone of discretion” granted to them by domestic 
legislatures. In doing so, this thesis reveals that regulators are acting in their principled 
professional interests when they create international financial standards. Furthermore, as 
Chapter 4 highlights, securities market regulators resisted creating IOSCO’s Methodology, even 
though doing so would increase the authority of IOSCO. This counters the hypothesis of 
existing PA theory that IOs or securities market regulators are driven by their bureaucratic 
and material interests. This demonstrates that the transgovernmental network of securities 
market regulators is driven by their principled professional interests to create and strengthen 
international securities market standards.  
 
Second, this thesis has re-introduced the concept of multiple agents in PA theory. Kenneth 
Arrow first introduced the concept in the 1980s. Arrow’s analytical concept states that 
multiple agents are used to overcome hidden-information problems and to ensure agents act 
consistent with the principal’s interests. This thesis has used the concept to explain how 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee was subject to pressure from the finance ministries of the 
G7 to create IOSCO’s Methodology to improve the adoption of IOSCO’s Principles.  
7.4 Conclusion: Future Research Agendas 
This project also suggests a number of research agendas. First, this thesis has limited its 
empirical analysis to four international securities market standards. There are a number of 
                                                 
8 This does not provide an exhaustive list of what role each political actor plays or their interests in the creation 
and strengthening of international financial standards or international securities market standards. Instead, it 
provides a list of some of the roles and motivations of each political in the creation and strengthening of the 
four international securities market standards this thesis has analyzed, and provides a basis to understand other 
international financial standards. 
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important international securities market standards that this thesis has not analyzed. An 
analysis of these financial standards, which fell outside the scope of this thesis, may reveal 
new and important political dynamics. For instance, IOSCO has produced a number of 
reports and international standards for OTC and non-OTC derivatives markets including: 
IOSCO’s Report on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products that analyzed how to improve the 
regulation of OTC derivatives,9 Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivative 
Markets,10 IOSCO’s Report on Trading of OTC Derivatives,11 International Standards for Derivative 
Market Intermediary Regulation,12 and Requirements for Mandatory Clearing,13 amongst others. 
Helleiner’s analysis concludes that OTC derivative market standards have been driven by the 
domestic competitiveness concerns of U.S. and E.U. politicians following unilateral increases 
in financial regulatory demands.14 This highlights new domestic political drivers in the 
creation of international financial regulatory standards. Similarly, these international 
standards have been monitored and overseen by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
written in concert with the BCBS and Committee on Payment Settlement Systems (CPSS). 
This highlights that there is likely to be (at least to some extent) a multiple-agent relationship 
between securities market regulators, banking regulators, the FSB and the G20 process.  
 
Second, this thesis has made an initial step towards defining the “bureaucratic culture”15 of 
securities market regulators to explain the creation and strengthening of international 
financial standards. This thesis has focused on the principled professional interests that 
securities regulators pursue, in order to promote financial stability and integrity in their 
respective domestic securities markets.  This does not encapsulate the entirety of the 
“bureaucratic culture” of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators.  
 
Although it is outside the scope of the thesis, the research project revealed that an important 
part of the “bureaucratic culture” of securities market regulators is that they are traditionally 
trained in law. In comparison, banking regulators and central bank governors are 
                                                 
9 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2009d  
10 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2011b 
11 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2011c 
12 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2012a  
13 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2012b 
14 Helleiner Forthcoming 
15 Nelson and Weaver 2013, p. 9 – 10 
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traditionally trained in macro-economics. Securities market regulators have viewed the 
regulation of securities markets through the lens of contractual relationships between parties 
to ensure the stability and integrity of domestic securities markets. By their own admission, 
this may have led securities market regulators to overlook systemic risk in securities markets 
prior to the 2007/2008 financial crisis. IOSCO’s Technical Committee produced a report 
titled, Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators. The report states the following:  
 
“The primary emphasis of the Principles is on comprehensive disclosure and 
market discipline, backed by regulatory oversight, to protect investors and 
enhance confidence. They also emphasized the role of business conduct 
regulation and corporate governance in protecting investors and addressing 
any misalignment in the interests of managers and investors. The Principles 
recognized the importance of systemic risk and the role of securities 
regulators in preventing and mitigating such risks. Nonetheless, one of the 
lessons of the crisis is that securities regulators, among others, generally paid 
insufficient attention to systemic risk.”16 
 
Future research could further analyze and conceptualize the impact of this and other aspects 
of securities market regulators’ “bureaucratic culture” on the creation and strengthening, and 
nature of international securities market standards. 
                                                 
16 Technical Committee of IOSCO 2011d, p. 8 
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